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I.

THE THEOLOGICAL PROFESSOR INSTRUCTED.

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On Friday evening, October 20, 1899, in Santee Prayer Hall, Lancaster, Pa., Rev. George W. Richards was inaugurated professor of Church History in the Theological Seminary of the Reformed Church in the United States. The important event took place in connection with the annual meeting of the Eastern Synod. The members of Synod, the visitors from far and near, and citizens of the community,—all present were made to feel that the inauguration of the new professor was an event of more than ordinary solemnity and significance. It does not exaggerate the importance of the event to regard it as an epoch in the history of the Theological Seminary, and in the history of the Synods under whose government the Seminary stands. Three addresses were made on the occasion, which, by order of Synod, have been published in pamphlet form for free distribution.

The inaugural address by Professor Richards by this time has generally been read by the ministry and laity of the church with no less interest than it awakened at the time of its delivery. The high commendation which it then called forth, because of its comprehensiveness, scholarliness and perspicuity, has doubtless

been confirmed by the larger audience to whom the address has been presented in printed form.

But it is not the address *by* the professor to which I would now direct special attention, but rather the address *to* the professor. On the occasion referred to, two addresses were spoken directly to the professor, which were of peculiar significance, for the reason that they voiced the instruction and the authority of the Synod which commissioned the members of the Inaugural Committee to speak and act in its behalf.

Both addresses were characterized by the same devout and earnest spirit, and followed the same broad, liberal lines of thought, contributing alike to the unity and harmony of the solemn services. One of the addresses was given by Rev. Mr. More, in connection with the administration of the oath of office. He enjoined upon the professor-elect, who, "as student and pastor, had proven himself wisely conservative and bravely progressive, circumspect as well as aggressive," that on assuming his new office he should be mindful of the spirit and attitude of the Church to whose authority he was amenable.

"The Reformed Church, holding firmly to the eternal principles which underlie all sound doctrine and rightful practice, finds little difficulty in casting off worn-out theories and customs, and she readily adapts herself to the requirements of all times and places; to the needs of all classes and conditions of men. This priceless quality is hers because she makes proper account of historical development." * * * She expects them (the professors) to be men of studious habits, who with untiring zeal will search the records of the past; men of sound critical judgment who will make a just estimate of the value of these records as affected by the circumstances in which they were produced; men of ready and open mind, who, without bias or prejudice, will accept the truth from whatever source it may come; men who are frank and fearless in presenting the results of their investigations, so that the students under their care, becoming thoroughly rooted and grounded in a sound philosophy of the history of the Church, may know what attitude to assume towards the many and often

conflicting tendencies which affect the historical development of the present, and determine the character of the Church in the future."

Next, I direct special attention to the address given by Dr. Calvin S. Gerhard, chairman of the committee. His message was delivered in the form of a four-fold charge. Dr. Gerhard rose to the great occasion, uplifted by the responsible office committed to him by the Synod, and by the need of the hour. The address, though brief, was comprehensive, profound and clear, and was spoken with the accent of authority and conviction. Every sentence gave evidence of careful study and prayerful thought.

From beginning to end the address was invested with the solemnity of a charge from the Church to one, yes, to all of her theological instructors. It was, moreover, an interpretation, setting forth the treasures of the past in the full light of the new day. It was a summons to the professor to use all the freedom which belongs to truth; to teach the truth obtainable from whatever source, and to adapt his teaching to existing needs. He warned the professor against the errors of rationalism, dogmatism and ecclesiasticism. He bade him to allow no barriers to obstruct the pathway of truth and progress, even though they appear in the form of traditional beliefs and biblical interpretations which bear the authoritative seal of doctrinal standards.

Lest these statements may be supposed to be drawn from unwritten thought between the lines of the address, I shall reproduce with substantial, if not always literal, accuracy the instruction as given by the chairman of the committee.

The more direct charge was preceded by a few general statements touching the responsibilities and opportunities of the professor of Church History at the present day. "The shackles of traditionalism are broken. There is wonderful activity and remarkable progress in all departments of learning. The Baconian method of acquiring thought has been pushed to perfection. Facts are sought after and allowed to tell their own story. This gives the feeling of liberty to the student, and enkindles enthus-

iasm as nothing else can." Then follows the four-fold charge. "I charge you first of all: Stand fast in the liberty wherewith Christ has made the study of history free. Be true to the facts. Be not afraid to go to the sources, and to examine for yourself what you there may find. Do not be content to read history according to a theory, however good and venerable it may be. Tradition has always two elements, one of strength and one of weakness. It endeavors to conserve the past, which is right, but in trying to do so in the face of progress and advancing knowledge, it becomes narrow and one-sided, and therefore false." * * * "The theory of Church History which was adequate for all necessities, even twenty-five years ago, will no longer answer to-day. In Church History, as well as in all other departments of knowledge, the dogmatic standpoint has given way to the scientific. The question of first importance is not now how to marshal the facts of history so as to fit the Church's doctrine of God, of the Trinity, of the Deity of Jesus Christ and of the Holy Ghost. Church History, like the Bible, dare not be made a thesaurus of proof-texts to hold up dogmas and to prove dogmatic assumptions, however important and true these may be. It is the business of the historian to make an honest effort to get at the facts of history and then let them tell their own story. * * *

"I charge you in the second place: Be true to the Bible. This you cannot do by being jealous for, and continually talking about its inspiration and infallibility. To honor the Bible properly it must be for you an emancipated book, needing no support outside of its own inherent strength, embodying a literature as real and natural as that of any other people, but a literature throbbing with the life of God." * * *

"Impress your students with your reverence for the sacred book. Show them that it is of such priceless value in your estimation, that you dare not allow yourself to falsify it, either by approaching it in the spirit of bibliolatry on the one hand, or of rationalism on the other." * * *

"I charge you again: Be true to the Heidelberg Catechism. Do not try to make out of it something which it is not. Do not

assume that it gives adequate expression to the theology of the sixteenth, seventeenth, eighteenth, nineteenth and every other century." * * * It is a work of art; a piece of literature; perhaps the best of all the catechisms of the Reformation period. Be true to it. Make the student feel that you are perfectly frank, and that you know that you can do them the best service, and at the same time the catechism, by showing them clearly what it teaches, and by calling attention to the larger truths into which the theology of the Reformed Church has grown." "He is not a true friend of the standards of the Church, who demands a slavish submission to their theology; for the letter killeth, the spirit only can give life." After referring to the enduring truths of the catechism, its scheme and arrangement, he adds: "It is not a mould into which the thought of the Reformed Church was cast once for all to be fixed forever, and therefore lifeless, but the historic product of the piety, learning and devotion of the best religious life of the Palatinate in the age to which it belongs, and therefore of lasting value to the Reformed Church which adopted it as its confessional standard."

"Finally I charge you: Be fearless in defending the truth as it is in Jesus. Let it authenticate itself to your soul. Live in constant fellowship with Christ and His revelation. See that you have the courage of your convictions. You need not, and should not be rash, but you cannot perform your duty unless you are above all fear. Love Jesus Christ, love the truth, love your calling, love the students. There is no fear in love. Perfect love casteth out fear. You may sometimes be misunderstood, misrepresented, persecuted. But if these things come upon you, rejoice that you are counted worthy to suffer with Christ."

What gives special significance to the charge, as delivered by the chairman of the committee, is that it is an official utterance. The speaker would not have presumed in his own name to have thus defined the responsibilities and duties of a theological professor.

The four-times repeated "I charge you," carries with it the authoritative instruction of the Synod. Viewed in its specific

relation to the immediate occasion, it was the voice of the Church, which is the director and guardian of theological training. But the charge means much more than that. It is a message of the Church and of the present age to all who would assume, or have assumed the function of theological instruction.

Dr. Gerhard spoke as one familiar with the theological beliefs of former times, appreciating what was true and good in the religious thought and life of the fathers, but discerning also the incompleteness and imperfections of the Old Faith. But he spake at the same time as one familiar with the changed conditions and the new and increasing demands of the present age. For the new wine there must be new wine-skins. The past, with its treasures, shall be cherished; but its standards and methods may not be regarded as an adequate measure and guide for the advanced thought, and the larger truth of our own age.

The specific terms which the chairman of the committee employed in his charge, doubtless, in his own thought were designed for the largest possible application. What he says to the Church Historian, he would say to the instructor in every department of theological science.

Be not bound to any man, or system, or method. Be free to follow truth, which alone can make free. Assert the truth, vindicate it, contend for it, whatever the effect may be upon former beliefs and theories. Faith unsettled by truth, is a far more valuable possession than a faith settled upon beliefs, from which the life and light of truth have departed. Do not adjust your teaching to past theories, but to present needs. To this end, "get at the facts and let them tell their own story." Face the new facts with candor, and welcome them into the realm of knowledge. In the presence of newly discovered facts, and in the increased light of the new day, let old theories be tested, reconstructed, and, if needs be, overthrown. Let your chief concern be to teach and advance the truth at whatever cost.

Be true to the Bible. It is a literature which "throbs with the life of God," and yet a literature "real and natural." Honor the Bible as an "emancipated book"; emancipated from bondage

to dogmatism and traditionalism, from "theories of inspiration and infallibility." Do not falsify it by approaching it in the spirit of bibliolatry on the one hand, or of rationalism on the other. It is a record of divine revelation, written by the hands of men. As such it bears the imprint of the spirit of God, and shows no less certainly the stamp of the mind of men who were influenced by modes of thought and the limitations peculiar to the times in which the several books were produced. That one may have a true insight into its aim and purpose, and a right understanding of its saving truths, he must ever keep in mind its divine character, and seek to apprehend its spiritual content by a heart illumined by the spirit of God. But reverence for the Bible must not be allowed to repress thorough scientific investigation of all the facts pertaining to the history of its origin and times, and of the interpretation of its varied contents. The theological teacher who would base his instruction on the Bible must know first of all what the Bible is. Its proper spiritual content cannot be rightly discerned apart from the literary and historical elements which have so largely entered into its structure. Theories of the Bible and methods of interpretation must be conditioned by the new light of advancing knowledge. In the light of modern science, in the light of biblical criticism, old theories of the Bible are being reconstructed; some of them are being overthrown. But the Bible stands; stands more securely than ever before, because its nature and purpose are coming to be more and more clearly discerned. They are not the truest friends of the Bible who, with boastful devotion, claim to defend the Bible by immovable adherence to old theories. To be true to the Bible all the facts concerning the Bible must be told. To conceal the facts is to obscure the truth of the Bible. The history, science, ethics, theology contained in the Bible, must be studied in the light of the times which produced them. To read back into the Bible the advanced scientific knowledge and ethical standards of our own times is to falsify its teaching.

But, it may be asked, do not the changed conceptions of the Bible tend to the undoing of the doctrinal systems which have

been constructed on the traditional notions and interpretations of the Bible? What of it! Systems of theology which have sprung out of a certain theory concerning the Scriptures and a certain method of interpretation, if the theory and method be found wanting, must be reconstructed conformably to the truth of the Bible, and in accordance with a more correct hermeneutical principle.

As the truth of the Bible is not impaired by the overthrow of defective theories of the Bible, neither is the truth of theology crushed in the wreck of theological systems. To the contrary, in both instances there may be the liberation and advancement of truth.

This leads to the consideration of the next important principle announced in the charge.

"Be true to the Heidelberg Catechism." "While of lasting value to the Reformed Church which adopted it as its confessional standard, it is not a mould into which the thought of the Reformed Church was cast once for all to be fixed forever" * * *. "Do not try to make out of it something which it is not." Do not assume that it gives adequate expression to the theology of our times. Be true to it. Be "perfectly frank" by showing clearly what the catechism teaches, and then call attention to "*the larger truths into which the theology of the Reformed Church has grown.*" * * *

And this is the charge of a Synod to its theological professor, and professors! It is more than that. It is the earnest call of modern Christianity, a call of the present age, to all theological instructors to be truth's freemen in their use of confessional standards.

The Heidelberg Catechism, which Dr. Gerhard modestly designates as "perhaps the best of all the Catechisms of the Reformation period," may be so generalized as to include all confessional standards which have regulated, or still do largely regulate theological beliefs. Does this mean that the standards must go? Not that. Certainly not unqualifiedly. It means that they shall stand as landmarks in the history of theological thought; that

they be prized for whatever service they have rendered in the past, or may render in the present and future, as guides to religious thought and life. It means that they be used and cherished in so far as they set forth the "fundamental verities of the Gospel"; but, that they shall not be regarded and employed as "moulds into which the thought of the Church has been cast once for all to be fixed forever." To thus use them, is to misuse them. They are not, and were not designed to be, adequate standards for the religious thought and life of our age.

This call from the Reformed Church to her theological professors is altogether in harmony with the spirit of freedom and progress which have been the prominent characteristic of her genius and history. The principle of historical development is thereby announced anew, and with an emphasis indicative of the imperative demand of the age.

The Chairman of the Committee gave expression to the general conviction of the body which he represented, and at the same time voiced what he felt to be a pressing need of the present age. Speaking in behalf of the Synod, he would have theological instruction untrammelled by any system of doctrinal belief. He charges the theological professor to be true to the Heidelberg Catechism by holding to the unchanging "fundamental verities of the Gospel" which it contains, and at the same time warns against its limitations by calling attention to the "larger truths into which the theology of the Reformed Church has grown." A confessional standard which is the product of the thought of the sixteenth century cannot serve as an adequate mould for the "larger truths" of the present century. The Church has outgrown the sixteenth and seventeenth century standards. Their doctrinal statements concerning the nature of God and of man, concerning the relation of God to man, concerning creation and redemption, concerning the Church and the Sacraments, do not adequately express the larger and truer conceptions of our own time. So far, therefore, as a confessional standard of former centuries may hold a place in the sphere of religious thought and life to-day, it is required that it be freely handled and historically

interpreted, that is, in accordance with the character of the times which produced it, and with due regard for the changed conditions and needs of our own time.

The catechism was made for man, not man for the catechism. The letter killeth, the spirit only can give life.

The final instruction to the theological professor is that he be "fearless in defending the truth as it is in Jesus." That is, the truth of all the past, the truth of the present and the future, as it may authenticate itself in the progressive revelation of Jesus Christ. While warned against rashness, he is enjoined to follow and teach the truth with a courage that knows no fear. Would he be faithful to his calling, he must have the courage of his convictions. He may be "misunderstood, misrepresented, persecuted," yet shall he be undaunted and unwavering in his devotion to what he believes to be the truth as it is in Jesus.

This, then, is the charge of a Synod to the theological professor. It is a strong, solemn call to those who occupy chairs in the Theological Seminary to move forward under the inspiration of enlarged freedom, and to contribute so far as they can to the advancement of every branch of theological science.

A theological seminary can be of little, if any value, if used mainly as a museum of religious antiquities, in which ancient dogmas shall be preserved and exhibited by professors, whose chief function shall be to serve as faithful custodians of sacred relics. A school of theology that would prepare men for effective service, must be a school of living thought. Its instructors must be wide awake to the thought and needs of the age, if they would be influential in moulding the thought of the age, and in contributing in any degree to its advancement. Theological science may never be bound by old theories and standards. It should be open to the truth of God wherever revealed: in the Bible, in nature, in history, in science, in creeds which have been formed, and in creeds which are in process of formation. The theological instructor therefore must be a leader in the realm of truth, no less than a conservator of the truth which has come to him as a heritage of the past.

It was because of his peculiar responsibility in relation to truth, the Church, and the age, that the theological professor, on the occasion referred to was so solemnly charged to exercise his trust with frankness, faithfulness and fearlessness.

In the light of the four-fold charge the professor assumed the pledge of office. The terms of the oath, touching the Holy Scriptures and the Heidelberg Catechism, accordingly, are to be interpreted in the light of the Synod's instructions.

In calling attention, as I have done, to the various features of the charge, and in reproducing them in enlarged definition and application, I may hope that there has been no misstatement or misinterpretation of the purpose, thought and spirit of the Synod's message.

Special interest attaches to the charge, not only because it was delivered by the Synod's spokesman in the presence of the Synod, but for the additional reason that it has received the Synod's confirmation.

Without any dissent, the addresses to the professor, along with the Inaugural Address by the professor, were ordered by the Synod to be published in pamphlet form for free distribution.

The Reformed Church in the United States, so far as represented by the "Acts and Proceedings of the Synod," has reaffirmed, and has emphasized anew the principle of freedom and progress which hitherto has marked her history. The "Inaugural Service" stands preëminently for that principle. It teaches an important lesson of the hour which may be wisely applied not only by those who are appointed to teach theology, but no less by those to whom are entrusted the supervision and guardianship of theological instruction.

II.

"LIMITATION OF THE SCIENTIFIC METHOD." A REPLY.

BY R. C. SCHIEDT, PH.D.

The success of any literary or scientific journal does not only depend upon the number of its subscribers, but also upon the lively critical interest which its readers take in the articles contained in the journal. By criticism I do not mean condemnation, but discussion. Discussion among educated men is always tempered by the spirit of toleration, for the end and aim of all education is toleration, or charity. If I do not honor my opponent's opinion by losing my temper, I forfeit the title of an educated man. It is in this spirit that I venture to inquire into certain fundamental statements in two striking articles, entitled "*Limitations of the Scientific Method*" by my honored teacher, the venerable professor Dr. E. V. Gerhart, which appeared in last year's April and October numbers respectively of this REVIEW. Dr. Gerhart defines the scientific method of research to be "the application of induction to the investigation of any realm of existences, whether natural or supernatural, whether personal or impersonal." The trustworthiness of the result depends primarily on the validity of the principle underlying and sustaining the inductive process. "This principle is an *a priori* idea." He maintains that the only adequate statement of inductive logic is that propounded by Sir William Hamilton, viz, the inductive method is that process of reasoning, which proceeds from *all* the parts to the whole, or "what belongs or does *not* belong to *all* the constituent parts, belongs or does not belong to the constituted whole." Dr. Gerhart claims that this method can scarcely be enforced in the investigations pursued by natural science, or in any other department of scientific inquiry: "So long as we do

not know all phenomena or all the individuals of a class we cannot logically infer that our knowledge covers the class as a whole or all the essential properties of a class." In support of this view he cites Professor William Thomson of Oxford who says: "Our confidence in the uniformity of natural laws is embodied in the canon that *under the same circumstances and with the same substances the same effects result from the same causes.* This great inductive principle is itself proved by induction and partakes of the same formal defect that may be charged against other inductive results, namely, that its terms are wider than our experience can warrant. Many groups of facts, connected as causes and effects, have not been examined; and in them it is conceivable at least that there may be capricious causes producing opposite effects at different times. * * * We draw a universal canon from an experience less than universal and then employ it to justify us in drawing other universal truths from other particular experiences." Dr. Gerhart then emphasizes as the principal law of induction "that in every valid inference from the singular to the universal, or from the parts to the whole the facts from which we reason and the universal to which we reason belong to the same class," and applies it to the methods of "many scientists" who "reason from animal phenomena not only to the laws of animal life, but also to the unique constitution of man, assuming in the face of extraordinary generic differentiations that man is an animal." "They relinquish the law of induction and proceed on the ground of an *a priori* conception, assuming that the ape and man are as to kind identical, an assumption which is an *assumption*, not an inference from the personal facts of mankind."

The gist of the argument, if I understand Dr. Gerhart rightly, seems to lie in the assertion that the scientific or inductive method is only valid when applied to each class of phenomena separately, that we cannot apply the results obtained from facts of one set of phenomena to another set of phenomena generically different from the first. Furthermore, the inductive method can only be of value to sound reasoning, if it furnishes all the data necessary

to prove the relation of the part to the whole. In reply to the first point I would say that the great triumph of modern science is the clear demonstration of the unity of nature, reached by the inductive method. The results obtained at first in the sphere of Astronomy and Physics found their application in Chemistry and finally in Biology, not only in the broad, general principles, nay even in specific details applying the data obtained in Physics to those of Biology, as I shall prove later on. The second point is closely connected with the first. When we speak of the relation of the parts to the whole, we clearly discern a decided vagueness in terms. The words species, genus, order, and class represent each one a part as well as a whole. A comparison between swine and sheep is only possible when we consider them as representatives of the same order, they both have the same order-characteristics, they differ in genera and species characteristics, nay even in individual characteristics of each kind, just as one man differs from another. Man is clearly a mammal because he has all the mammalian characteristics, he is therefore an animal like all other mammals. Man clearly belongs to the order of Simiae or Apes because he has the structural characteristics common to all apes, viz, the orbita completely separated from the temporal furrow by a bone septum, a simple pyriform uterus, a discoidal, deciduous placenta and a deeply furrowed cerebrum. These characteristics belong to no other order but the Simiae and from this point of view man is an ape, however much he may differ in the minor family, genus or species characteristics. The scientific or inductive method clearly aims at unification upon the broadest basis and its chief value for modern thought lies in the fact that the leading *a priori* ideas intuitively perceived but not demonstrated in former centuries have been either proved or disproved by its application. However, it may be replied that just herein lies its limitation, it moves within circles. History, I think, leads to different conclusions. The process of deduction had reigned supreme for thousands of years without apparent results when the inductive method slowly but surely took hold of men's reasoning powers, and we have learned

more about the laws of the universe and the position of man in it during the last two hundred years than had been learned throughout all the ages before. Limitation after limitation falls before the onslaught of inductive reasoning, and since we are only in the beginning of the new era, who can tell where it will end? The new method has not removed the old, but it has rationalized it and given it is proper place in the sphere of thought; in connection with it there is practically no limit to it within the sphere of the phenomena, both physical and moral. More and more we discern a close relationship between the laws of the physical realm and that of the moral, spiritual laws in the natural world, just as we have long ago learned that the law of molecular composition and decomposition reigning in the mineral world reigns likewise in the plant and animal world, an inductive discovery which lies at the basis of organic chemistry, and just as we are now assured that there exists no chasm between the plant and the animal world. Limitations there are, they are the characteristics of our finite existence, they call a "halt!" when we venture upon an inquiry into the essence, the absoluteness of things.

To show the progressive character of the inductive method, I may be permitted to touch upon its historical development by way of illustration.

The ancient natural philosophers defined nature from the deductive point of view, they *assumed* certain fundamental principles, from which they proceeded in their arguments. These principles were, however, generally of a doubtful character: fire, water, air and earth played the rôle of elements, an essential difference between the upper and the lower region is assumed and the relation is partly defined as the absolute. The simplest experiments by means of which they could have tested their assumptions were disregarded. Aristotle speculated on the fall of bodies: if the weight of a stone increases ten times the rapidity of its fall must likewise increase ten times, experiment, however, teaches that all bodies fall with equal rapidity to the ground. The difficulty with deductive reasoning therefore lies in the establishment of the fundamental principles. Fundamental principles

may constitute the beginning of an investigation but not exclusively so. The road to the discovery and establishment of fundamental principles is very wearisome, those who travel it, are constantly embarrassed by their self-confessed ignorance and again and again impelled to ask nature for guidance and instruction. Deduction without induction is one of the childhood diseases in the intellectual life of the human race against which the natural sciences waged the first war, entering upon their triumphal march during the middle of our century, when Schelling's philosophy of the identity of subject-object was finally refuted. Yet to this day men prefer the deductive method of reasoning because it merely appeals to the laws of logic, which is so universally and evenly distributed. The difficulty arises with the choice of the moment when deduction is to set in. This choice constitutes an inductive element.

One of the most striking illustrations of the dependence of deduction upon induction is furnished by the *investigation of planetary motion and its results contained in Newton's law.* It is not the problem of a generation, but of centuries, nay of thousands of years, and the last word has not yet been spoken in its behalf. For the purpose of my argument I shall treat it more at length. Let us compare the geocentric view of the older cosmic systems with the heliocentric view of Copernicus. I do not underestimate the progress implied in the change of view; I think, however, that this has not infrequently been overestimated.

As long as the discussion turns only upon *rules*, according to which planetary motion is to take place, we must, from the purely speculative point of view, lay stress upon the relativity of all motion in space, which grants the same rights to both the geocentric and heliocentric theories. A simple mathematical equation permits the change or transition from one view to the other. As long as the establishment of *rules* is only the issue of the question, an æsthetic element, viz, simplicity of description, will decide in favor of the heliocentric view. But certain it is that the Copernican system is also a first approximately correct induction, based upon astronomical observations, and intended to furnish

certain deductive observations, by which the correctness of the rule can be tested, in order to again establish inductively a second stronger and still more correct definition as rule. This second inductive advance was made by Kepler, when he established the three laws named after him—in reality *rules* in the above sense.—1. The planets move in ellipses around the sun which is within one of their focal distances. 2. The radius vector from the sun to the several planets describes in equal times equal areas. 3. The squares of the periodic times of the planets are always in the same proportion as the cubes of their mean distances from the sun.

However, in all these cases we still deal with rules, a deeper insight into the mechanism of the motion is as yet absent, only when this is at hand can we speak of a law. Such an insight is given us by Galileo's law of the inertia of matter; according to him all bodies move, if not externally influenced, in a straight line with uniform rapidity; if they deviate some external cause will account for it, and the amount of influence can be measured by the amount of deviation. From this point of view Isaac Newton studied planetary motion. According to Galileo's principle of inertia the planets left to themselves would permanently move away from the sun—along the tangent of Kepler's ellipses; if they do not some external influence must account for it. Newton's great inductive deed consisted in this that he applied this influence directly proportional to the masses of the sun and the planet, and inversely proportional to the square of the distance of the two, without, however, expressing any conjectures whatever as to how such influence would or could arise.

But now it became necessary to justify such an induction, and this could only be done in the deductive way. First of all Kepler's rules had to be derived from Newton's statements in order to show that Newton's inductive process was in comparison with Kepler's rules a further approach to truth. The squares of the periods of revolution were found to be not quite exactly proportionate for all planets to the cubes of the great axes; the numerical relation between the cube of the great axis and the period

of revolution was not, as Kepler's third rule seemed to imply, proportional to the mass of the sun, but to the sum of the masses of sun and planet; only in so far as the mass of the planets is considered as small, *i. e.*, very small in proportion to the sun, could Kepler's third rule be looked upon as an approach to truth.

Newton's laws solved deductively innumerable difficulties and problems in the sphere of astronomical phenomena, which can hardly be enumerated in a discussion like this. The apparent mysteries so long associated with many established astronomical phenomena disappeared at once, when deduction was applied to Newton's law. I only refer to Leverrier's prognosticon in relation to the planet Neptune, based upon the inductive results obtained from the deviations of the path of Uranus, and demonstrated by the discovery of Galle. Leverrier's later failures, however, demonstrate that Newton's law may not be the last link in the chains of inductions. It certainly was the beginning of that long line of triumphant discoveries which were the results of the inductive method repeated in various classes of phenomena and applying to all alike, viz, the law of the conservation of energy, the theory of the nature of light as wave motion advanced by Huygens, which is only the beginning of a series of inductions, the end of which can hardly be estimated; the introduction of spectrum analysis and its application to all classes of physical phenomena. In short laws and hypotheses, the results of inductions established in the inorganic world at first serve as starting points for all deductions, which must lead to a perfect and harmonious conception of all the manifold phenomena of nature The same legitimate interaction of induction and deduction holds sway in the sphere of organic existence, breaking down the barrier between plant and animal distinctions. I do not consider it essential to a strict scientific method that it should produce all its proof material inductively. Deduction is fully as valuable in the establishment of scientific data as induction, but it is forever dependent upon fundamental principles derived from induction. I shall make this clear by a more detailed discussion of our present knowledge of the relationship between plant and animal life. Dr.

Gerhart says: "If we study both (animal and plant) simply as being each a domain of organized life our facts justify an inference to some universal law characteristic of life, but not a law characteristic of animal life, each being a peculiar order of organisms differentiated from the other." This statement seems perfectly plausible at first sight. Fifty years ago it was generally accepted as a deduction from the facts of natural phenomena known then; it is even to-day endorsed by many as the only correct view. But since that time our inductive efforts have discovered such new facts as have led to new deductions, deductions to be sure for which specific empiric data are not always at hand, but which legitimately, *i. e.*, scientifically follow primary deductions for which such data have been found. This is perhaps one of the most interesting problems of modern science, and in discussing it I shall confine myself to the subject matter as such, leaving it to the reader's judgment to find out in how far my argument rests upon inductions and in how far I rely upon deductions. To separate them into scientific and unscientific methods would destroy all legitimate inquiry.

I may state at the outset that it is one of the most difficult problems of modern science to establish an exact scientific definition applicable to the distinction of plant and animal life. For more than a century we have been contented with Linné's well-known definition given in his great work, "Systema Naturæ" and expressed in the words: "Vegetabilia vivunt, non sentiunt. Animalia vivunt et sentiunt sponteque se movent." In this statement all animals are credited with sensation and voluntary motion while such are denied to the plants. This definition was scientifically faulty inasmuch as it introduces a psychic element not open to objective observation. For we cannot prove that motions are the result of purely independent voluntary determinations. The same is true of sensation. Of course it depends altogether on what we mean by sensation. If we define it as vital irritability, viz, the power of an organism to respond to external or internal stimuli by the generation of a certain amount of vital energy, we must ascribe it to every plant, because

there is none which does not respond, at least to a certain degree, to the influences of light or water or chemical agencies. If we define it, however, as a psychic act or as an act of consciousness we encounter the same difficulty as we do in the consideration of voluntary motion. For, since we have no knowledge of the consciousness of other organisms with which we cannot communicate by means of language, we cannot ascertain, whether in the organism, ascribed to the animals or plants, a reaction resulting from some stimilus has been preceded by a conscious condition or not.

However, the considerations which led to the abandonment of Linné's definition, were of a different kind. They were based upon facts which contradicted the great botanist's statement. Some sixty years ago the Vienna botanist Franz Unger published a treatise under the startling title: "Die Pflanze im Momente der Thierwerdung," in which he communicated to his astonished cotemporaries his observations on one of those primitive plants which under the name of Green Felts are familiar to everybody as the green, dense, felt-like masses covering wet soil or dripping rocks or other similar localities. The particular species which he treated was the *Vaucheria clavata*. He described, how from the minute green, hollow filaments of this water alga little lumps of a living substance, containing chlorophyll and provided with cilia, emanated, how they moved about in the water by means of these cilia, how they carefully avoided foreign bodies, exhibiting alternating moments of rest and of motion "nach Willkür."* After these structures had enjoyed the warmth of the sunlight for about two hours, they moved towards shady spots, there to become again sessile and to grow into long filaments. Since that time similar phenomena have been observed in the so-called zoöspores of numerous plants, all belonging to the lowest class of plant life and including the green scum on our ponds, houses and trees. These observations have led to the conviction that the motions of these plant structures and their reaction to chemical, mechanical or light stimuli are essentially not different from those

* *Franz Unger.* Die Pflanze im Momente der Thierwerdung, 1843, p. 93.

of the lowest animals. The criterion of sensation and voluntary motion is therefore not sufficient to differentiate between plant and animal life among those forms which belong to the border land of the two kingdoms.

In the meantime another view had developed relative to animal and plant life, which seemed to furnish ample recompense for Linné's incorrect definition. The foundation for this view had already been laid inductively during the last century by the Anglo-American chemist and preacher Priestley. He had proved that animals will suffocate under a glass bell as soon as they have used up all the air, but that they are capable of living on in the same closed space, if a fresh, green plant is inclosed with them. However, many years passed before the real cause of this startling phenomenon became known, when it was scientifically proved that the animals inhale oxygen turning thereby the carbon of their food and of their own body into carbonic acid gas, while the plant consumes carbonic acid gas giving up a part of the oxygen thus gained. This discovery led to the bold generalization, centered in the statement: the plant is an organism of reduction; the animal one of oxydation. And since in every reduction kinetic energy becomes latent and chemical potential energy is generated, while with every oxydation potential energy changes into kinetic energy, the plants were defined as organisms generating potential energy, in which, as it were, a spring is wound up as in a watch; the animals on the other hand as organisms in which potential energy is changed into kinetic energy, the spring unwinding itself again. Moreover, to the plant was attributed the exclusive ability of assimilation and synthesis, while the metabolic process of animals was in the same way defined as disassimilation or decomposition of plant compounds.

This doctrine of an antagonistic dualism existing between animals and plants was announced during the first decades of our century by Boussingault, Dumas and Liebig meeting partly through the influence of these famous names and still more so on account of its apparent plausibility with universal approval. Even to-day we hear it taught in the class-room by physiologists

of repute, although sufficient data have accumulated which demonstrate that the doctrine is no longer in harmony with established facts. It has been most conclusively proved that plants, when not exposed to the sun-light, consume oxygen and give up carbonic acid gas just as animals do; it has, furthermore, been established that plants without chlorophyll as well as those parts of green plants which are free from chlorophyll retain this type of so-called animal respiration during their whole life-time; besides, no one, familiar with the subject, any longer doubts that even animals are capable of changing carbohydrates rich in oxygen into fats poor in oxygen, *i. e.*, that they likewise are reducing agents changing kinetic energy into chemical potential energy. But the tendency to compile and systematize the empiric material is so intense, that very many, and among them even the Puritans of exactness, prefer to shut their eyes to some few obstinate facts rather than give up their comforting and much cherished system.

But even though the recognition of the incorrectness of the old dualistic doctrine has not yet penetrated the general consciousness, its criteria can no longer be applied when it is to be decided whether a doubtful species belongs to the animal or plant kingdom. Modern text-books enumerate, therefore, a whole list of doubtful middle forms, viz, Amœbæ, Myxomycetæ, Flagellata, Diatomaceæ, etc., which the Zoologists classify as animals and the Botanists as plants. Other investigators again maintain that there exists no definite distinction between plants and animals, while Professor Heackel has even gone so far as to establish a neutral interregnum for doubtful forms. This procedure has, however, not removed the difficulty, because it does not allow a sharp line of distinction between plants and "protists" (as Haeckel calls the interregnum) on the one hand and between protists and animals on the other, the determination of every protist would always lead to the legitimate inquiry as to wether it belongs to the more vegetable or the more animal protists. All this goes to show that the old criteria are utterly insufficient.

The discussion assumes quite a different aspect when we view the relation between plant and animal from the standpoint of the

most recent metabolic theories. The vital processes of all organisms, whether plant or animal, depend entirely upon the composition and decomposition of those complicated atomic combinations, which constitute their living component parts. These combinations or protoplasmic molecules of plants and animals necessarily possess an analogous chemical structure because they employ in either case the same three groups of alimentary substances in their synthesis, viz: protein, hydrocarbons or fats and mineral substances. These materials are not only in the animal derived from the food or the reserve food stuffs and employed in the construction of protoplasm, but the fungi likewise grow and thrive in a liquid which contains peptones, sugar and mineral substances. Moreover, we know by experiment or inductively that the digestion and assimilation of animal bodies and their proteids finds its extensive application in the higher plants, *e. g.*, in all insectivorous plants, viz: the sundew, pitcher plant, flycatcher, etc. Finally, analysis has proved again and again, that wherever germs, whether plant or animal, grow at the expense of reserve food stuffs, *i. e.*, in eggs and plant seeds, the above mentioned three groups are always present. Having therefore sufficient proofs which show that these substances are employed in the construction of new protoplasmic molecules in plants and animals alike, we necessarily conclude deductively that synthesis and assimilation cannot be ascribed to plants either exclusively or predominantly, because animal protoplasm derives its complicated chemical units from simpler food and reserve stuffs in exactly as is the case with plant-protoplasm.

Deductively, it has been established that protoplasmic molecules possess either very little or no oxygen at all; thereby a whole series of formerly obscure processes has been elucidated, viz, the great desire for heat among all germinating organisms, the preference for carbohydrates among the inhabitants of the tropics, for fat among the ice dwellers, the specific respiration of fatty plant seeds, fermentation, anaerobiosis, etc. But, if the protoplasmic molecules contain but little or no oxygen at all, then it becomes necessary that not only the carbonic acid gas assimilated

by the green plants and the nitrates, sulphates and phosphates to be employed in the structure of plant photoplasm first lose their oxygen, but also the carbohydrates, fats and proteids which serve in the construction of animal protoplasm must be deprived of their oxygen. Therefore every new formation of protoplasm implies the presence of kinetic energy and the formation of potential energy or form of chemical force, no matter whether this protoplasm belongs to a plant or to an animal.

But just as we ascribe to the chemical units of animal protoplasm the same capacity for synthesis as to those of plants, so must we likewise ascribe to all protoplasmic molecules a high degree of chemical oscillation. These extremely unstable molecules separate under the influence of the least touch, but the affinities thus set free enter immediately upon a new combination with the separated atoms of the surrounding oxygen, generated at the same time a large amount of heat. We see then that not only in animals but also in plants complicated combinations, poor in oxygen, are destroyed in order to give rise to simpler products richer in oxygen, proving that all organisms change potential energy into kinetic energy.

Furthermore, kinetic energy does not merely appear in form of heat vibrations when the unstable protoplasmic molecules break up, it also performs a certain amount of mechanical work, when in the process of growth new layers of cells are interposed between the older ones; mechanical potential energy is thereby accumulated which would, if at any time from any cause the interposed parts should decompose again, lead to a contraction of the separated parts and thus set free mechanical energy. Such contractility must be ascribed to plant protoplasm no less than to animal protoplasm, finding its visible demonstration in the amœboid motion of certain gelatinous fungi, in protoplasmic motion as such, in the locomotion of swarmspores and of vegetable monocellulates, in the pulsation of their vacuoles and finally in the various movements of multicellular plants, *e. g.*, in the closing and opening of the leaves of oxalis. But since a decomposition of unstable protoplasmic molecules never arises spon-

taneously, being always caused by external influences, either by direct stimulation of the molecules or by transmitted oxydative decompositions, we must conclude that such a thing as spontaneous or automatic motion does not exist either in plants or in animals. And even where vital motions seem to create the impression of spontaneity, a closer investigation will always reveal the presence of stimuli, the beginning of which lies for various reasons beyond the ken of our observation.

Since, then the two fundamental phenomena, determining every expression of life, are attributable to plants and animals alike, since on the one hand in animals and plants protoplasm is formed and developed by assimilation of food and reserve-footstuffs, thus producing potential energy; and since, on the other hand, the destruction or decomposition of the protoplasmic molecules in both organisms leads to a transformation of the accumulated potential energies into the various forms of kinetic energy, we conclude that *the actual differences between animals and plants so striking, especially in the physiological accomplishments of the higher forms, are only differences of degree in the two elementary processes of decomposition and composition of the living substance.* Can these differences inductively be fully established? Not all protoplasmic beings possess the same active power of assimilation. The plants, generally speaking, are able to assimilate simple but highly oxidized compounds, the animals are not. While, therefore, the animal protoplasm can obtain its carbon, nitrogen, sulphur and perhaps also its phosphorus only from carbohydrates, fats, proteids and nucleins, the plant assimilates directly such combinations as urea, glycolide, asparagin, nitrates, sulphates and phosphates, ammonia and even atmospheric nitrogen. This difference in assimilative power is undoubtedly due to the greater complexity of the animal protoplasmic molecule.

It would require an enormous amount of nitrogen atoms for the building up of analogous molecules, which can be much more readily obtained from compounds like peptones, in which the nitrogen atoms are numerous and analogously arranged than from ammonia or nitric acid molecules, which would necessitate

a regrouping of atoms. More important, however, than this hypothesis is the simple fact that all organisms of undoubted plant-nature are capable of assimilating simple compounds of carbon, nitrogen and sulphur, while all other organisms of undoubted animal nature lack this ability. If plants and animals could be divided upon this basis the criterion of difference would be found. But what would we do with the doubtful forms, which seem to form the bond of union?

Moreover, this different assimilative ability of animals and plants suggests another important conclusion in reference to the difference in the decomposition products of the two organisms. It has been stated above that the nitrogenous atomic combinations of the decomposing protoplasmic molecules are partly employed in the form of albuminoids for purposes of growth. But what becomes of the simpler nitrogenous combinations? They are directly assimilated by the plants, not by the animals; they need special apparatuses to expel these compounds as well as the sulphur and phosphorus compounds from the body. Here, then, would be another criterion between plant and animal life; the plant changes simple nitrogenous compounds into the various alkaloids, *e. g.*, nicotin, morphin, strychnin, etc.; the animal expels them from the body. However, even this difference is only one of degree, it is simply a difference in the degree of molecular stability, which is less in animals than in plants, demonstrated by the fact that inactive decomposition predominates in plants over active decomposition. This is due to simplicity of structure. The plant is rich in structures, which no stimulus can irritate and poor in differentiated organs for the reception of stimuli without which an active protoplasmic decomposition is not possible. And yet the degree of this difference is so gradual from the lowest plants to the highest animals, that in the so-called transitional or middle forms, *e. g.*, in the common Flagellate Euglena viridis of our ponds, the two processes seem to come to a standstill; for no one has as yet ventured to ascribe to it a one-sided classification either among animals or plants. The same is true of the Volvox and the Pandorina, also very common forms.

These beings have all the properties of plants and all the properties of animals. If thus the cause for the greater stability of vegetable protoplasm is to be sought in its simple structure in its smaller atomic weight and in the rather insignificant dimension of its chemical units, the difference between plants and animals must be explained from the same point of view. This by deduction leads inevitably to the conclusion that the primordial organisms of our earth possessed a vegetable character. Since we can trace the highly complex molecules of present-day organisms back to simpler forms, which during millions of years developed from gradually simpler forms, and since it is clear that these molecules enjoyed less opportunity for assimilating complex foodstuffs the farther back we go, it becomes clear that these primordial organisms with their simpler protoplasmic molecules and their ability to assimulate simpler chemical compounds should be classified among the plants. Our present organisms have, therefore, not developed from the members of a neutral kingdom of Protists, but from primordial plants or Protophytes.

Following this process of thought we conclude that the primitive chlorophyll plants as well as the primordial animals arose at about the same time from a common stock. Of course the primordial plants must have already possessed the ability to obtain their carbon from the atmospheric carbonic acid gas, because this was at that time the only source of carbon, but it is utterly impossible to assume that these organisms should have had from the very beginning the same highly complicated chlorophyll apparatus, especially so since there are plants living to-day without chlorophyll which possess the power of assimilating carbonic acid gas, as demonstrated by the famous digestive experiments of Salkowski with the yeast-plant. But as soon as the complexity of the protoplasmic molecule had increased in one part of the organisms to such a degree that the ability to assimilate carbonic acid gas and other simple compounds was lost, it was but natural that the possessors of these protoplasmic structures, which now had acquired the character of animals, more and more felt the need of substances which they could assimilate, especially such as

were free from nitrogen, because the increasing complexity of structure resulted in an increasing instability of the molecules and of the irritability of its component protoplasms. The result was necessarily an increase of active decomposition, and since this is closely connected with the oxydation or combustion of the non-nitrogenous atomic groups, the need of non-nitrogenous, organic assimilative material became necessarily larger for the animal organisms. It could no longer be supplied by the assimilation of carbonic acid gas on the part of the pale primordial plants. The appearance of the first chlorophyll plants at the same time assumed the function of assimilating the constantly increasing quantities of carbonic acid gas, furnished by the actively decomposing protoplasmic bodies, while on the other hand the nitrogenous excretions of the latter, having lost all value for them on account of their inability to digest them, served the new purpose of constructing the protoplasm for the new chlorophyll plants. Thus the possibility for an energetic growth of green plants arose; these in turn furnished through the inactive decomposition of their protoplasm constantly larger quantities of non-nitrogenous reserve foodstuffs and thus abundantly supplied the evergrowing desire of the animal organisms for non-nitrogenous food. In this way most likely arose the wonderful mutual relationship between animals and green plants which controls our modern world of organisms.

I have so far endeavored to prove that the most profound characteristics belonging to plant and animal life are one in kind, controlled by the universal law of metabolism. They only differ in the degree of complexity. The difference in the complexity of structure, however, nowhere offers insuperable obstacles to the scientific investigator who is familiar with the storehouse of unrefutable inductive facts furnished by anatomy, palæontology and embryology and understands their relation to the factors of environment, natural selection, adaptation and inheritance. To him the physical differences between animal and man are of much less consequence than those between plant and animal; if he once understands the latter the problem of the former is solved. Dif-

ferences in cranial capacity are differences of degree existing, broadly speaking, between reptile and mammal no less than between the highest animal and man.

The limitations of the scientific method are to my mind not coincident with the border lines of classification. Imperfect and insufficient data are characteristics of the youthfulness of the method, time will remedy such defects. The data at hand warrant the discovery of the missing links. I feel that Henry Drummond has even demonstrated in his "Natural Laws in the Spiritual World" that there are bridges leading over the broad chasm between the realms of the natural and the spiritual. It is only when the scientist denies the existence of spiritual phenomena because his imperfect data do not warrant such a conclusion, that he places arbitrary limitations to the inductive method. He will learn to his dismay, when he has passed the limits of the natural phenomena, that all lines of induction meet in the crowning law of the spiritual world, the law of love.

III.

CHRISTIANITY IN THE SPHERE OF THE PRACTICAL.

BY A. E. TRUXAL, D.D.

"In His Steps," by Rev. Charles M. Sheldon, has proven itself to be one of the most popular books of the century. Not less than six million copies of it were sold last November already. Its circulation is not limited to the United States, many copies having been sold in England, Germany and other countries. The question at once arises, why is it that this little book has everywhere struck such a responsive chord? There must be a reason for this. The burden of the author's contention, put in the form of a story, is that christianity ought to be applied to the believer's every day life; that it ought to exercise a controlling and governing influence over the person's course of conduct in every relationship in life; in other words, that our holy christianity ought to be the regenerating and regulating power in society in general as well as in the life of the individual.

The book assumes that the condition of things in our country, christian land as it is, is not what it ought to be. There seems to be too much difference between the worship of the church and the works of the church. The members in the church sing:—

> "All for Jesus, all for Jesus;
> All my being's ransomed powers;
> All my thoughts and all my doings,
> All my days and all my hours:"

but, says the author by the mouth of one of his characters, "it seems to me there's an awful lot of trouble in the world that somehow wouldn't exist if all the people who sing such songs went and lived them out." And again he says, "it seems to me sometimes as if the people in the big churches had good clothes and nice

houses to live in, and money to spend for luxuries, and could go away on summer vacations and all that, while the people outside the churches, thousands of them I mean, die in tenements and walk the streets for jobs, and never have a piano or a picture in the house, and grow up in misery and drunkenness and sin." The contention of the author is that the members of the churches, including the ministers, are not actualizing the principles of their religion in their various callings in life. And the avidity with which his book has been sought and read indicates that the correctness of its position is very generally acknowledged. And to our mind it is a hopeful sign, a fact full of promise, that the christian public is arriving at a more or less clear consciousness that there is something wrong in the present condition of society. Until it is sensibly felt that an evil or defect really exists no efforts will be put forth to correct it. The admission that things are not what they ought to be in the christian household is the first essential condition of improvement. Therefore it is a cause for rejoicing that Mr. Sheldon's book has received such extensive circulation and met with such general favor.

It is undoubtedly being felt ever more keenly that the Christian religion has not penetrated, as a regulating and moulding power, into all forms of society. It has been too much a matter of churchmembership and worship only. Men and women enter the churches, make their confessions, sing and pray with much emotion and earnestness, and dedicate themselves to the service of the Lord. Church buildings are erected, congregations gathered, educational and charitable institutions established and liberally endowed, Home and Foreign missions prosecuted with great vigor and various kinds of church work carried on with much enthusiasm. Let all this be spoken in praise of modern christianity. But one very serious thing is lacking. The various forms of wordly activity have not been brought into subjection to the religion of Jesus Christ. The relations which men sustain to each other in the complex constitution of society are not regulated by the principles of the gospel. The discontent which prevails among large portions of the people in every civilized and christianized

nation, the Anarchisms, Socialisms ond Secularisms as we have them in these latter days, are, as an able writer* lately has said, but the symptoms of a diseased society. There is something radically wrong in the body of humanity among us. Religion is to correct this wrong, to heal this disease. But it has not done so yet, and it has not done so because it has not been applied. Some may indeed say that the church has nothing to do with the affairs of society, that it is the business of the christian state to correct any wrongs that may exist in the social compact. But if even this be admitted it will surely not be denied that the church is related to the state and owes a duty to the state. And the church has withheld her instructions and admonitions. Religion has been too much confined to worship and works of charity. And it is not charity that men in these modern days want so much as it is the formation and regulation of the affairs of society on such a basis that they will be able to provide for themselves and for the necessities and comforts of their families. Merchants and business men of all kinds, doctors, lawyers and editors, corporations and employers of men in general, legislators, judges, governors and presidents, all need to learn that they ought to prosecute their avocations and perform their works in obedience to the demands of christianity. Wordly enterprises, business, government and all ordinary social relations ought to become permeated by religion. When this has once been accomplished many of the ills by which society is afflicted will be healed. And there seems to be a feeling among men everywhere that the churches have failed to press religion upon the various affairs of society. Dr. Fairbairn in his latest work speaking of the condition in England says, "We have suddenly become conscious that our legislation and civilization have been too little penetrated by the spirit of Christ, while so pervaded and dominated by the spirit of selfishness, that they have been making heathens faster and more effectually than the churches have been able to make Christians."† The consciousness seems to be growing on all sides that the dif-

* Dr. A. M. Fairbairn: Catholicism, Roman and Anglican, p. 6.

† Catholicism: Catholic and Anglican, p. 3.

ferent forms of our civilization are largely wanting the spirit of Christ. This does not, however, mean that the present condition of affairs is worse than it was at any time in the past. The world in a general way is getting better from age to age, our civilization is improving gradually in every respect. But a new consciousness is arising in the hearts of men. The conviction among the masses is growing that religion ought in someway be the means of relieving them of their necessities and of bettering their condition in this world. If religion is good for the world to come it ought to be good also for the present life. The Kingdom of of heaven, it is felt, ought to come here and now.

Mr. Sheldon's book is a product of this conviction, and it proceeds to show how a change for the better may be introduced. The work belongs to modern theology in the sphere of the practical. It is altruistic in spirit and aim. Altruism, Professor Fiske says, is an ugly word but expresses an important truth. All the prominent movements in practical church work of the present day are inspired with this idea. The late Professor Henry Drummond, of Glasgow, carried the thought to a paradoxical extreme when he said that a christian is not one whose great effort is to save his own soul and get to heaven when he dies, but rather one whose supreme effort it is to save the souls of others, though he lose his own soul thereby.* The book before us is based on the duty which the christian owes to his fellowman and society. That he may come to a knowledge of his duty in every case it proposes that he shall consider the matter in the light of the question "What would Jesus do in the case?" The proposition is that every believer in every position in life, in all his dealings and acts, shall determine his course only after a prayerful consideration of the above test question. The author illustrates by a number of assumed examples the great changes that would be wrought in the lives of christians and for the betterment of society if this principle of action were generally adopted. We believe the general position of the author to be correct and good. It would be a blessed thing if believers

*See his address, "what is a christian?"

were to make it a rule to act in accordance with the question "What would Jesus do?" A marked improvement would soon be effected in church and state, in religion and public morals. Not that there is anything essentially new in the proposed principle of action. Christians have long since been exhorted to do the will of God in all things. They have also been taught to act prayerfully and conscientiously before God and always do the right. In each case it would be doing the same that Jesus would do. But the form of the principle as submitted by Mr. Sheldon is the best. The matter is put before the mind in such clear, tangible, practicable form. The christian who adopts it cannot easily rid himself of its demands. Though we do not agree with the author in every particular as he works out his principle into actual results, yet we accept it as a good working principle for every follower of the Lord. We doubt the advisability of having members of a congregation bind themselves together by a pledge that they will govern themselves by the proposed test. That would be too much of a church within a church. But we believe that it ought to be laid on the conscience of every christian that it is involved in his confession that he do in every case what Jesus would do if He were in his place.

But, as the author also sees, difficulties would arise in determing what Jesus would do in particular cases at the present time. Times have changed so much since the day of Christ. Social customs have been revolutionized. Society has in all respects become so very much enlarged and complicated. Circumstances and conditions in the United States in the present century are altogether different from those in Palestine, among the Jews, when Jesus dwelt on earth. Hence it is possible that Jesus did some things then that He would not do now if He dwelt among us. For example, he made wine at a marriage feast. Would He make whiskey or beer now? The thought is monstrous. Other particulars will suggest themselves to the reader. How then shall the believer know in the present day what Jesus would do in his case? Mr. Sheldon answers, and we believe correctly, that he must base himself on the promise that the Holy Spirit

shall guide him into all truth. That promise is as true for the believer of the present and every day as it was for the apostles and early christians. If on the basis of the general principles of God's word and in the light of the teaching of the church, the believer humbly surrenders himself to the Lord and sincerely prays for the illumination and guidance of the Spirit of truth and then acts in accordance with the dictates of his conscience he will do that which will bring peace to his soul and meet with the divine approval. For other than that he cannot do.

But would not each one then become his own judge as to what is right and wrong? And would not different persons come to different conclusions in regard to the same matter? And would not endless confusion of action come to prevail in the household of believers. These questions are legitimately raised and we will consider them under one topic. And in the first place we say, yes, each one must be his own judge in the light of the test question as to what he shall do in any case. Jesus is the only Lord of his conscience. And nothing dare come between him and his Lord. This is the spirit and position of protestantism, and we believe of the gospel too. Personal responsibility is one of the leading tenets of the protestant church. The Roman church claims to be the mother of believers and regards it as her province to tell them what they shall do. The protestant church, however, acts rather as a teacher to properly enlighten and instruct believers, and then refers them to the Lord their God to Whom they must answer for all their doings. Each one is under responsibility to do what he believes in his conscience to be right before God. Protestantism does not allow anything to come between the believer's conscience and his God. But is it not the teaching of protestantism that the Bible is to be the believer's judge; that he must needs obey the scriptures; that they are to direct him what to do; that they are his only rule of faith and practice? The scriptures are indeed of immense value to the christian. They are the divine means for enlightening his mind and heart, for bringing him to a knowledge of God and His Christ, of His Kingdom and the principles that rule therein, of

his duties and privileges in relation to the Lord and His Kingdom. But his own mind and conscience must discern what the scriptures say to him. It is only when the voice of God in the scriptures unites with the voice of God in his conscience that he comes to a real knowledge of what the scriptures reveal to him.* So that in the end he becomes through his enlightened conscience his own judge again. And as a consequence it often becomes just as difficult for him to determine what the scriptures require of him as it is to decide what Jesus would do. And as a matter of fact an endless diversity of opinion is held as to what the Bible does teach in regard to christian faith and morals. But this confusion in the judgment of conscience is the evidence of living personal faith on the part of believers and is certainly to be preferred to sameness of faith and practice brought about by some external authority which has a tendency to destroy the individual conscience. Besides in the sphere of morals the diversity of conviction of duty would not likely be very great if each one were honestly and prayerfully to consider the question what would Jesus do? The confusion would be more imaginary than real.

We note another question. Is it not more important to ask what *did* Jesus do, than what *would* He do? For what He did do we may at least in a measure learn from the scriptures, whereas what He would do must always be largely a matter of conjecture. We do not think that the two questions in this inquiry ought to be placed in opposition to each other. They are not antagonistic. As a matter of course no one can form an intelligent opinion as to what Jesus would do in any case unless he had a knowledge of what Jesus was and did in the days of His flesh. And the more one knows of Him and the better he understands the spirit and

* "The Bible never was to protestants an authority in the same or even kindred sense with that in which Rome was an authority to Romanists. The difference comes out in the most manifest form in the so-called principle or doctrine of private judgment; which means that the Bible was, by its very nature, not a body of formal *ex cathedrâ* determinations, but, as it were, the home and source of the material that was to be determined by the living Christian spirit, as illumined and guided by the indwelling Spirit of God—the *testimonium Spiritus Sancti externum* sealed by the *Testimonium Spiritus Sancti internum*." Fairbairn's Catholicism, p. 235.

principles of His life, the better will he be prepared to answer the question what would Jesus do now? This knowledge he must obtain from the Bible, especially from the New Testament. But what use is he to make of this knowledge, or how is he to apply it? He is to follow Christ. But how is he to follow Him? Does this mean that he is to adopt the modes and customs of life according to which Jesus lived and do in an outward way what He did? Some pious people answer this question in the affirmative. They claim that we ought to learn what Christ did and how He did it, and then endeavor to do the same things in the same manner. Some piously hold that the right place to be baptized is the river Jordan because Christ was baptized there. Consistency would then demand that John, the Baptist, is the proper person to perform the act, for he baptized Jesus. The general application of such a principle leads to folly. Jesus was a Jew and from first to last submitted to the requirements of the Jewish law. Must we therefore do so too? Jesus conformed to the social and religious customs of the people to which He belonged. He lived as they lived, ate, drank and clothed Himself as they did, and observed the amenities of life as they then existed. Must we therefore recline at the table, eat the Lord's Supper in an upper room, greet each other with a kiss, wash each other's feet and do the numerous other things that He did which now would be incongruities and anachronisms? That principle when consistently applied throughout leads to a reductio ad absurdum. But perhaps the effort ought to be made to do as nearly as possible what Jesus did. We think not, for the very effort would be based on a false principle. It is not outward forms we are after. Christianity does not consist in such externalities. It is not like unto a cold lifeless statue, chiselled out perfect in all its outward details, that may be conveyed in its external completeness to all the nations of the earth down through the ages through all the various grades of civilization. But christianity is spirit and life, and to follow Christ is to adopt and absorb into our souls the spirit and life of Christ and to practice the principles by which He was actuated. Our efforts must be to

make His virtues our virtues. These then will assume such outward forms as are in harmony with the degree of civilization in which we live and in conformity to the customs of the people to which we belong.

When we study the life and character of Christ there are three questions that confront us. They are, what? how? and why? First it is necessary to know what He did; second, how He performed His works, that is, the manner and form of them; third, why He did what He did and employed the forms He used. The why rests upon the motives that prompted Him and the motives grew out of the virtues of His soul. His virtues, His principles of action, the spirit by which He was actuated, these are our examples to be imitated and made our own, and these are the only things of His life that we in reality can imitate. Among the fundamental characteristics of the person and works of Jesus were the following: Foremost of all was His love for the Father in Heaven. This He manifested by His obedience to the will of the Father and His faithfulness to the business that was entrusted to His hands. The test by which the disciples were to estimate their love was given them in the words, "If ye love me, keep my commandments." Judged by this standard we must say that Jesus cherished a supreme love for His heavenly Father, for He kept the commandments of God to the full extent. And He also manifested His love for the Father by the worship which He rendered unto Him. He performed His devotions to Him on the Sabbath and on feast days, in the temple and in the synagogue, and privately in the desert apart or on the lonely mountain's side. Now then we walk in the steps of the Master, not by striving to imitate His doings in a formal, literal way, for that would require us, among other things, to keep the Sabbath day holy instead of the Lord's day, and to use the same liturgy, order of worship, that was employed in His day, but by adopting His principles of action; by loving the Father in Heaven and showing our love by keeping His commandments and doing His will, by keeping holy the day sacred to the worship of the Lord and His Christ, by strengthening ourselves through frequent com-

munions in private prayer to the Father in the name of Christ, and by striving faithfully to carry out the mission laid upon us from heaven. Literally it is impossible for us to do the same things He did or to do them in the same way. But His principles we can and ought to practice under the forms made necessary by the conditions in which we live and serve the Lord.

It seems superfluous to say that Jesus loved His fellowmen. He devoted His life to their welfare. He ministered unto their necessities. He came not to be ministered unto but to minister unto others. He lived, labored, suffered and died for the salvation and blessedness of his brethren. His heart seemed always ready to overflow with love and mercy. Rich and poor received His blessing. He forgave the sins of the penitent, fed the hungry, comforted the sorrowing, healed the sick, raised the dead and encouraged all who came unto Him to rise to a life of purity and righteousness before God the Father. We cannot do the same things Jesus did, but we can perform such works of beneficence as are called for in our circumstances, and we can minister unto the well being of others as we have opportunity and ability, and aid them in their efforts to live lives of faith and devotion. And by so doing we follow in the steps of the Master.

Jesus always did the right regardless of the consequences. He was in no sense a time-server. It is true He often exercised prudence and wisdom. But He never swerved from the right, the true and the good, out of fear of evil consequences to Himself personally. Two events of His life stand out prominently as indicating His attitude in this respect. These are His temptation at the beginning of His ministry and His soul-struggle in Gethsemane at the close of it. In each case after a severe trial with all the consequences clearly before His mind He determined to do the right according to the will of the Heavenly Father. In the temptation He was confronted by the Zeit Geist which offered Him the comforts, luxury and glory of the world; but He decided to be true to His mission whatever self-denial and humiliation might follow. In the garden He said to the Father, "Thy will be done," though He saw before Him unrighteous

condemnation and cruel death. In like manner ought His followers carry out their convictions of the right before God regardless of the consequences. One of the prominent weaknesses of christians of modern times, perhaps of all times, is that they allow themselves to be influenced too much by custom, by the ways of the world, by ease and luxury, and not definitely and positively enough by what they conceive to be the right.

The actions of Jesus viewed in the light of the times, circumstances and conditions in which He lived were reasonable. His works are not characterized by arbitrariness. God Himself is the absolute reason and the source of all the powers of reason possessed by His creatures. The reason comes from God and in its way manifests God. The reason seeks the truth and the truth leads to God. God evidently acts in accordance with the postulates of reason lodged in His Being. Jesus as the full manifestation of God on earth must necessarily be reasonable in all His gracious words and blessed works. We, therefore, regard His miracles even as having a rational basis, though in our present limitations we may never be able to grasp it. Any construction put on the words and works of Christ, that would make them contradict the postulates of reason, we believe to be incorrect. Those who would therefore follow Christ must also be reasonable in their words and works. We certainly cannot hold that if Jesus were present now He would demand of us that which would in the premises be entirely unreasonable. Our duty is determined by our present circumstances and conditions, by our modes and customs and life, by the condition of society in general as it now prevails, and by the ideas of the right and the good as these have been developed. And the forms of our worship and works cannot be determined by the incidentals and accidentals of nineteen hundred years ago. Moreover some things that were essential to external forms then would not be essential now.

So that viewing the subject from every standpoint we are forced to the conclusion that it is our duty to investigate and study to the full extent of our ability both what Jesus said and did for the purpose of obtaining a correct conception of His character and

principles of action, and then in the light of this knowledge seek to do what we believe that He would do if He were in our place.

But does not a serious danger lurk in this position? For where then is the common standard for the regulation of men? Will the children of men not be at sea with respect to their faith and morals without chart or compass to guide them? Such danger there is that always goes with individual liberty. There is always a risk involved in laying the responsibility of righteousness upon the individual. But what else is to be done? There is only one alternative, and that is the position of Romanism, namely, that it is the province of the church to teach the follower of Christ what to believe and do. In that case the believer goes to the church for direction and guidance and casts the responsibility of his faith and conduct upon the church. And for anyone who can satisfy his conscience in that way Romanism is undoubtedly the most comforting religion in the world. It gives rest to the soul but it is the rest of death. It is largely destructive of individual character. And it cannot satisfy the minds and hearts of those who have been stirred up to a sense of their personal responsibility before God. But it may be said that the Bible is the common standard of faith and morals for the Protestant. There is a sense in which this is true, but in the sense in which the statement is frequently made it is not true. It is not true that the Bible furnishes the christian with a clear and definite system of rules and forms for him everywhere and at all times to practice. If such were the case we would not be confronted by the diversified beliefs and the various practices as these obtain among those who claim to follow the teaching of the Bible. The fact of the matter is the Bible does not contain a systematic presentation of divine truth. It is rather a book of *facts*. It is like unto the vegetable kingdom with its various kinds and forms of vegetable life, from the largest tree to the tiniest moss, all intermixed with each other, spread out before us. There is no system about it. But the botanist discovers the principles and laws by which vegetable life is developed and maintained, systematizes it and sets it before us in families, species and specimens. In like manner

throughout the biblical books of history, prophecy and poetry are scattered in a promiscuous manner many and various facts and precepts, all more or less divine, some more human than divine. The teaching of the Bible must be disentangled and studied as a whole. And as these facts belong to the sphere of religion and morals it is more difficult to systematize them than those of any material kingdom. By taking them in a disconnected and unrelated form one can prove almost any position. Slavery, Mormonism, Divine Healing and every other abnormity of religious faith and practice, each appeals to the scriptures in defence of its position. All this but shows that men may have an erroneous conception of what the Bible in reality is and may make an improper use of it. The Bible must be studied for the purpose of apprehending the Spirit that dwells in it, the general principles underlying its teaching and the laws that are operative in the kingdom of divine truth. These then become a common standard by which the christian in every age must regulate his life as a member of the kingdom of the Lord.

The teaching of the Bible and the practice of its precepts from age to age produce a general christian consciousness that is broader and deeper than the individual and carries with it informing and authoritative power that no believer can ignore even if he would. This christian consciousness comes to expression in the consensus of faith, in limited ways through the creeds and confessions of the churches, in international law and the laws of christian nations, and in general ideas of right and truth as these have found lodgment in the household of faith. Here the believer finds a standard for his guidance in faith and morals. But this standard does not exercise an external authority over him. The general consciousness is a real authority only when it becomes articulated in the christian's own consciousness. What is everywhere and by all christians believed and done is possessed of authoritative power, but the individual will submit a proper obedience to it only to the extent that he feels in his own soul that the common faith and practice represent the right and the truth. After all, God is the ultimate authority for the believer,

and his idea of God and his faith in Him constitute the regulative force of his life. Truth, as representative of the divine mind and will, is our guide in all things. Christ represents authority for the conscience and reason not because arbitrary power dwelleth in Him but because He is THE TRUTH. He is the personification of truth, and through His words, works and life the truth is revealed.

The conclusion, then, to which the discussion of this matter leads us, is, that the problem by which the christian church is confronted at the present time is the introduction of religion into the everyday life of the believer and into the various departments of society. The spirit of Christ needs to be more effectually infused into our civilization. Religion has been so much confined to the churches and church work. It needs to be united with the affairs of the world; not that religion is to be secularized but that the secular is to be christianized. The kingdom of heaven is to be established on the earth, and all the interests of man are to be comprehended in this kingdom. The will of God is to be done in all things. It may be said, however, that this thought is chimerical, that the undertaking is impracticable, that the world is so full of ignorance, selfishness and sin that it would be vain to attempt to mould the world's life by the power and principles of religion. But our faith in God and our conception of His character and purpose compel us to believe that human society as well as the individual is to be christianized, and that consequently the efforts of the followers of the Lord are to be directed to the accomplishment of this end. The process from the human point of view is a slow one. It always has been slow. But the kingdom of God is coming, and will come. "But forget not this one thing, beloved, that one day is with the Lord as a thousand years, and a thousand years as one day." But with us one day is not many. Our life on earth is but a span. It behooves us, therefore, to be diligent in our day and generation that we may do our part in the great work of the Lord, and in order that we may be effectual in our efforts we ought to determine our conduct and actions in every relationship in life by the question, "What would Jesus do if He were in our place?"

IV.

THE ETHICS OF AMOS.

BY REV. A. ZIMMERMAN, B.D.

There is such general agreement in regard to the time in which Amos, in obedience to the divine call, went to the Northern Kingdom to deliver his message to Israel from Jehovah, that it is not necessary to enter into a discussion of this question. There is no doubt that Amos preached during the reign of Jereboam II. of Israel, or more exactly about the year 760 B. C., with a possibility of being a few years earlier or later.

It is also well known that during the reign of Jereboam the kingdom of Israel extended its borders and entered a new era of material prosperity. Owing partly to the former devastations of war and the general apathy resulting from a period of decadence, and partly owing to the sudden outward prosperity and the neglecting of the cultivation of a corresponding inner life, this period is also known as one in which morality was rapidly declining and the religious life was correspondingly low, while at the same time the outward ceremonies of religious life were scrupulously performed, and to these men appealed as if this was all that was required of them.

During this time Amos was sent to the Northern Kingdom to awaken it out of the slumber into which it had fallen. He obeyed the summons, and preached an ethical doctrine which is still worth our while to investigate. Of course he did not limit himself to ethical teaching, yet this appears very prominently in his discourses. The ethics of a nation is closely related to the religious and social life of that people. And although religion does not consist in a moral code, yet it is of little or no value to a people when it does not lead them to a pure fount of ethical

instruction and life. For this reason, perhaps, Amos laid such great stress on the morals of the nation.

Amos had been a herdman and a dresser of sycamores, laboring in the region of Tekoa. In the wilderness life of the prophet there was nothing to inspire within the breast of the prophet such an advance on the thinking of the nation as regards morals and religion. Nor is it supposable that these ideas came to him as the result of his rugged life. He must have had some source of knowledge and inspiration. They could not have arisen spontaneously within him without some previous knowledge of ethics on which he could build. It seems to me to be no fancy or mere imagination to suppose that Amos had access to some form of revelation common among the people among whom he lived and to whom he preached. Even if it is admitted that the Law of Moses was not reduced to writing at this time, we are not warranted to conclude that there was no ethical and religious instruction in Israel and Judah at the time in which Amos lived. But we are not ready to admit this. The sermons of Amos presuppose more than the admission would warrant. But on the other hand it need not be claimed that the Pentateuch in its present form was in the hands of Amos. He knew the past history of his people, both morally and religiously. The opportunities and the corresponding responsibilities were plain to him. The requirements of Jehovah were the basis of all his preaching. But these requirements were not of recent date, but had been known to Israel for some time.

It is therefore only proper to suppose that Amos had access to some forms of religious instruction as it was carried on before his time. These could not be void of ethical elements. These ideas shaped his own. In all probability the associates of the prophet shared his views at least in a general way. His ideas of morality were the birth of ideas previously taught. And because of his advanced thinking, he was ready to bring to the nation out of his treasure things both old and new.

We are also to remember that Amos did not live such a great distance from the great market-centers of Judah and Israel. It

was not such a hazardous nor arduous journey from Tekoa to Samaria and other markets of the Northern Kingdom. And it is only natural to suppose that he would market the produce of his labor. The wool from his sheep, the sycamores which he prepared, these were taken to the market where there was a demand for such products. So he had ample opportunity to study the morals of Judah and Israel as he would move among the people on these business trips. He would detect that which was detrimental to the nation. Then in conversation with different people he would learn what he had not the opportunity to observe himself. The corruption which he saw and about which he heard so much would naturally lead a more pure soul like Amos to long to do something to stem the inflowing tide and the outflowing tide of moral corruption. Now that he is called to go and appeal to the people that they forsake their evil ways and follow after that which they know to be purer and better, he obeys.

I. Ethical Ideas Relating to Foreign Nations.

It is noticeable that Amos is not narrow in his ethical ideas. He applies them to foreign nations as well as to Judah and Israel. With him ethical laws are not only to be observed by a select few, but they apply to every one. True, the standard of measurement is different in Israel, than among any of the foreign nations. Yet they are not free to do as they please, but are to give an account of their doings.

Damascus had "threshed Gilead with threshing instruments of iron," and thus displayed a wonton and inhuman brutality. She had swept down upon the people of this community, and, though it be in a time of war, it is still inexcusable to treat the captives in the conqueror's hands with unnecessary cruelty. Here there is a case not of ordinary cruelty even, but a case of laying aside all compassion and feeling for fellow men, though of another nation, and inflict upon him the greatest cruelty, and treating him with the greatest barbarity that can be devised. It is this that Amos holds up before his hearers and points to as a

great transgression against even the fundamental laws and requirements of morality. The morality of a people has sunk indeed very low when they have no compassion, no bowels of mercy. They evidently went farther than their calm and better judgment would allow them to go. Their innate ideas of humanity, rude as they may have been, would testify against them whenever they permitted this sentiment to rise within them and give its unbiased testimony.

Gaza had "carried away captive an entire captivity" and not only in the usual way of reducing people to serfdom, but with the avowed purpose "to deliver them up to Edom." The great transgression did not consist in reducing these people to the position of slaves, but in their engaging in the slave-trade in a wholesale manner. It may be taken for granted that Amos was not in the least shocked by the idea of slavery. Nor is he to be understood as laying down a protest against this institution. He no doubt acknowledged the propriety of slavery. But even slavery has principles underlying itself which it must respect if it is not to be censured, even in an age of slavery. Amos no doubt had ideas in regard to the ethics of slavery, but not nineteenth century ideas. The practice of taking whole populations and selling them to another nation for mercenary ends is what Amos condemns. Here is a wrong. Here is a flagrant injustice. Here is the fruit of decaying morals and of a still more decaying religion. There is rottenness at the core. But Gaza must not think that she can escape the doom to which her transgressions have been leading her. Decaying, she must die.

Even as Gaza, so also had Tyre "delivered up an entire captivity" and in addition had not "remembered the covenant of brethren." Thus Amos sees in Tyre all the moral guilt that he exposed in the case of Gaza. The guilt of Tyre is further increased, in that she had established a treaty with a neighboring nation and had not remembered the agreement of brethren when she delivered to Edom this whole captivity. She had voluntarily entered into an international agreement and had as voluntarily and arbitrarily set it aside when she saw other interests arise

from another quarter. This is a moral wrong. And Amos declares that this guilt shall not go unpunished. This, like all moral offenses, is to be reckoned with in another form some day. The making of treaties and the breaking them at pleasure is the result of wrong practices and the outcome of perverted reasonings. The ethical ideas of Amos require that all treaties between nations are to be respected and held sacred until changed in proper order.

In the case of Edom the moral guilt is of a somewhat different character. He pursued "his brother with the sword, and corrupted his compassions, and his anger did tear perpetually, and he kept his wrath forever." In the statement that Edom pursued his brother with the sword there is not only an evil intention implied but a brutal mistreatment of that brother. In so far he did wrong to another. Instead of cultivating fraternal relationship and acting in accordance with the more humane feelings that are moving the heart and are appealing to men more or less strongly at all times, evil intentions were harbored, and animosity was engendered within his own breast. Instead of cultivating the feeling of pity and compassion, these feelings were corrupted. In so far as these feelings were harbored a great wrong was done themselves. The feeling of anger was nurtured. The more it was nurtured, the more did his anger "tear within him perpetually." This is the ground for the condemnation pronounced upon Edom. Here moral principles, even if of a very elementary character, were grossly violated. And because of the violation the consequences of the evil could not be stayed perpetually. Since they have been weakening themselves they shall be unable to resist the enemy when he shall appear with avenging fire.

Ammon is severely criticised for his rudeness to, and cruel treatment of defenseless and helpless human beings. The treatment which pregnant women received is shameful in the extreme. This evidences a very low state of moral sense. And Amos draws attention to the fact for this very reason. Morally a state of affairs exists here for which no excuse nor reasonable apology

can be offered. Where such moral degradation is found the vitality of moral and spiritual life is fast ebbing away and the clouds of judgment are gathering already above the horizon.

Moab has been guilty of a great insolence to the dead. Instead of respecting the bones of the dead king of Ammon and leaving them lie in peace, they were treated with insolence. Not that we have here anything similar to cremation, but it was an act that was prompted by sheer meanness. To burn the dead was considered an insult, and because it was so considered this course was taken. There is however a moral principle involved. It was not a question of right or wrong with Moab; but it was a mere question of vengeance. This is a violation of common innate morality. The common sentiment among the nations was against the act. The idea that was violated was one of benevolence and honor. And on moral as well as on religious grounds Amos condemns this act as wrong. And because it was wrong, its fruit would follow in its footsteps.

We thus see that Amos was not narrow-minded, that he was no bigot. But we also see that he looked farther than to the surface. He looked into and investigated the motive in so far as that was revealed in the act. He does not call these nations to account for misdoings other than those which their own sense of right and wrong would dictate. He is not measuring them by the high standard of right as seen in the revelation to which the Hebrews had access. Yet he holds them to a standard just as real and just as valuable and trustworthy as far as it goes. Cruelty and brutality in the treatment of men; the deportation of people into captivity for mercenary ends; the disregarding of treaties established; the quenching of the sense of pity and the permitting of anger to strike deeper roots; brutal treatment of pregnant women and heaping of insults upon the dead; these are some of the things wherein they have blunted their moral sense and have transgressed the moral law written within themselves. The principle may be elementary, but the transgression is just as real as it is where higher laws are transgressed by a more refined people. While it is true that Amos has so far only treated

very elementary principles, he has set them forth as vital principles. While the ethics so far taught is rudimentary, it nevertheless goes down to the bottom of human society and human relations. It is after all an ethics of a high order.

II. Ethical Ideas Concerning Judah.

When Amos reaches Judah we notice a decided change in tone and spirit. Here he leaves the plane of natural ethics or of innate moral laws and steps out into the broad field of revelation. Judah has had advantages which these other nations have not had, but this very fact puts him also under obligations which cannot justly be required of those not so favored. When Amos speaks concerning Judah, as well as later against Israel, his tone and spirit enter more the domain of religion than had been the case heretofore. But this is only so because Amos knows no religion without a corresponding morality, nor a morality without being based on religion. These go hand in hand. He does not try to differentiate and say, here is morality and there is religion. Morality is with Amos a part of religion as religion is inseparable from morality.

While the prophet does not enter into the details of the moral condition of Judah as fully as into that of Israel, he gives us sufficient to see that Judah was not as religious as he pretended to be nor as refined in morals as they tried to make themselves believe. Amos tells us that Judah "rejected the law of the Lord, and have not kept His statutes, and their lies have caused them to err, after which their fathers did walk." While they had a Torah from Jehovah which was meant to help them in their personal as well as national life, yet they had rejected this Torah. Though Jehovah had given them statutes which they should observe that their life might draw from a more pure fountain of truth than that from which other nations drew, and that their religious, social, and moral life might be on a higher plane, yet they did not keep these statutes. But more than this. They not only neglected to be guided by Jehovah, their lies caused them to err which they concocted and walked in them as if they were the

truth. They lived in the darkness of lies rather than in the light of Jehovah's Torah. And here there is material for pure ethics as well as for a good religion. It is man's duty to follow after the highest and best within his reach, and turn his attention away from those things that so easily beset him, lest he lose the one and gain nothing in its stead. The moral no less than the spiritual law requires this of him. Judah failed to appreciate the importance of this requirement. Revelation only enforces the truth and sets it in a new light, but it does not add to its authority. It can only make known and seek to impress what is true on other grounds, though on account of our shortsightedness we may not be able to discover the basis for that which is revealed. The moral light of Judah was, therefore, more flagrant because they had positively refused to walk in the revelation that had been made known to them, and had also allowed lies to deceive themselves.

III. Ethical Ideas Concerning Israel.

Since Amos was sent with a special message to Israel, he deals more fully with the ethical situation of the Northern Kingdom than with any nation previously mentioned. And this we should naturally expect. In the discourses as we have them in the prophecy of Amos light is thrown on the social life to such an extent that we not only can see the moral depravity of the nation, but we can also see the position which Amos took over against these practices in Israel. From his sermons we can ascertain the thoughts of Amos on those different moral problems that confronted him in his work of reformation as well as the nation in its progress towards decay and dissolution or establishing itself on the rock of truth as contained in the word of revelation which it already possessed. Either of these courses was open to the nation. The moral situation has become so critical and the religion so imperilled that these alternatives were clearly set before the people. Immorality and irreligiousness had become the cancer of the nation. The cut must be deep. And Amos deals with the problem most manfully.

a. Ethics of Perverted Judgment.

Justice and judgment are essentials in good government. They are concomitants of good morals and true ethical culture as well. But here in Israel where they had, as well as in Judah, the Torah of Jehovah, the statutes of their God, so that they might be better able to pronounce a correct sentence and establish justice because of its own merits, the courts of justice were perverted and were used as instruments of oppression. Instead of justice the prophet finds injustice prevailing to an alarming extent. No doubt that he witnessed the perversion of justice himself. This would be no difficult task. As he would sojourn among the inhabitants of Samaria or some other city, he had ample opportunity to observe the progress of trials. They would seem to him as mere mock-trials. All but universally they would result to the advantage of the rich and the disadvantage of the poor and needy.

"They have sold the righteous for silver," says the prophet. The case that should have been settled on its own merits was decided on the basis of silver and gold. Those who sat in the gates to pass judgment and grant justice in man's dealing with man, preferred money to justice. In that they "turn judgment to wormwood, and cast down righteousness to the earth" they have been blunting their moral sense and have also taken the right out of the hands of the needy and gave the advantage to the unscrupulous and the more influential. Amos sees the unjustness of such a method of procedure, and condemns it in unequivocal language. He cannot compromise the matter in the least. He prefers the right to popularity and applause.

Judgment is mostly perverted because of their system of bribery. His language in regard to this matter is plain. His hearers certainly understood his meaning. "Ye that afflict the just, that take a bribe, and that turn aside the needy in the gate," is a very vivid picture of a scene often to be witnessed in the gates of the cities of Israel. The moral effects of bribery were clear to Amos as they are to men of all times who have their eyes open to the importance of a pure moral standard of life. Even in these days we often have opportunities of seeing the re-

sult of such conduct. Amos unbares the truth so that they might be more thoroughly impressed with the wickedness rampant in the land.

But Amos does not only teach his ethics negatively; he proceeds positively as well. He exhorts his hearers to "hate evil, and love the good, and establish judgment in the gate." This is that at which he aims. He points out the evil of the present course of life and shows that there is something better and nobler. Nothing is gained by taking bribes and perverting judgment, while on the other hand much is lost. If they will forsake their past ways and hate the evil and love the good and actually establish righteousness in the gate in all their proceedings, "it may be that the Lord God will be gracious to the remnant of Jacob."

Instead of turning the needy aside because they are in a helpless condition; instead of withholding justice from the poor; instead of turning "aside the needy in the gate" as is now the almost if not the universal practice, Amos points Israel to a better method, showing true moral culture and worthy ethical ideals, in that they should "let judgment roll down as waters, and righteousness as a mighty stream." Under such a system the whole nation would be uplifted because the center of national life would be purified. Here we have before us the fullness of ethical principles as they swayed within the breast of Amos and moved him to speak and to spare not.

b. Ethics of Oppression.

During the time of prosperity in which they had been living the wealth of the rich increased still more rapidly, and with the increase of wealth the desire for still more increased also. The rich became richer, and with their riches also more independent of the laboring class. On the other hand the poor became poorer, and as their poverty increased they were more dependent on the wealthy for their daily bread. The wealthy class became more aristocratic, and began to oppress the poor more and more and make exactions which had not been made before. Privilege after privilege was taken from them. Rents were increased in their

greed after wealth. So extreme was the situation that the prophet summons the Philistines and the Egyptians to assemble "upon the mountain of Samaria" in order that they might bear testimony concerning the "great tumult" and concerning the great "oppressions in the midst thereof." These nations which had far fewer privileges and opportunities to cultivate good ethical tastes and establish moral practices were to lift up their voices protesting against the oppression in Israel and testify to its moral decline. This reminds us of the appeal of our Savior to the Sodomites and the Ninevites who should rise up against the generation of His day and condemn it.

Oppression had gone to such an extent that the "needy," were sold "for a pair of shoes." So little did they respect the rights of the lower class. The rich in their pride and arrogancy were storing "up violence and robbery in their palaces." Even those actually in need did they "turn aside," yea they were "swallowed up," and the aristocrats "caused the poor to fail in the land." In their weights and measures they were as unjust to the poor as in their meting out of justice. The "epha small" and the "shekel great," the "balance of deceit" so that they might have an opportunity to "buy the poor for silver and the needy for a pair of shoes," and sell the refuse of the wheat: these were practices that offended the moral sense of Amos. This was as displeasing to God as it was ruinous to man. There was no justice in it. No humane feelings were displayed by such treatment. But we find even more than this. Even the very clothes of the poor were "taken in pledge," for security. There seems to have been no end of greediness and oppression. Amos exposes this condition of affairs that he might teach them a better and more humane way of dealing with the poor and the needy of the land.

Amos condemns these practices and teaches that every man has certain rights which others should honor and respect. The rich have no right so to oppress the needy, so to withhold from them their just dues, to satiate their own greediness as they have been doing. On the other hand we see that the ethical position of Amos was that the rich should rather befriend the poor. Not in

such a manner as to lead them to greater carelessness, but so as to help them that they might have a fair show in the struggle for life in this world, not to make their hard lot still harder but to pour the oil of sympathy into their hearts to convince them of the brotherhood of man. Amos bespeaks for the poor and needy a more humane and considerate treatment than they had received heretofore.

At this point we would also call attention to the fact that it is more difficut to espouse the cause of the helpless and downtrodden than that of the rich and influential. By coming to the rescue of the oppressed, by embracing "the lost cause," Amos shows the depth of his convictions and purity of his ideals.

c. Ethics of Luxury.

Amos does not disapprove of riches, he disapproves the inordinate desires for them. Nor are we to understand him as inveighing against the fine things which the rich men have in their houses, but he does decidedly disapprove of the luxuriousness which is displayed at the expense of the poor, or obtained by oppression. To make beds of repose from clothes taken in pledge "beside every altar" and to impose a fine on debtors for nonfulfillment of obligations so that they may "drink wine in the house of their God" are forms of luxury which Amos cannot sanction. These things exhibit blunted religious and moral tastes as well as perverted inclinations. The house of God was not only profaned, but they accustomed themselves to revellings and carousals and effeminacy which was fast preparing them easily to become a prey to the enemy.

The "winter house" and the "summer house" were not only the result of luxury but also places where various forms of social evils were rampant. In their mantions we find costly "couches" and "beds of ivory." By trampling upon the poor and taking "exactions from him of wheat, they were enabled to build themselves "houses of hewn stone" and plant "pleasant vineyards." Enjoying all these things while they could look upon their fields and vineyards and behold renters laboring hard while they were

poorly clad and ill fed; in this consisted the unrighteousness of the luxury. The contrast was too great.

In these mansions they would lie down and be at ease, "eat the lambs out of the flock, and the calves out of the midst of the stall" they would "sing idle songs to the sound of the viol" and "devise for themselves instruments of music" that their hilarity might be increased; they would "drink wine in bowls, and anoint themselves with the chief ointments"; but they were not "grieved for the affliction of Joseph."

Thus the capitalists would spend their time. The men, however, were not the only ones guilty of these sins against humanity and themselves. Their wives would urge them to oppress the poor and would say to their husbands, "Bring, and let us drink." They too were greedy after style and pleasure and effeminate living. In a great many instances they would stir up their husbands to use more stringent measures and be more exacting so that they might go prancing about at the height of fashion. For this reason the prophet calls these women "kine of Bashan, that are in the mountains of Samaria." Amos protests against this system of eating and drinking and revelling. There is a system of morals of which they know that positively disapproves such doings. They are undermining the moral strength of the nation. Those who should use their influence to strengthen the morals of their nation as well as its religious life are foremost in depriving it of its strength.

Social Impurity has also taken a deep root among the people. Father and son go unto the same maid, and blush not to profess that they are clean. And where such extreme pollution exists, what can be expected amid the social gaities of Samaria and Bethel.

Amos would have the people return to more simple habits of life and cultivate social purity throughout. He would like to see this abnormal desire for amusements and luxuriousness quenched, and in its stead a healthy social life inaugurated, so that rich and poor would not stand at such extremes in social and in religious life, and that due respect and a due reward be rend-

ered the laborer for his hire, and the fuel for luxuriousness used to strengthen the bond of the brotherhood.

d. Ethics of Religion.

When the ethics of a nation are on the decline, there will also be a corresponding decline in religion. So also if the religion fails to inspire a people, and fails to hold them to the true interests of man, the impetus for true ethics vanishes at once. Religion must ever be the mainspring of the moral life of man. And as religion and ethics are inseparably connected, so there is also an ethical side to religion itself. This is not neglected by Amos. Religion, to be soul-inspiring, must be permeated with ethical ideas, and must lead to moral virtue in the every-day life of the devotee. Amos sees that in Israel religion has lost its hold on the people, and those religious ceremonies that are performed have no religious value nor do they afford a moral impetus.

Nazarites had been raised up in Israel by Jehovah, but instead of acknowledging the sacredness of the vow taken they were induced to treat it lightly and violate it by drinking wine. The moral effect of this procedure was overlooked. An immoral element was thus introduced into one of the most sacred parts of religion. Evidently the sanctity of the Nazarite vow was known, but because it was known and treated with disrespect, there rested the heavier guilt on the transgressors, in that they preferred to see these things held up with contempt and to be ridiculed to honoring such persons for their manliness in holding strictly to what they have pledged themselves to do.

But the transgressors in these and other lines also refused to be rebuked by the prophets, for they said to these, "Prophesy not." They did not desire to be awakened out of their religious slumber, nor stirred out of the apathy into which they had fallen, or have their consciences aroused to testify against them. They were so steeped in indifference that, in spite of their many transgressions, they "felt at ease in Zion." They felt secure in the mountain of Samaria because they had no moral questionings in regard to their earnestness in religion. There was not even a

moral element in their religion that appealed to them with sufficient strength to lead them to see the weakness and insipidity of their religious pretensions.

They had not only omitted to do some things in connection with their religious services, but they had also introduced foreign elements so that their religion became perverted. At Bethel and at Gilgal, where they professed to reverence God, they "multiplied transgressions." The very altars devoted to Jehovah were not only used to worship other deities, but their precincts were the scenes of immoralities and revelries, which they now began to attach to their religion as part and parcel thereof.

Amos points out to them that these tendencies among them are not only irreligious, but that they show their whole system to to be founded on lies and vanity. This mixture of religion and immorality and impurity was not only heinous in the sight of God but was one of the evidences of decay in their national life. He appeals to them for a pure morality as the fruit of their religion, which at the same time would give them strength and stability as a nation. Amos is convinced that it is contrary to sound morals to pretend to worship and honor a deity when at the same time His Torah is held in disrepute, His religion revealed to them mixed with gross immorality, and there exists a blind refusal to hearken to the voice of His prophets. Let the religion be pure and let the life show an outward conduct corresponding to the principles of the religion. A religious conviction that is strong enough to uphold man in his every-day life was a burden of the preaching of Amos.

Jehovah had especially known them among all the nations of the earth, and for this reason He had been looking for a corresponding knowledge of Him among them. These exceptionally good privileges which they had been enjoying involved also exceptional opportunities on their part, and these in their turn involved obligations. But where the religion was so mixed with irreligion, only one course was open if they would persist not to repent and turn to their God—to send them into captivity. There they could reflect and learn to see the error of their way.

That on which they relied as the best reason why the prophet was speaking foolishness, proved to be the reason why they should be punished for their iniquity.

IV. The Basis of the Ethics of Amos.

Amos does not only seek the basis for a true religion in Jehovah and thus make everything of a religious character amenable to Him, but he has the same basis for his ethics. In fact he does not differentiate ethics and religion, but so combines them that neither is complete without the other.

When he speaks of the morality of heathen nations, he makes them answerable to God. To Him they must give an account. And this is the same God to whom Israel and Judah are to render an account, and who threatens to lay the land of Israel waste because of the many transgressions both of a moral and religious character. Indeed, all these transgressions are sins against Jehovah, whether they are committed by Moab or Ammon, or whether by Israel or Judah. There is thus only one basis on which to rest a morality, and that is the being of God. Hence the ethical ideas of Amos are farreaching and universal. No matter what his ideas concerning the gods of Tyre and Edom are, these people are subject to the same natural laws of morality as is Judah and Israel. These nations are also truly under the dominion of God, and hence He will call them to appear before Him on the day of reckoning. Amos sees only one reason for morality at all, and that is the idea of the existence of a just and benevolent God who requires the exercise of these same virtues in so far at least as they are implanted within the breast of every man. He is indeed the preacher of righteousness, but he preaches a righteousness that exists only because God exists and requires righteousness and justice on the part of man. All are to live in the light which they really have. Here is the sphere of their accountability.

Whether he calls the people to repentance in an ethical or in a religious sense, they are to turn to God in whom alone they can find a place of safety. There were no object in thus appeal-

ing to the people, if there were not a being magnanimous enough and righteous enough and forgiving enough to receive and honor as well as to call them to account for their misdoings.

Ethics is therefore given the same basis as religion by the prophet. That basis is God. Whatever evil committed, whether against man or against God Himself, is to be settled with God. God stands in such close relation to man that He considers a crime against man as a sin against Himself.

Conclusion.

We thus see that Amos deals with the principles that have an abiding value. International ethics have always had and still have an interest for man. Treaties between nations are sacred obligations and demand the respect and honor of those concerned. Whether in time of peace or in time of war, it is not right to wreak out vengeance on the helpless and defenseless. But those who do so must not expect to escape unpunished. While Amos does not protest against slavery as an institution, he opposes the wholesale slave-trade, and believes that man has rights which should not be taken away from him.

The relation between rich and poor should be fraternal, and should be conducive to the good of both. But oppression and greed have no place in a civilized system of ethics or religion. Nor should time be spent in riotings and drunkenness, but improved for the good of humanity. Honesty in all dealings with man is the only method that can be commended, because it reveals noble principles and evidences true manhood. No advantage should be taken of the poor and helpless.

All courts of justice should be guided by principles of righteousness. All systems of bribery are condemned. Every case is to be decided on its own merits. In these courts "let judgment roll down as waters, and righteousness ever flowing." In religion there is no room for hypocrisy. Let the heart flow out to God in truth and in sincerity. All pretentions without a corresponding life are vain. God will have no such worship. He has never sanctioned it, and they must not conclude that they can deceive Him.

V.

WHAT IS A POET?

BY LANE COOPER, M.A.

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In the beginning God creates each man in His Own image. He blows the breath of life into the nostrils, and the man becomes a living soul. Creation is not a thing that ended long ago; it is a ceaseless work. Each day is one of light and darkness, a morning and an evening as at first. But it is individual; unique in the works that are done upon it; neither more familiar nor less wonderful than the first day. So, each appearing man, compact of clay, bears in his forehead and between his eyes the new yet changeless mark of the Potter, that the first man bore. Is not the work of every artist in the artist's own likeness? By his fruits we shall know him. Also, it is the heritage of all the children of the King, His creatures, wrought cunningly and very well, to shadow forth their Imperial Artist's self.

But must not he that is made in the similitude of a Creator himself be a creator? Yet as creation is done with a word, when it is said, 'Let there be light and a firmament, and herbs and fishes, fowls and beasts and creepers, and lastly the erect one,' and these all are and continue, so we may look upon the power of man to produce, to see if this has not its most perfect measurement and expression in language. Therefore it was that the Greeks, the race of old that even played its games artistically, dignified the one who used the medium of words to body forth his brooding idea, as *par excellence* the maker among men, ὁ ποιήτης, or, as we have it from their quickening, not dead, tongue, the poet.

To the question, then, "What is a poet?" We answer, "First of all he is a creator." See how he takes the formless

material that lies about him, the crude passions of commonplace men and women, to refine, to harmonize and to blend in the admirable characters of his heroes. "Let us" we might hear Homer say, be he one blind bard, or a band of bards imbued with one idea—"let us" we might hear him say communing, "make men in our own image." Accordingly, there come down the avenues of time those mirrors of the childlike Grecian mind and genius, wrathful Achilles, and subtle Odysseus, and heedful Penelope—all wrought out of their maker's mind, as alive to-day as on the yesterday on which the timeless poet formed them; far more alive than those of us who have with shallow joy received the seed and word of life, yet do not choose to be participant in the work of giving life. In these children Homer still survives. He has added to the measure of power entrusted him; he has given his soul a new and manifold expression. Into his art and his labor he breathed his life, and they, being in the likeness of their creator, are themselves creative and a source of inspiration unto us.

Are we not conscious of a more abundant being in us when we read the Odyssey? Surely the Homeric mantle falls upon us and we have a double portion of spirit; the day on which we read becomes, as it were, a thousand days; wide vistas stride forward upon us; we see more clearly the excellence of the universe. There is also a bodily exhilaration: we would rejoice as an active man to run a race. In many senses of the phrase, we experience a new creation.

Such an influx and elevation of life and spirit we feel as we enter the various worlds that Shakespeare has brought to pass. Here are groups of men and women weaving out their destinies, some well, some ill; in the comedies, all harmoniously at last; in the tragedies, by a deep and mighty order, which allows what seem at first most frightful inconsistencies and contradictions, yet, at last, by the great reconciler and pacifier, death, all harmoniously. For the poet makes his survey from the standpoint of a creator, seeing in all things possibilities of strength and weakness, good and evil, and choosing the strong and the good;

nevertheless, with a use for the feeble and a tolerance of the foolish and the harmful, until, at his pleasure, he shall reduce them too to order, power and beauty. He retires behind the veil of time and space, gathering his materials, and consulting for a season. Suddenly he breaks forth and projects his organized idea upon this warp and woof of our imagination, and we behold a new creation, wonderfully fair and very good. We also, following him in his effort, feel a sharing in his agency, and he in us and we in him are recreated. It is a part and form of immortality.

It does, to be sure, make little difference what materials the artist uses. What shape he puts upon them, what order he puts in them measure him. He may take a product already wrought; as Shakespeare took from Plutarch, with marvelous economy saving a divine energy for the difficult last touches; as Rubens took his pupils' canvases, and finished them, as he, and not his pupils could. He may mould his men, of dust, so to speak, and nothingness. Yet he will mould men, if he be a great poet. How Browning's spirit leaped to be embodied in a multitude of personalities, one after another, formed out, of (almost) nothing that had previously existed! A hint or two from Samuel to give us in elaboration and concretely the character of 'Saul'; 'Rabbi ben Ezra' arising with his rich philosophy out of little more than a medieval name. Browning saw nature as a whole, with civilized man its highest product. In the reverse lay the misconception of Rousseau, although he too was undoubtedly a poet. And if in the work of a writer of to-day the animals and the boy considered as an animal are better art than the men and women, this author cannot be held among the highest.

In other ways also it makes little difference what material the artist uses. After all he is not toiling with anything altogether crude or incapable of artistic moulding. What the Primary Imagination has furnished for the secondary, that is, what God has made, is not common or unclean in itself. That is foul and sinful for us which we as filthy poets make so; we may turn a temple to a den of thieves. But the author of the Book of Job saw a poetic

use for a back corrupt with scabby boils; and for Homer there is poetry in Nausicaa and her maids as they wash the dirty garments and spread them on the shore; yes, there is poetry for him in fifty full and fifty empty, pig-sties. Toward the close of the Odyssey he pitts a miserable beggar, as it seems, against a real mouthing abject, to fight at fisticuffs, and we find the glory of the former and the downfall of the latter, alike enchanting. All the poetry of the Bible is centered in a manger. There the lowly is uplifted and the proud brought down to dust. Before the poet, sin and sorrow and suffering flee away, vanishing in love and joy and laughter, transformed by the power of a maker. His own peculiar griefs he makes beautiful and universal, and in them we see our own all purified, and suddenly reconciled and emulous for the crown for very joy we seize and bear our cross again. So Goethe gathers his pains and lost loves in his Werther, and later, with a better-balanced genius, in his Meister, and there they have an outlet and a use; since out of things once full, of pangs, or even bad and ugly, he has according to his power made forms of beauty.

What God has made is essentially all very good. This we must believe. This the poets know; for they are most in his likeness; and they see with a measure of Divine sight, and put forth again what they have seen, with a measure of the Divine imagination. And they confess, as Shelley did, that there is a perfect poem-hymn of which their strains are only fragments; and they can conceive of an artistic scheme, with an aboriginal beginning, a middle of agony ineffable, and a triumphant trumpet-sounded ending—an artistic scheme, wherein as in one grand unutterable theme, too lofty for the infirmities of human speech to cope with, all things, in a seeming state of incompleteness and inconsistency, are moving onward to perfection and a final glorious reconciliation; wherein, as we are lifted up and re-created by the sorrow and fear of a tragedy, or the passion of a fugue, or the exceeding humanity of a masterly portrait, so by the skill and anguish of the greatest Poet, who is also the Perfect Word or Poem, we shall be raised even from the very negation of life and given endless life.

We have chosen here, as the race has chosen, to call him poet who adapts the means of language to the ends of his creative impulse. But the painter also has the power of inbreathing life, and figures forth ideal men with their environments. And the sculptor is a poet: who compels the chilly stone to be alive; ascending toward the heavenly ideal, and drawing all men after him. And, in fact, whoever follows nature, the Divine art-product, in her continual effort to bring forth more complex and lively forms, and strives as a conscious part of her to evolve something better than could be without his aid—he is a poet.

Therefore it is clear that in some sense every man can be a poet —as also was seen, since every man is in the image of the Word, the Maker. Now, he who makes his fields to flourish has the artistic impulse; and whoso heals men's bodies and gives them longer, fuller lives, displays it; consciously or unconsciously doing the Creator's own work of replenishing life. So, also, he who labors on men's souls, with agony and ardor moulding them to fairer forms. Thus the teacher is a poet, fashioning a material as plastic as language, yet more subtle; aiding the Divine Parent and the earthly in producing a symbol and an image of the Original; forming what Dante says all art is, a grandchild of God.

Not all of us by any means can become poet-prophets like Isaiah and Ezekiel, men for whom the distinctions of time are abolished, who see not paltry signs of happenings to come, but everlasting truths to be spoken forth, and powerfully justify the ways of the Eternal to time-considering men.

Nor can all we be poet-priests like Taylor and Charles Wesley, with majestic ejaculations on our lips, or songs upon them; with blessed full-toned tongues of charity for all to stir and make abounding the spiritual life of men. Albeit we as they draw inspiration by no laying on of hands, nor by any ceremony bolstered up with the false dignity of time, that shadow of smoke, but by direct receiving of the breath of the Creator.

Nor can all we be poet-conquerors like David and King Alfred, men of hearts and voices powerful to fill a host with courage, yet to suffer no diminishing by the outlay; making and keeping

realms in decorative order by our good cunning and wise activity.

We must be, most of us, of the mighty numbers that only stand and wait, our lot to hold a golden silence. We may be but hewers and drawers for a masterbuilder.

And yet, in another fuller sense, according to the message that all literature contains, if rightly read, we may be prophets, priests, and kings, and masterbuilders, too, and withal poets. "Life," says Goethe, "lies before each one of us, as a great quarry lies before the architect. He little deserves the name of architect who elaborates therefrom no structure corresponding to his own good and preconceived idea." The poet is a maker: we are poets when, having assured ourselves what poetry is, we make our lives abiding places for it, or, to gather from the most sublime and artistic of all books, when we make ourselves habitable for the Word, the *Λόγος*; when also we shall be lovers of it, too, and in the finest sense, *φιλόλογοι*, philologists. Then, indeed, we shall have built a new temple, a mansion for a Prophet, Priest and King, and the Spirit of a Prophet, Priest and King will be in us. And the conquering, vivifying Word shall also be the standard and the critic of the perfectness of each life; and to the poet He shall say in commendation, as once in agony He said of His own life and labor: "It is finished."

VI.

SELF-CULTURE IN THE MINISTRY.

BY REV. H. MOSSER, D.D.

It is generally understood that culture is the deliberate avoidance of all dwarfing and degrading influences, thoughts and words, and the earnest practice of principles and virtues for moral elevation and purification.

Self-culture implies attention to the positive determination or motive of the individual who strives persistently after the perfection of self. Having in view the great pattern of manhood the intelligent direction of moral and spiritual energy finds magnificent opportunities in the present period of civil and religious freedom. When the individual life is well directed there is assistance offered from heaven and earth—obstacles or hindrances are held in check. And we have *Christian* culture.

Spiritual self-culture in the ministry refers to the exemplification of Christian life on the part of pastor—the leader of the congregation. He shall be possessed not only of knowledge and tact but shall exemplify character building. The battle ground of character is the individual heart. The great work begins at home. The minister must attain moral and spiritual strength so as to lead the flock in good works and life. Heaven is offered to sinners, but the poor sinner must grasp the hand which leads; the door of privilege is opened, but he *must enter;* the fruit is within reach, but *he must pluck* it.

Self-culture suggests two thoughts for special consideration. The indefinable something in the soul which precedes work in character building is *motive.* Motive constitutes the real standard of the man. His moral worth, value of soul is not measured by heredity, money, society relation or popular favor. There is in man a disposition to a reasonable, useful and pure life, or a disposition to spurn, despise and reject all influences for good.

This impulse defines the quality of soul. The motive to do good is a reflection of the Saviour's word, "love thy neighbor as thyself." He who loves the good and rejects the evil possesses this motive. He seeks the sinner, associates with him in some way, to stimulate also in the sinner the desire to do good. This is the positive motive. The negative—the motive to evil—to destruction also exists. Where this motive prevails no elevation, purity or good character can be expected. This opens the downward grade and ends in darkness.

The discovery of these is made most unexpectedly. The motive to good is found in individual savages, half-civilized, in families for generations degraded. On the other hand persons who have had every advantage of heredity, birth, culture and society are grossly degraded.

The appearance of the positive motive so unexpectedly, in such individuals, seems to us mortals like a divine spark. Whence it comes we know not. We simply know the fact. A spark never so deeply covered by human corruption, never so small, has all the elements of ignition. It needs but the application of a breath to quickly excite a blaze. So the motive in sinners, never so small, may feebly live under adverse circumstances, but may be excited by simple truth to giant strength.

He who possesses this motive and allows it to work, will generate manhood, useful character, yea, sainthood. It is to be taken for granted that every Christian possesses this motive to a greater or less degree. Ministers will become spiritual leaders, shepherds, in proportion to the development of this motive. What sort of minister can he be who is not given to earnest reflection, persistent study, conquest of flesh and self? He who overcomes the world by faith, who is determined morally to arise and shine, who knows the meaning of "to be constrained by the love of Christ," will be a leader of men. The determination to live in and for God dominates will, understanding and conscience. This motive creates spiritual activity. It suggests associates, institutions and books which bring joy in work and experience.

There are persons who argue with much skill and marshal a

stern array of facts that we are moulded and stimulated by our environment. Such environment includes all the influences surrounding the individual, as family, society, as well as intellectual, moral and spiritual forces. They suppose when these are favorable it follows as logical consequence that the proper motive in the individual will be generated. When the environment is unfavorable the individual will be warped in motive, culture and life.

It must be remembered, however, that the environment in and of itself does not generate the divine motive. Environment reminds us of the woolen garment on the living body. It has much to do with the regulation of vitality. It conserves the forces of life, stimulates growth and furnishes protection against climatic changes, but it does not create vitality.

Suppose you clothe a corpse in the finest garment, place it before an altar in the most magnificent cathedral, environed by the purest, best and richest productions in painting and music, that inanimate remnant of humanity cannot worship. It is a lifeless corpse.

Garments on the holy body of Christ did service as on the bodies of other men. Had the same environment encased Pontius Pilate, Caiaphas, Annas the high priest, or Herod, it would have simply covered murderers of the blessed Master. Environment is an important element, but only *one* element in combination with something else.

For a definition of environment we turn to "Natural Law and Spiritual Law" by Henry Drummond, p. 191; John Alden's print. "There are three things especially which are necessary for us to keep constantly in view. The first is that the organism contains within itself only *one-half* of what is essential to life; the second is that the other half is contained in the environment; third, that the condition of receptivity is simple union between the organism and environment."

This is the conclusion of a course of reasoning. Important as environment is, it amounts only to *one-half* of what is essential to life. The remaining half the author calls "the condition of receptivity" or what we call the positively religious and spiritual function of the soul—the *motive*—the true measure of man.

What steam is to the engine or electricity to the power house, *motive* is to the activity of the soul. Not money, ability, human acquirement, but motive is the directing force of human activity. Why do you live? What is your purpose, are questions which will reveal the moral and spiritual manhood. As the motive, so will the soul exemplify in activities, why he lives—whither he is going.

Every minister of the Gospel presumably enjoys an earnest Christian life. The one thing he possesses is the divine motive to glorify God in the salvation of men. Paul expresses the thought: "I determined not to know any thing among you save Christ and Him crucified."

This earnestness,—motive—moral determination or Christian life permanently fixes the character or activities of the soul, and directs only to the pure, the beautiful and the good in Christ. Every effort looks "to the Author and finisher of faith."

A minister of the Gospel possessing this motive cannot stand still. His growth will be in proportion to his activity. If motive is defective or by bad habits impaired, he degrades. No growth is decay—defective life. It is either progression, or retrogression.

The Corliss Engine of the Centennial Exposition of '76 was a remarkable mechanism. The motive power—steam—was perfectly reliable. It proved completeness in its smooth, regular and quiet movements. The beholder seeing the acres of machinery respond to the simple touch of the engineer received a life impression of its silent power. This mechanical invention is a feeble figure of the spiritual power of grace in the soul. It is feeble compared with divine motive, exercise of spiritual power and resistance of evil. Earnestness, activity and trust in God enables the helpless to create and enjoy.

> "We love and live in power. It is the Spirit's end.
> Mind must subdue. To conquer is its life."

After considering the principle in the human soul by which we mould, each one for himself, Christian character, we ask are there not methods which will facilitate this work? Much is claimed for modern methods. A great deal of time is consumed in

devising wise methods which simplify the way to the high ideal. We can refer simply to the main subject.

The eternal ideal, the head of the Church, the glorified God-man should be constantly kept before us as the object of worship and the source of grace. The plate in the photographer's camera is made so exceedingly delicate that the rays of light paint accurately every object placed before it. So the Holy Ghost prepares the souls of men, prints or incorporates the very life of the Son of God. There is now to be had much good literature on the blessed manhood of Christ, helpful in the comprehension of the perfect standard of character. Such literature should be a regular part of ministerial reading.

In addition study the characters of prophets, apostles and saints of all ages. You will particularly note in these how the good is, by trying and ever recurring processes, eliminated from evil. Every soul, without a single exception, ascends to higher estate "through great tribulation." The malice of hell often inspires degraded men to destroy souls. At the end you will see how all things work together for good unto them that love God and who are the called according to his purpose.

A very significant and inspiring lesson is given in the indescribable influence which Christian men have wielded for good in the world. In this sphere you find veritable miracles. We mention such names as Origin, Augustine, Athanasius, Jerome, Boniface, Reformers of the XVI. century and Martyrs of the XVII. century, no less than the leaders in the wonderful missionary period from Carey to this day. The kingdom of God influences the world for good even to the last, greatest and most wonderful manifestation of the International Arbitration.

Here is food for thought. If such subjects do not stimulate, feed, and enthuse the soul, nothing else will.

The force of self-culture will more clearly appear when you consider the formidable obstacles which each successful Christian meets and conquers. The possibility exists in each person to attain by grace to a high degree of spiritual and intellectual culture.

A certain patient, after long hesitation, concluded he was the subject of an incurable disease. He selected for consultation a

physician, who, as he thought in knowledge, skill and experience, had no superior. He was thoroughly examined, had medicine prescribed when he ventured this question: How much sooner in seeking permanent relief, should I have come? The doctor replied: "My dear friend, if you had come to me before your grandfather was born, I might, in all probability, have done you much more good than can now be done." This means to say that man suffers spiritual as well as physical maladies which come by heredity. With few exceptions, where rationality remains, most obstacles by grace may be overcome.

It is a well-known fact that next to brain a student must have the power of application or concentration of thought. Culture implies the power of comprehension *and* the concentration of thought as well. Should a minister be so unfortunate as to lack the power of concentration, he meets a serious obstacle to spiritual culture. The scatter brain habit is a most unfortunate weakness. There are good men, well meaning and true, who continuously suffer from this defect. Work of every kind is interrupted. Repeatedly most precious opportunities are lost and valuable offers neglected, simply because the slovenly habit of mind fails in coming to logical and prompt conclusion.

There is an infinite number of mental conditions which occasion serious obstacles to spiritual growth. Men often imagine themselves to be reasonably free from prejudice. Who is without it? It is an admitted fact that there are only a few, comparatively speaking, who advance logically, freely and speedily to a high degree of spiritual culture. Prejudged conclusions are maintained with remarkable tenacity. These mental moral, spiritual knots must be undone. Many persons suffer fearful struggles before the once established standard or opinion can be corrected.

Notwithstanding these and other obstacles there is an assured conquest. "My grace is sufficient for thee" was the reply to Paul's prayer, when he asked to have the worrisome thorn removed from the flesh. The certitude comes to a plain expression when he declares, "all things work together for good." Or, when he says: "For I have fought a good fight, I have finished my course; I have kept the faith."

VII.

EDITORIAL DEPARTMENT.

Election and Selection.

It is often said nowadays that science in its latest phase is Calvinistic. By Calvinism in this connection is understood the theory of *determinism*, which leaves no room for freedom in created beings. It is the theory that whatever any creature is to be or to do, depends entirely upon the creative energy. In theology this theory is called the doctrine of election, or predestination. Now science, in its latest development, it is said, comes to the same conclusion in so far as the question of creaturely freedom is concerned. The doctrine of evolution especially is supposed to be thoroughly deterministic. Evolution is the theory that things come to be by the progressive and orderly operation of forces imminent in nature, among which forces are pressure of environment, struggle for existence and natural selection. Natural selection lays hold upon any advantageous peculiarities which the pressure of environment and the struggle for existence may have produced, and causes the favored individual to survive its less favored competitors. In this process there seems to be no possibility of freedom. Every individual being is the product of antecedent causes and conditions, and could, therefore, not be otherwise than it is. Nature, as conceived in the theory of evolution, it is said, is a complete chain of causation, which admits of no exception or accident, and whose products are necessarily determined by its whole past operation and condition. Whatever any being at any time is, it owes, therefore, to the selective action of the process of causation which has been going forward in nature from the beginning. And whatever any being may do is again determined by the constitution of its own nature and the influence of its environment. Neither beast nor man, accordingly, could be anything or do anything other than what is de-

termined in the process of causation, or selection, by which they are produced. Hence science, whose watchword is *selection*, is as deterministic as Calvinism, whose watchword is *election*. There is only this difference, that selection is supposed to be the result of a process of causation acting blindly and unconsciously, while election is believed to be the effect of an absolute will acting without any other motive than its own causeless decree.

Dr. Abraham Kuyper, in a work noticed elsewhere in this issue of the REVIEW, therefore, expresses surprise that this age should be so generally willing to accept the doctrine of *selection*, and yet hesitate to accept the doctrine of *election*. Do the two theories not practically come to the same result? Is the theory of selection not as much deterministic as the theory of election? As often represented, it doubtless is. But that, we submit, is no sufficient reason for accepting either theory. It only shows that a person who accepts the one theory, can have no great reason for rejecting the other. Dr. Kuyper, for instance, is a strong advocate of the doctrine of election, but an equally strong opponent of the doctrine of selection; and in this, we think, he displays no very eminent faculty of discrimination. For if the differences appearing in creation and in history must be referred to a principle of determinism, it can not matter much whether that principle be supposed to be a blind world-process, or a will whose activity is as unmoral and inexplicable as fate itself. If we held the doctrine of evolution in the sense in which it is here regarded, we confess that we could see no good reason why we should not admit the theory of election in its stiffest and harshest form; and so we also confess that we can see no good reason why Dr. Kuyper should refuse to accept the doctrine of evolution with all its supposed deterministic implications. The one accounts as readily for the differences appearing in nature and history as the other.

Dr. Kuyper says that "the tremendous problem that lies hidden behind these two words, *election* and *selection*, concerns the fundamental question: *Whence are the differences?* Why is not all alike? Whence is it that one thing exists in one state, another in another? There is no life without differentiation,

and no differentiation without inequality. The perception of difference is the very source of our human consciousness, the causative principle of all that exists, and grows, and develops, in short the mainspring of all life and thought. I am therefore justified in asserting that in the end every other problem may be reduced to this one problem: Whence are those differences? Whence is the dissimilarity, the heterogeneity of existences, of genesis, of consciousness?" It is the product of natural selection, says the evolutionist—of the pressure of environment, the struggle for existence, the survival of the fittest. Not so, says Dr. Kuyper; it is the sovereign will of Him who created all things visible and invisible, that is responsible for all the differences in creation. "The determination of the existence of all things to be created, of what is to be camellia or buttercup, nightingale or crow, hart or swine, and, equally among men, the determination of our own persons, whether one is to be born as girl or boy, rich or poor, dull or clever, white or colored, or even as Cain or Abel, is the most tremendous predestination conceivable in heaven or on earth; and still we see it taking place before our eyes every day, and we ourselves are subject to it in our entire personality; our very existence, our very nature, our position in life being entirely dependent on it. This all embracing predestination the Calvinist places not in the hand of men but in the hand of Almighty God." And this all embracing predestination determines not merely the constitution of our being, but also our conduct, and our eternal destiny, whether of weal or woe. All is election: "election in creation, election in providence, and so also election to eternal life; election in the realm of *grace* as well as in the realm of *nature*." See *Calvinism*, pp. 269–272. And this is the theory which Dr. Kuyper would put in the place of the doctrine of natural selection. He expresses his gratification, however, at the prevalence of the doctrine of selection, for he thinks that it must in time lead to the acceptance of the theory of election. Perhaps it will; but what advantage there will be in this we can not see, for man becomes a mere *passive thing* in the one view as much as in the other.

The fact upon which this theory of election is based is one that must, of course, be admitted: it is the fact of *differentiation*, or *individuality*, among existing beings. And it is a fact which grows more prominent the higher we ascend in the scale of existence. In the lower stages of existence there is not much individualization. Two crystals of the same species differ only in size and weight; in other respects they are exactly alike. In the vegetable world the process of organization and individualization has gone somewhat farther; but even here complete individuality has not been reached, as is shown by the fact that a branch taken from one tree may, in many cases at least, be made to grow into another tree of the same kind. In the higher animal world there is a higher degree of differentiation, but still the individual animal is for the most part merely a specimen of its kind. In the human world finally individualization has achieved its complete triumph; and no two men are exactly alike. The differences of sex, race, temperament, talent, nationality, family, are here combined in such an infinite variety of ways as to make every individual man or woman different from every other individual man or woman. The creative energy, whatever it may be, never repeats itself in its works. Every product of its activity differs in some respects from every product that has gone before or that shall follow after. The Calvinist is therefore entirely right when he emphasizes this fundamental and constitutional difference, which must forever prevent one being from becoming precisely like another, and which forms one of the indispensable conditions of the existence of a moral world. There could be no kingdom of God, no organized moral cosmos, if all moral subjects were precisely alike. Of things without a difference no organism could be constructed.

The question as to what constitutes the principle of individuality has often been discussed, and has received various answers. It has been said, for instance, that individuals differ merely because of the difference of the place and time in which they appear. This would imply that by exchanging places one individual could be transformed into another. A second theory, closely allied to

this, is that the differences are due to external influences. But this is only throwing the question backward; for we should immediately have to ask, whence are the differences of the influences? A third theory of individuality, especially in the human world, of which we are now speaking, is that the differences arise from the various admixtures of material elements in the human body, and from the influences of this upon the soul with which it is united. All souls, it is here supposed, are alike in their essential constitution, and come to differ only in consequence of their connection with different physical organisms. But the difference is deeper than this. If this were the correct theory, then it would follow that when they have either completely mastered the matter with which they are connected, or else freed themselves from this connection, all souls would lose their individuality and become identical—a conclusion which is contrary to experience as well as to reason; for the prominence of individuality does not fade in proportion to the advancement of mental culture. On the contrary, the greater the culture, the more marked the individuality—a fact showing that individuality has its seat in the soul rather than in the body. A fourth theory of individuality, finally, is that which supposes mental and corporeal differences to result from a difference in the use of freedom. This is the theory of Origen, which teaches the pre-existence of souls in another world, where they are supposed to have determined their own nature by their own volition. But if this theory were true, it would follow that, if all men made an equally good use of freedom, they would all become alike, and individuality would disappear; in consequence of which there could be no organized moral world. We are bound to assume, then, that the fact of individuality is due, not to the accidental influences of space, or time, or matter, nor to individual choice or activity, but to a selective or discriminative function in the creative energy. And as the result manifests an intelligent purpose, the selective energy must be guided by intelligence; though this decides nothing as to the manner in which it may be exercised. That may be the law of evolution as well as the law of instantaneous creation. As theists

we are bound to believe that every human being is the realization of a distinct thought of God begotten of His eternal love and wisdom, and that this ideal divine element in creation is the ultimate ground of individuality. The creative idea has for its object, not merely the human genus, but the individuals which the genus comprehends, in all the distinctness of the qualities fitting them for the time and place which they are to occupy in the moral cosmos; but in the history of the world this idea is realized progressively and by means of the operation of secondary causes.

We are bound to agree with the Calvinist, then, in assuming that the individual differences which appear in the human world must be traced ultimately to the exercise of divine creative wisdom and power. That one individual is a man, another a woman; that one is white, another black; that one is sanguine, another phlegmatic in temperament; that one is talented, another dull—these and innumerable other distinctions are due neither to accident nor to human agency, but to a divine preference expressed in the process of creation and providence. But how far shall we suppose this divine preference to extend? The Calvinist makes it to extend not merely to the *constitution* of the individual nature but also to its *moral activity*. Not only what a man is and is fitted for does he, according to this theory, owe to the divine election, but also what he does and becomes. A man's thoughts and actions are not really his own, but are entirely dependent upon the divine election and fore-ordination, being free only in appearance, not in fact. Whether a man shall be a Cain or an Abel, says Dr. Kuyper, in effect, depends not upon his own choice but upon God who has fore-ordained his destiny. This is *determinism*, which is not made any more reasonable or attractive by the fact that it is theological rather than scientific determinism. The circumstantial determinism of the materialistic evolutionist is the theory that everything that is or occurs is the result of past circumstances and conditions. Fichte, in the *Bestimmung des Menschen*, makes the remark that, according to a certain philosophy, if a grain of sand had been found half a league farther from the shore than where it is now situated, the whole world

would have been different from what it is—the wind and wave which carried that grain of sand would have been different, the continents and climates of the past would have been different, and this would have had a determinative influence upon the condition, and character, and destiny of every member of the human race. This philosophy makes of man only a link in the chain of nature, and no one could be in the least degree different from what nature has made him. This is a hard and cheerless philosophy. Man, who has within himself a spirit capable of happiness or misery, who thinks he is free and holds himself responsible for his good and evil deeds, being agitated with the pain of remorse when he has done ill, and thrilled with the feeling of joy when he has done well, is altogether the creature and sport of circumstances, and his destiny, whether of weal or woe, is simply made for him, not by him. That is a theory at which we may well shudder. But we can not see that it is any worse than the theory of Calvinism, which attributes a similarly blind and inexorable determinism to the divine will which is supposed to be ready to make a Cain to be damned for its own glory, as well as an Abel to be blessed. What is the difference whether our destiny be fixed by an absolute will that has no pity, or by a process of nature that has no understanding?

Both of these theories do violence to the moral consciousness of man and we are sure, therefore, that neither of them can be true. Man recognizes himself as a moral being; his consciousness tells him that, within certain limits at least, he is free; that he determines his own acts, and is, therefore, responsible for them; and that he is the creator of his own character and the shaper of his own destiny. Much as one may feel himself to be dependent upon the absolute power and will of God, yet no man of unsophisticated mind can ever rid himself of the consciousness that he is a self, a person, capable of originating purposes and actions, in which he is bound to see reflected his own character, and for which he cannot but hold himself responsible. But this is the consciousness of freedom, which is indestructible in the human soul and with which no theory of determinism can be consis-

tent. It may be said, indeed, that the object of this consciousness is merely a *phenomenon* of whose reality we can at least not be sure. What if our consciousness should deceive us, and our feeling of freedom should be only seeming and not real? And what if revelation tells us that this must be the case, because the sovereignty of God, which it asserts, leaves no room for the exercise of creaturely freedom in any real sense? What, then, will be the result? Absolute scepticism, we answer, moral as well as theoretical. If we cannot trust our consciousness when it testifies to us of moral freedom and responsibility, how then can we trust it when it testifies to us of anything else—the existence of God, for example, or the meaning of a revelation? Who will ever assure us of the meaning of any revelation, if we cannot trust the soundness and veracity of our consciousness? And what good could any revelation do us, if it should only tell us that our eternal destiny depends not at all upon anything that we can do, but solely upon the absolute will of God?

But our consciousness testifies to us that we are self-determining moral beings, capable of acting according to an idea of goodness, and that God Himself is a good and reasonable being, whose actions are determined, not by absolute caprice, but by His character of absolute goodness and love. It is only on condition that the testimony of this consciousness be regarded as true that there can be any real morality among men. If the theory of circumstantial determinism were true, there *could* be no morality, in the real sense of the word, the sense of conduct determined by the conception of an end, but only spontaneous activity like that which prevails in plants and animals, and the science of ethics could only be a branch of biology. But how would it be if the doctrine of theological determinism were true? Would the cause of morality be any more secure? Not at all, for the human will would then become a passive organ for the divine, and ethics a branch of dogmatics. And what would be the moral influence of such a theory? Let Mohammedanism, with its doctrine of absolute fatalism, and its monstrous immorality, furnish the answer. We know it is usually claimed that Calvinism promotes

a high state of morality; as it is also claimed that it favors religious and civil liberty. From its own principles, however, as determined by the Synod of Dort, it does the one no more than it does the other. Some Calvinistic communities, indeed, like other religious communities, have exhibited a high degree of morality; but that has been because, like other men, Calvinists have been endowed with reason, and conscience, and will, and were touched by the grace of God; not because they believed in the doctrine of determinism which, since the Synod of Dort, has been the characteristic doctrine of Calvinism. Indeed Calvinism lays no stress on *character*, or moral goodness, as the result of moral action, and as having any relation to the salvation of the moral subject. Dr. Kuyper tells us in almost so many words that a moral character is not necessary in order to salvation. "Regeneration," he says, "is sufficient for the elect man, to make him sure of his eternal destiny, but it is not enough to satisfy the glory of God in His work among men." Good works are necessary on the part of the elect in order to the glory of God, and God will see that they are forthcoming; but they are not necessary in order to the salvation or blessedness of the elect. This certainly is giving to morality a most precarious ground. It is to say that good works are the spontaneous products of God's irresistible power of grace in the soul, and that so far as man is concerned they amount to nothing when they are performed. God, indeed, glorifies Himself therein, but so also He does in the damnation of the non-elect; and what then is the difference? How long would any morality continue to exist, where this theory is held with conscious and logical consistency? Would Calvinists now dare to preach this theory without any shuffling or evasion? Calvinists may be moral, but not in consequence of the doctrine of determinism which is now considered the heart of Calvinism.

We hold that in order to vindicate the cause of morality, it is necessary firmly and above all things to maintain the freedom of the moral subject. If the determinism of the Spencerian theory of evolution can not give us morality, so neither can the Calvinistic theory of theological determinism; although men who

hold this theory may be moral men, because their common human sense is stronger than their logic. In order that a man may be moral his being and conduct must at least in some sense depend upon himself. The plant and the animal cannot be moral, because they are only made and in no sense make themselves; while of man it is true in a very profound sense that everyone has the making of himself in his own power. There are essentially three factors which contribute to the making of the man. There is, first, his *nature*, that which is *born*, or given him without any agency of his own. This determines the limit of his capacity. More than is involved in the potentiality of his nature no man can ever be. Secondly, there is a man's environment, stimulating the energies of his nature, and tending to bring out the possibilities which it involves. This, too, is in a large measure given to a man without his own agency, although he may somewhat modify the influence which it shall exercise over him. The place and time of one's birth, and the conditions under which he shall be educated, are not matters of his own choice. Both in respect of his nature and environment, then, an element of determinism must be admitted to exist in the life of every man, which sets limits to his capacities and possibilities. But there is finally, also the self, or person, which is not made, but in a profound sense makes itself by its own effort. The self is a free subject, acting not as a link merely in the chain of natural causation, but as a conscious self-directing energy. In a word, it is something supernatural; and it exercises a controlling influence over the nature, or the physico-psychical constitution, out of which it grows, as well as over the environment by which it is surrounded. It may by its own act divest itself of this supernatural quality, and then float helplessly on the stream of time and circumstances; but by virtue of its origin and constitution it possesses this quality. The human will possesses power, not absolute or unlimited, but real power over the organs of the body and faculties of the mind, as well as over the influences of the environment. It is a well-recognized fact that a man's outward circumstances exercise over him only so much influence as

he gives them power to exercise, and that this is in no two cases alike. Whence this difference? From the sovereign will of God, says the Calvinist; from the self-determining energy of the human will, says the libertarian, and we, at least, have no doubt that the latter is right.

If it be true, then, that a man has his destiny shaped for him by the constitution of his nature and the circumstances of his environment, it is true also, in another sense, that every man *makes* his destiny by his own choice. But, it may be asked, can any man make anything else of himself than what is involved in the destiny that is fore-ordained for him? The Calvinist says: No, there is a chain of causation in the realm of grace which is as infrangible as the chain of nature, and which determines a man's will as inevitably as cause determines effect, so that no man can be anything else than what he is, and what his destiny calls for. Cain was predestined to be a murderer, and a murderer he was bound to be. Paul was predestined to be a preacher of the gospel, and a preacher of the gospel he became, quite against his own will or choice. Eternal life and death are in like manner matters of eternal predestination. This is the terrible doctrine which Calvin himself pronounced *horrible, yet true.* Schleiermacher divested the doctrine of predestination of its harshness by assuming that all men are predestinated ultimately to be saved. He believed that God is not partly good and partly bad, but that He is altogether good and wills a good destiny for all men, although each man's destiny is different from every other man's; and God wills men's destiny so effectively, that no one will be able finally to frustrate it. This is doubtless correct in so far as it assumes a relation, in the divine idea, of destiny to individuality; but this theory would imply the doctrine of universal salvation—the doctrine that all man are going to be saved sometime, somewhere, and in some way. To this doctrine, of course, many would object as *unscriptural.* And in fact, so far as our experience goes, it does appear as if man had power to resist his destiny, and make of himself something different from what his Maker designed him to be. We constantly see men who fail to make of

themselves what their nature and circumstances seem to suggest. It may, however, be supposed that this failure can only be temporary, and that those who have frustrated their destiny here, may have another chance hereafter. To this supposition the Calvinist, of course, strenuously objects; for he believes not only in an election of *grace*, but also in an election of *wrath*, and thinks that the latter might be imperiled if the chance of salvation were too much extended. This is a question which we do not now propose to discuss. We only remark here that if the time of grace should be extended beyond the present life, and if some, or all, who are not saved here, should be saved hereafter, we may be sure that this will not take place in contravention of the personal function, in the development of human life, of which we have just spoken. The same moral principles must prevail in the future world, that prevail here; and the development of character and achievement of destiny can only be the result of free moral action. God will never save men by force, whether they will or not; nor will He ever by a mere exertion of power wake them *willing*.

Man is a free moral subject; but such a subject in its finished moral character can not be created off-hand. It is only the *nature* of a moral being that can be *born*, or created; the moral personality must develop itself by its own determination and effort. The idea of a completely intelligent and perfectly formed moral being called into existence by an instantaneous exertion of power, is unthinkable. Only things, not persons with the peculiar contents of personality, can be created off-hand. God makes moral beings only by causing them to make themselves. At least that is God's way of making moral beings now, and the presumption is that it has always been His way. Indeed, it *could* never have been otherwise; for morality is nothing unless it be free; and freedom, like intelligence, can not be created. We are thus by ethical considerations led to the conclusion that evolution, or gradual development, must have been the divine method of creation. This at least is God's method of creating men now. God never makes a finished man by an instantaneous exertion of power. The child is born and grows into the man,

partly through the influence of environment, and partly through the effort of the incipient self. And the child is born with a nature determined by the nature of a long line of ancestry, and under conditions determined by a long series of previous conditions. Now it is in the line of ancestry and in the series of conditions that the evolutionist tells us that the law of selection is at work, causing any particular individual to be what it is. And this corresponds with our daily observation. We have never seen a full grown man spring up out of the earth, or drop down from the clouds. But we see human beings born and developed every day. We see how their nature is affected by the law of heredity, and how they are influenced by environment; and we also see how much their development is determined by their own personal effort. Doubtless, this is evolution; but is it not also creation? Because human beings are produced by the operation, according to fixed laws, of forces immanent in nature, shall we therefore say that they are not divinely created beings? Do we not teach our children to say that God made them, although we know that they were not produced by an immediate act of God? Topsy said, "she was not made but growed." Now, Topsy was right in supposing that she grew; but she was not right in supposing that she was not made; for the forces immanent in nature that made her grow, and made her grow into this particular colored girl that she was, were, in the opinion of the theist at least, the divine thought and will realizing the eternal idea expressed in her individuality. Thus the evolutionist is right in supposing that natural or individual differences among men are due to a process of natural selection; and the Calvinist is right, too, when he supposes these differences to be due to a divine election. In fact we may say that the eternal act of election is realized in time through the process of selection. But both the untheistic evolutionist and the unethical Calvinist are wrong when they suppose that the human subject, in his concrete personality, is the product either of selection or of election alone, forgetting that there is in man a *self* that must work out its own salvation, and that it is only because of this self that man is worth saving.

Either selection alone, or election alone could only result in the production of *things*, not of *persons*. But man is the offspring of God, and that makes him a person, a child of God, and not a mere thing. Calvinists are much concerned for the *glory* of God. But a God who can give existence to *persons*, to free, self-determining children, is a far more glorious God, than one who could only give existence to *things*.

We have but one word more in conclusion; and that is that while this article has a somewhat controversial aspect in relation to Calvinism, it is not *original* but *modern* Calvinism that we have in view. Our controversy is not so much with the Calvinism of Geneva as with the Calvinism of Dort and of Westminister. Calvin was a predestinarian, like all the Reformers, whom the fear of Pelagianism drove to this extreme view; but there was in Calvin's system much truth that had no relation to the principle of determinism—truth relating to the person of Christ, to the church, the sacraments, and kindred topics—which the fathers of the Palatinate accepted and wrought into their Christian teaching, and which we highly respect. It was at Dort, more than half a century after the death of Calvin, that his system was transformed into the consistent *determinism* which we now know as *Calvinism*. And it is with this system that our controversy is concerned.

Sanctified by the Offering of the Body of Christ.

"By which will we have been sanctified through the offering of the body of Jesus Christ once for all," Heb. 10:10.

In the tenth chapter of the Epistle to the Hebrews the writer proposes to show that the Christian believer possesses in Christ all, and more than all, the benefits which the Jew expected to receive from the sacrificial system of the Mosaic law; but in a different manner, for the law is only a shadow, not the exact image, of Christian realities. The Jew looked for his salvation to the oft repeated sacrifices of the Mosaic system; the Christian is saved by the one sacrifice of Christ on the cross; which however

is a sacrifice in an essentially different sense from that in which the offerings presented on the altar were such. In proof of this truth the writer refers to the 40th Psalm, in the form which it had taken in the Greek version of the Septuagint; where the essence of true sacrifice is placed, not in the shedding and sprinkling of blood, nor in the burning of flesh and fat, but *in the doing of the will of God.* In the sense just indicated God, according to the teaching of the Psalm, has no pleasure in sacrificial offerings. The only true sacrifice consists in doing His will.

By "the will of God," which the Christ has come to do, and in the doing of which consists His saving sacrifice, is to be understood *the object or work willed.* It is that work which the Father gave Him to do, and which He accomplished with absolute fidelity and at the cost of the sacrifice of His life. That work consisted in the manifestation and glorification of the Father, and in the establishment of His kingdom in righteousness and truth. See John 17 : 14. The accomplishment of this work was what cost Christ His life; and in giving His life to His work consisted His sacrifice. The sacrifice of Christ was thus, not a passive event, but a moral work, through which He Himself was made perfect as the author of our salvation. His doing the will of God by accomplishing the work assigned Him, that is, by bearing witness to truth and righteousness, and by laying the foundation of God's kingdom in goodness and justice, made Him perfect as the eternal high-priest and king of humanity. It is in this view that the work and suffering of Christ are uniformly regarded in the Epistle to the Hebrews. The first reference of His suffering is to Himself, and its immediate effect is His own perfection. "It became Him, for whom are all things, and through whom are all things, in bringing many sons unto glory, *to make the author of their salvation perfect through suffering,*" Heb. 2 : 10. Again: "Though He was a Son, yet learned *He obedience by the things which He suffered;* and *having been made perfect,* He became unto all that obey Him the author of eternal salvation," Heb. 5 : 8, 9. See also Luke 13 : 32; John 12 : 23, and Luke 24 : 26, 46.

And now it is by, or in, this will, that is, on the ground of the work done as divinely willed, or on the ground of the accomplishment of the Christ's divine mission, that men are sanctfied —"sanctified once for all through the offering of the body of Jesus Christ." The adverb ἐφάπαξ, *once for all*, though the last word in the sentence, must be construed with *sanctified*. It can not be connected with *offering*, for in that case it would require the article which is wanting. There is no doubt that the term *sanctified* is here employed in an ethical sense, that is, in the sense of being made morally pure and holy, or made conformable to the divine idea of man. There are three words which this writer uses in what is practically the same sense, namely *sanctifying*, *purifying* and *perfecting*—ἁγιάζω, καθαρίζω, and τελείοω. The blood of Christ, it is said, "*purifies* the conscience from dead works, to serve the living God," Heb. 9 : 14 ; and by one offsring He has *perfected* forever them that are sanctified," Heb. 10 : 14. The general sense involved in these terms is the idea of purification, moralization and ethical perfection of the human personality. This idea may be taken, however, in a twofold signification, namely, first in the signification of an instantaneous objective moral experience, and, secondly, in the signification of a continued subjective moral process taking place in man himself through the operation of his moral faculties. Sanctification is a moral habit of the soul; but such habit can only be produced by the activity of a man's own will, or by an extended moral process in his own personality. Such process, however, is possible only on the basis of an objective divine act in his soul furnishing the energy of will for it, and giving promise of its completion. The word *sanctified* is used in both these meanings in our epistle; but in the passage now before us it is used in the objective sense, as is plain from the addition of the adverb *once for all*. It means that we are sanctified *potentially* and *virtually*, and that this involves the potency and promise of personal moral perfection.

And now this effect is ascribed to the offering of the body of Christ, but to this offering in its spiritual and ethical character.

It is the doing of the will of God that forms the content of the sacrifice of Christ, and gives it its value. The sacrifice of Christ, taken in this view, is regarded as an infinite moral act, which has the power of really, and not merely symbolically, cleansing men from sin, and thus making possible on the human side a real moral life according to the will of God, and on the divine side forgiveness for past sins and for present remaining infirmities. In some real way the essence of Christ's sacrifice, that is, the doing of the will of God, is reproduced in the life of the sinner; and the moment when that begins to be the case, God can look upon him, and he can look upon himself, as a *just* or *righteous* person. In the language of St. Paul this is called *justification*. Justification, or the forgiveness of sins, if this be understood in the sense of a liquidation of debt or remission of guilt, is not the *immediate* effect of the self-sacrifice of Christ. There is not one passage in the New Testament in which it is presented in that light. St. Paul is sometimes held responsible for the idea that the first effect of Christ's sacrifice is a *legal* effect, covering the sinner's guilt in the sight of God, and thus making it possible for God to be gracious. But even St. Paul makes the objective effect to be dependent upon the subjective; for Christ's being set forth in His blood, that is, as a sacrifice, comes to be a *propitiation* only *through faith*, Rom. 3:25. Where there is no faith there is no propitiation. The immediate effect of the sacrifice of Christ, then, is a moral effect; first in Christ Himself, who is thereby made perfect in His moral development; and then in the sinner, who is sanctified, purified and made perfect in the power of it. Christ obtained His sanctifying power by being Himself made perfect by the things which He suffered.

It is only mediately and secondarily, then, that Christ's sacrifice touches man's moral relation to God; but then it does so really and not merely constructively and symbolically. The atonement, accordingly, is not merely a legal transaction between Christ and God with reference to men; but it is primarily a work accomplished in man. Man needs to be reconciled to God, in order that God's attitude to man may be right. It is said

sometimes that God needs no atonement, that He is always reconciled, always well disposed towards man, and that man only is wrong. This, however, is not quite a correct statement of the relation between God and sinners. Of course, it is only man that is wrong; but so long as man is wrong, God's attitude towards him cannot be what He desires it to be; just as the father cannot be to the prodigal son what he wants to be to him, until the latter comes to himself, and, repentant and sorrowful, returns to his home. God's fatherhood, indeed, is universal, but the sinfulness of disobedient and undutiful children must prevent Him from letting the blessings of fatherhood flow out unto them as freely and fully as He desires that they should. Hence God, too, needs atonement. To suppose that He could forgive sins without any conditions, or that He could make men blessed in sin, would be to suppose that sin has no reality for God. To make it morally possible for God to forgive sins, some compensation, some satisfaction must be found. But that can be nothing else than the conversion of the sinner. The only satisfaction that God can accept is that sanctification, that purification, that moral perfection which grows out of the reproduction of Christ's sacrifice in the person of the sinner. Other satisfaction there can be none. No moral law is ever satisfied by any thing other than obedience; and by that it always is satisfied. And this is the satisfaction which Christ accomplishes. Had Christ proposed to put Himself in the sinner's place, and to suffer the penalty of his sin in his stead, God would have said, no, that cannot be, the soul that sinneth it shall die. What Christ did was to offer Himself as a sacrifice in doing the will of God in opposition to a sinful world, and, having been made perfect by the things which He suffered, to become the author of salvation, through sanctification, to them that believe. And so, as the true mediator between God and man, He stands towards God as the absolute guarantee of human sanctification, and towards man as the absolute guarantee of divine forgiveness.

Christ can be to God the surety of sanctification because He,

in His perfection, is the author or cause of salvation, or of moral and spiritual wholeness, in man. By His doing of the will of God—by the accomplishment of the work which the Father gave Him to do, and which came to its completion in His death—He has become in humanity and history a power which can break the force of sin in all hearts, and sanctify and perfect all men. His blood has power to cleanse the conscience from dead works to serve the living God, or as St. John expresses it, to cleanse men from sin. This means not merely that reflection upon the suffering of Christ can bring to the conscience the thought or assurance of divine pardon. If that were all, then it would not differ in effect from the material offerings of the Old Testament, for these also could, at least from time to time, effect that thought. Nor does it mean that the suffering of Christ was a legal equivalent for the penalty of our sins; so that the conscience of the sinner may now rest at ease in the conviction that the debt is paid. But it means that the soul of Christ, the life of Christ having been made morally perfect, has power now to infuse a new moral life into men, and, by quickening their moral nature, to lift them out of the sphere of the flesh into the sphere of spirit, in which doing the will of God becomes not only a possibility, but an actual necessity and a delight. Thus in the blood of Christ there is established that new covenant of which Jeremiah speaks (Jer. 31 : 33), and to which there was a plain reference in the action of the last supper (Mk. 14 : 24; I Cor. 11 : 25)—that new covenant, which consists in this that God's law is written in men's hearts, that all know God, and that their iniquities are forgiven and their sins remembered no more. When Moses offered the covenant sacrifice in the wilderness (Ex. 24 : 1–8) the commandments of Jehovah were written in a book, and when the people heard them read, they said, all these things will we do; and then, in token of the covenant thus established, Moses sprinkled both the book and the people with the sacrificial blood which had been prepared. But now a new covenant is established in the blood of Christ, the essential characteristic of which is that the law of God is no longer an external letter written in a book, but an internal,

sanctifying, quickening spirit, bearing fruit according to its own kind.

But now how shall we conceive of the process by which this result is brought to pass? How are human hearts sprinkled with the blood of Christ, and consciences cleansed from dead works? How shall we conceive of the process by which the work accomplished by Christ becomes a principle of purification and santification in us? Can we conceive of it at all? Some have answered that we can not; and, therefore, they hold that there can never be any satisfactory *doctrine* of the atonement. All past theories of this profound mystery, it is believed, in one way or another do violence to the best Christian reason and conscience. The fact is too profound, too mysterious for our finite comprehension. But it is not for that reason any the less sure and comforting. And, so, many Christian thinkers, like Lotze, for example, would class the atonement among the incomprehensible mysteries of our spiritual life. We can feel it and be sure of it as a blessed reality; but we cannot explain it. "He who in an unprejudiced way," says Lotze, "allows the teaching of Christ and the history of Christ's life to influence his mind, without analyzing this impression, may be convinced that an infinitely valuable and unique act has occurred here on earth for the salvation of humanity. But the attempts to settle speculatively the contents and value of this fact, do not as a whole, lead to the end designed." And why should such speculative settlement of the contents and value of this fact be considered necessary? In order to live and enjoy existence, do we consider it necessary to explain the manner in which life originates or existence is maintained? But if we cannot tell how the human soul is made, why then should we suppose ourselves able to tell how it is redeemed? The one, certainly, is as great a mystery as the other.

There is doubtless much reason in this view of the case; especially when we remember some of the impossible theories of the past, which seem to us now as crude as are some of the primitive philosophical theories of the origin of the universe. And yet the Christian mind cannot be entirely satisfied to rest

in this position. It cannot cease to think on the subject, and to formulate its thought in definite propositions; and for such thought the Christian Scriptures, as well as the Christian consciousness, furnish certain data. Now among these data of Scripture there is none more rich and instructive than the statement in the Epistle to the Hebrews, quoted at the beginning of this article, to the effect that the moral work accomplished in and through Christ becomes a basis and principle of sanctification in man. The process of redemption, then, is not a physical, nor a legal, nor a magical, but a moral process. So much at least we can say with confidence. The process consists in the free moral reproduction in man of the moral work accomplished in Christ; but in such reproduction through man's own moral faculties under the stimulating, quickening influence of Christ. Christ sets His own character in the heart of man; but in doing so He makes use of man's own faculties. Or, in other words, the glorified Christ, through the activity of His living Spirit, writes upon the hearts of men, in living characters the law of His own moral life, and gradually stamps upon the soul His own living image; but in doing so He acts through the moral energies of the soul itself. Thus the Christian is by his own moral energy, but under the stimulating activity of the Spirit of Christ, transformed into the image of Christ, that is, he is *sanctified* and *perfected*. And this moral appropriation of Christ, we suppose, is what is meant by St. Paul when he speaks of "putting on Christ," ἐνδύσασθε τὸν κύριον Ἰησοῦν Χριστόν, Rom. 13 : 14, and what Christ Himself means when, in the Gospel of John, He speaks of eating His flesh and drinking His blood as the condition of possessing eternal life.

If now we would express, by a single term, the activity which Christ Himself exercises in this process of our sanctification, we could think of nothing better than the term *moral influence*, or *moral inspiration*. When used of the redeeming and sanctifying activity of Christ, however, these terms can not be used in the ordinary superficial sense in which they are usually understood. By moral influence we usually understand the moral

effect of a process of reflection. We think of a man's character, reflect upon his good deeds, and resolve to be like him. His character has then only as much force with us and over us as we choose to give it. And this we call *moral influence.* We may thus think of the character and life of our absent friends, or of eminent and good men in history. And we may be profited by such reflection. The ideal presence which we may thus give to the persons of good men and women, may impress us in such a way as to elevate and ennoble our spiritual life. The cult of the Virgin Mary and of the Saints may no doubt in this way come to have a good effect, provided it can be kept free from idolatry. And we may also thus think of the life, and deeds, and sufferings of Jesus Christ, and be benefited. It is in this way that the merely historical knowledge of Jesus becomes morally useful. To know what Jesus was, and did, and spoke, and suffered nineteen centuries ago, will have an important influence upon the human mind. But after all such historical knowledge of Jesus is not the highest kind of knowledge. It is this sort of historical knowledge that St. Paul has in mind, we think, when he speaks of knowing Christ *according to the flesh*, to which he opposes knowledge *according to the spirit.* And this historical knowledge, together with the effect which it may produce, is not the *moral influence* by which men are sanctified, purified, and perfected in Christ.

Moral influence in this latter sense means a creative, vitalizing, transforming impression of a present living personality. It means a touch of spirit by spirit, whereby, though not through any impartation of any physical or spiritual substance, but through vital excitation and stimulation, the life and character of the one are communicated to the other. There is doubtless much that is mysterious in the relations and intercourse of spirit with spirit. This is true even of the relations between different minds in this world. We can not understand just how one mind may influence another either for good or for evil. We feel that we have not described the whole process when we have called it reflective. But we have all experienced something of the power

that is in the life and character of a good man to affect the mind and conduct of other men. There is a moral power in the personality of a good man or woman, which spontaneously impresses itself upon those around, and tends to produce in them a character similar to that from which it proceeds. The character of one thus tends to reproduce itself in others; and the closer one soul comes to another the more easily does such reproduction take place. This gives us an idea of the kind of influence which Christ now exercises through the Spirit upon the souls of men. Not that we suppose that His influence may be fully explained in this way. His spiritual influence as much exceeds the influence of an ordinary man as His personality exceeds the personality of any other man; and His capability of coming into touch with the spirits of men everywhere now must be ascribed to His divinity. But in its nature His influence is re-creative, regenerative, sanctifying; and yet it is moral influence, and does not set aside the will and freedom of the man in whom it works. Take an illustration from nature. When the soft, warm breath of spring touches the plant, which has stood inactive and dormant during the winter's cold, and stimulates its life into new energy, causing the sap to rise and the buds to swell, the leaves to expand and the flowers to form, that would be creative, vital influence. And if we were to think of the plant as being endowed with will, and by a conscious activity of its own responding to the power that comes upon it from without, and freely co-operating with it and suffering it to produce results corresponding to the highest law of its own life—this would be a complete illustration of that moral influence which Christ, the perfected Author of our salvation, exercises in the hearts of men, and by which He purifies, sanctifies, and saves them.

Our salvation as thus considered is a moral reality. It is not the result of a legal fiction, of substitution, of hypothetical construction. And it seems to us that in such a matter as this we want reality, and that any faith which rests on a mere fiction, however venerable and hoary it may be, must sooner or later break down, especially in this age of exact scientific and moral

thinking. The religious teaching which shall satisfy men in this age must satisfy the demand for undoubted reality. If it makes any assumptions, they must at least be in harmony with the postulates of the theoretical as well as practical reason. But we are sure that the idea of the Christian salvation is not an assumption without any ground or reason; and we are sure that the Christian salvation is not a legal or theological fiction, but a real moral process and work in the heart of man. It has its basis, its root and ground, not in ourselves, in our intelligence or will, but in the power and influence of Christ, "who was dead for our offences, and raised again for our justification." We are saved by Christ; and yet we must work out our own salvation with fear and trembling. Our salvation is not a legal work, nor a physical work, that has been done for us, and that we need now only complacently to accept; but it is a moral work which we ourselves are bound to accomplish; and yet not we ourselves alone; for it is God in Christ that worketh in us both to will and to work, for His good pleasure.

The Question of Theological Education.

For some time past an interesting discussion has been going on, in various quarters, concerning the subject of theological education as related to the present condition of the churches. An animated debate on this subject took place at the International Congregational Council at Boston, last October, which was participated in by Dr. Hyde, of Bowdoin College, Dr. Fairbairn, of Mansfield College, Oxford; President Slocum, of Colorado College, Professor Moore, of Andover Theological Seminary, and others. Since then the discussion has been kept up in various periodicals and journals. For instance, the January number of the *Atlantic Monthly* and the January number of the *Forum* both contain interesting articles on the same subject, the former by Dr. Hyde, the latter by Dr. Slocum. It is our purpose in this article to present a report of this discussion, giving it, however, mostly in our own language, and adding such reflections of our own as the case may seem to call for.

The first point involved in the discussion relates to the character and quality of theological students, and has to do mainly with the question of beneficiary aid. There is a pretty widespread feeling of opposition to the plan of extending pecuniary aid to students for the ministry. In favor of this plan it may be said that, in consequence of the generally low pay which ministers of the Gospel receive, students cannot safely borrow money while in the course of their preparation, as the chances of repaying it afterwards are too uncertain. Consequently, if the plan of extending aid, which has long been pursued by the churches, were abolished, many worthy men would not now be able to get into the ministry. If they were compelled first to raise the money required for a college and seminary course by their own labor it would take so long that in many cases a man would have reached the dead-line before he could get in. It may also be said that as a man who has once entered the ministry is expected to give his whole time and energy exclusively to the service of the church, it is no more than right that he should receive at least some help in his preparation. The State educates young men for its services, paying all their expenses while in preparation, and good salaries afterwards, and there is no reason why the church should not do something of the same sort. On the other hand, however, it may be said that this plan results in bringing men into the ministry who possess little ability and less energy, and who will not amount to much in the service of the church. The pension system, it may be said, is always of doubtful propriety; but it is especially questionable when it proposes to pay men pensions for services not yet rendered. In answer to the argument that the abolition of the beneficiary system would result in greatly reducing the number of ministers, it may be said that this would be no great calamity, as it would tend to reduce the number of churches in many places which would be a direct benefit to Christianity. There are communities in which there are three and four times as many churches as can be properly supported; and a diminution of the number of ministers would tend to wipe out some of the superfluous church organizations.

It would also tend to raise ministers' salaries; and in view of the higher salaries in prospect bright young men could afford even to incur some debt in order to get into the ministry, as young men do in order to get into other professions.

Is there not reason on both sides of this question? It is undoubtedly true that the indiscriminate bestowment of aid attracts to the ministry men who could be employed to better advantage in some other calling. Sometimes men who have neither talent nor piety select the ministry as their "trade," because it costs them nothing to get into it, and seems to promise them an easy life when they are in. It is true also that there is not the same need now for multiplying ministers, which there was at the time when the beneficiary system was adopted by the different churches. Then ministers were scarce; now the number is about large enough. But there is greater need than ever that ministers of the Gospel should be men of the highest order of mind and heart. On the other side, it is true also that occasionally there are men of large minds and large hearts, who can be of the highest service in the ministry, but have not themselves the means of getting there. In these cases it seems eminently proper that the church should extend to them some pecuniary aid during the period of their preparation. They will pay it back manifoldly, sometimes in actual money, but always in efficient service. We do not believe, then, that the offer of pecuniary aid should be wholly withdrawn, but that beneficiary boards should be very careful in the selection of their beneficiaries. Some standard of scholarship as well as undoubted evidence of piety might very properly be required as a condition of receiving aid. In no case, however, should the granting of such aid be considered as a check upon the mental freedom of the recipient. The theological student must be free to think for himself and reach his own conclusions by his own mental activity. Any young man who should be willing, for any consideration, to forego this right, would not be worth having in the ministry.

The next point at issue relates to the choice of theological teachers, and involves the question whether they should be

shackled by subscription to a theological creed. The requirement of creed subscription, it is claimed by many, must necessarily result in filling theological chairs by men who are either *incompetent* or *dishonest*. Dr. Hyde, at the Boston Council, laid down the proposition, as one in which all were agreed, "That the signing of a creed by a professor is an anomaly—that a Protestant cannot teach a creed that varies a hairsbreadth from what he believes." A teacher of theology must not only possess knowledge and ability, but he must also have a theological conscience, and may not teach what he does not thoroughly believe to be true. Hence to ask a man in advance that he shall teach only in accordance with a given creed, it is said, is to offer him an insult. And this is true not only of professors in schools of theology, but also of preachers. But now the taking of an oath by which a man binds himself to preach or teach only in accordance with the dictates of a certain creed is said to be a violation of this principle of theological honesty. The creeds are not infallible. This is a proposition that is acknowledged by all Protestants. If they were infallible, there could not be so *many* of them, contradicting each other in vital parts. The creeds are not unchangeable. They are capable of improvement. This is a proposition that would be admitted by all Protestants, we suppose, without exception. But if that be so, then what right has a church to bind its teachers and preachers to teach and to preach nothing but what is contained in a given creed or confession? Is not that equivalent either to forbidding them to think at all, or bidding them to say what they do not think, in case they must think? Does it not make mere machines of them? Some, indeed, try to get over the difficulty here presented, by admitting that creeds may be changed, but claiming that individuals are bound to think in conformity with them until they are changed by proper authority. They say to men who are restless under their fetters, get your creed changed by general assembly, and then it will be lawful for you to believe what now you may not believe. This is attributing to outward authority more influence in matters of faith than is consistent with Protestantism. And, then, it is a false conception

of the origin of creeds. Creeds are not so easily made or changed as is here supposed. In fact it reminds us a good deal of the heathen notion of the way in which gods are made. The Israelites set up their golden calf, and then shouted, "Lo, these be thy gods, O Israel!" So now it seems to be supposed that men, or an assembly of men, may almost at any time set up a series of propositions, and then cry out, "Lo, these are your creeds, O ye faithful." This after all does not imply a very lofty conception of the character of creeds.

In fact, it is said, this hedging around of theological teachers implies a sense of weakness in the churches and societies practicing it. Would they make such demands if they believed that their creeds were in all respects absolutely and demonstrably true? If a man were absolutely sure of some article of faith, would he ever grow nervous over its maintenance? Would he not suppose that its rationality would commend itself to all minds with the same force that it commends itself to his mind? "If a man is as sure of the truth of a theological position," says Dr. Hyde, "as he is of the law of gravitation, or of the equality of the three angles of a triangle to two right angles, he will not feel the need of stipulating that the professors in the institutions which he founds shall always teach those views which he holds. It is the doubter posing as believer that ties up teaching to a creed. * * * These creeds which are wound so tightly around our theological professorships are everlasting proclamations of the weakness of the doctrine they thus artificially protect." But there is another inconsistency here. These creeds which are so carefully protected by different denominations, are by these denominations themself regarded as indifferent and unessential to the development of Christian character. For instance, men who, if they dared, would burn a theological professor for departing in the least from the creed of the denomination to which he and they belong, will take by the hand a man of another denomination, who entirely ignores their creed, and call him *Christian brother*. Thus a Presbyterian will fraternize most lovingly with a Baptist or a Methodist. Now this is either hypocrisy or it is

sincerity. If it is sincerity, then it is a confession that after all the Presbyterian creed is not of so much importance as one might suppose, seeing how willing some Presbyterians are to persecute other Presbyterians for departing in the least from their confession. This exaltation of a creed is not consistent Protestantism. "The Protestant movement from the earliest time," says Dr. Slocum, "has maintained, subjectively and objectively, the rationality of theological truth and the supremacy of the human reason over against mere authoritative declaration." Faith cannot be established by authority, but only by the self-authentication of the truth to the rational spirit in man. It is Romish practice, not Protestant, to set up a theological doctrine by mere *authority*, and then maintain it by *violence*.

Should creeds, then, be entirely discarded, and should churches exercise no influence over theological teaching within their bounds? We hardly think that any of the eminent men who have been quoted above would be willing to go quite so far as this. We think some of the trouble in regard to this subject comes from the habit of not distinguishing between a *creed* and a *confession*, or a *creed* and a *system of dogmas*. A creed is a summary of fundamental and undoubted articles of Christian faith. The Apostles' Creed is the best illustration of the nature of a creed. Whatever may have been said in recent times in regard to the origin and history of its several articles, all will acknowledge that it is a most admirable compend of the fundamental facts of the Gospel. A confession is a logical comprehension and presentation of a certain group of related doctrines, which a church has adopted as the authoritative rule of its public teaching in regard to those doctrines. It does not speak on all theological questions, but only on such as have become prominent at a certain time and place; and on those on which it does speak, it speaks in the light and in the terminology of the age in which it originated. A dogmatic system, finally, differs from a confession in that it proposes to comprehend and systematize the whole sum of Christian truth. Now in view of these distinctions, it appears to be quite a different thing to propose to bind a theo-

logical teacher to a confessional or dogmatic system, from proposing to bind him to a creed. The articles of a creed must necessarily be few and simple; those of a confession or of a dogmatic system are usually many and complicated. No man can be a Christian without accepting at least some form of a creed. To the *qua creditur* there must necessarily correspond a *quæ creditur*. Nor could it be otherwise than that this should develop into some sort of a confession, or intellectual expression of truth. In this way all churches, whether they know it or not, have in fact a creed, and some sort of confession, too, however meager these may be. There is a confessional spirit which pervades the life of a denomination and causes it to differ from other denominations. And we certainly can see no disadvantage in such confession existing in a written form. It is not a legal code, and exercises its influence not so much by means of its letter as by its spirit. The Heidelberg Catechism is a confession. It was produced in the time of the Reformation for the purpose especially of settling the sacramental questions and the related group of doctrines. It bears the stamp of the philosophy and theology of its age; and, therefore, the Reformed Church very wisely requires of its preachers and theological teachers acceptance only of "the *doctrinal system* of the Heidelberg Catechism"; or of "the *doctrine* (not *doctrines*) contained in the Catechism." There are many doctrinal questions in regard to which the Catechism is entirely silent. It has, for example, no doctrine of inspiration, no list of canonical books, no theory of the trinity, of the person of Christ, or of the last things. It has, however, a distinct spirit; and to that spirit its confessors are bound rather than to its letter. If other churches were as broad and liberal in regard to this matter of subscription as the Reformed Church has always been we do not believe that there would now be any trouble anywhere. In our church, professors, students, and ministers are expected to be conscientious and honest in their investigation of the Bible and of theological questions; and if once in a while men rise up and invite them out of the church for being thus earnest and honest, these are not the men who love the church

most and have done the most for her welfare. Dr. Joseph F. Berg, whom our readers will remember from the tremendous castigation which he once received from Dr. Nevin in the *Mercersburg Review*, is a pertinent illustration of what has just now been said.

The next point in the discussion under consideration relates to the subject-matter of theological education. What should theological students be taught? What branches of theological learning will be of most importance to the future minister, and should therefore receive most emphasis in the curriculum of a theological seminary? There is pretty general agreement now that the traditional curriculum which makes dogmatics, or as it used to be called *systematic theology*, the discipline of chief interest, is no longer satisfactory. The old conception of a theological education was to the effect that one should have much dogmatics, some church history, a little exegesis, and a very little homiletics. A man who was thus furnished was supposed to be well equipped for the work of the ministry in modern times. He would at least feel that he needed nothing more. In ordinary circumstances he would rehash his dogmatics to sleepy congregations; and in extraordinary circumstances, such as revivals, he would act the lion's part, which was *roaring*. At the present time there is a general feeling that all this is wrong, and that there is urgent need of a reform in the curriculum of theological studies.

In the first place it is demanded that a more modest position should be assigned to dogmatics than has been the case generally up to the present time; and in some institutions this change has been effected already. "Systematic theology," says Prof. Moore of Andover, "no longer occupies the place of overweening or monopolizing importance which perhaps it held in former times." There are, however, institutions in which one-third to one-half of the time is still devoted to this discipline; and perhaps in most of them it still occupies an overshadowing position. Weary weeks and months are still spent, if not in trying to find out how many angels could dance upon the point of a needle, at least in trying to discover how the angels were made, of how

many orders they are, what they are doing, and what service they are performing in the history of individuals and nations. There are still dogmaticians who seem to regard it as no hardships at all "to be compelled to teach what nobody knows." The swelling of dogmatic systems to inordinate proportions and their inclusion of great amounts of irrelevant material, that has no value for Christian faith and life, are the two circumstances which have brought dogmatic theology into disfavor with students and into disrepute with churches; so that all dry and ineffective preaching is now called *dogmatic*, though in fact there may not be much of a dogmatic character in it. Dogmatic theology is an important branch of theological education, and could by no means be dispensed with. And in a certain sense it is central, too, in the organism of theological disciplines. It is its business to place the student at the proper point of view from which to survey the whole field of theological science, and to furnish him the true principle of observation. Dogmatic theology properly has nothing to do with uncertain or doubtful speculations, unless it be to present them *as* doubtful. A dogma is an article of Christian faith or doctrine stamped as such by the authority of the church; and a dogmatic system is a logical comprehension and arrangement of these articles of Christian faith. The German name for this discipline is *Glaubenslehre*, the doctrine of faith, or of things that are believed. When, however, a work on dogmatics includes all sorts of things, doctrinal, historical and exegetical, true, false, doubtful and uncertain, then it loses its value, and the time spent in the study of it could be applied to better purpose. It is this circumstance that causes the outcry against dogmatics at the present time. This outcry, we are sure, will not result in banishing dogmatics from the theological curriculum. There will, however, be no reaction in favor of the overgrown and presumptuous dogmatics of former times; on the contrary the present movement will force dogmatics into its proper dimensions, assign it to its proper place, and hold it to its proper task.

In regard to the study of the Bible also changes are demanded.

The method which has prevailed hitherto almost exclusively has been to study the Bible in its original languages critically, exegetically, microscopically. Such study could, of course, extend only to a very small part of its contents. The students did not get much of the Bible; but what they did get they were supposed to get very thoroughly, and this would afford them a basis on which they could pursue their studies in this line afterwards. How many did so, we are not able to tell. We are afraid that in most ministers' libraries the homiletic commentary soon displaced the critical. But this minute study of the Bible in the old-time seminaries had its origin in a certain theory of inspiration. "The purely exegetical study of the Bible," says Dr. Moore, "the rigid grammatical exegesis, which had its root in the belief in verbal inspiration, and its reason for being in the belief that some essential doctrine might turn on a Greek aorist or the force of a Hebrew particle, has lost the importance which it possessed." That is doubtless true; and there are few now who would derive important dogmatic distinctions from a confusion of the particles ἐν and εἰς in the New Testament. The reader will remember what immense consequences have been built upon the preposition εἰς in the formula of baptism. That is a method of exegesis which we presume is now obsolete; not because the modern exegete possesses less, but because he possesses more knowledge of the New Testament than his predecessors did. No one would contend, however, that the critical study of the Bible should be abandoned. That would certainly be unreasonable at this time when critical theories of all sorts are so rife. But what is contended for is that the Bible should be studied more as literature, and that students should be more familiar with its contents and meaning as a whole. And besides this it is contended that more time and care should be given to the new discipline of *Biblical theology*. What has heretofore generally passed under the name of Biblical theology, was simply a doctrinal compendium fortified with proof-texts taken indiscriminately from the Old and New Testaments, more on the principle of sound than of sense. On this principle *any*

thing can be proven by the Bible; and works of this kind have also at times been designated by the more ambitious name of systematic theology. But what we mean by Biblical theology now is the inductive historical and critical study of the several books of the Bible, first by themselves, and then in relation to each other. We thus come to have a theology of Paul, of Peter, of John and of Jesus, separately, and then a theology resulting from the comparison of all of them; although this second stage has scarcely yet been reached. When thus studied by itself any book of Scripture yields a very different meaning from what it was supposed to mean when the preconceived notions of a dogmatic system were first read into it. The Epistle to the Romans in relation to the doctrine of predestination will afford a striking illustration of what has just now been said. Now such a discipline as that just described is cultivated in most theological seminaries, but not to the extent required. In some institutions the want here existing is supposed to be met by one lecture a week during the senior year. But this is not enough. Biblical theology should at least be put on a level with dogmatics.

But the most serious defect of theological seminaries, according to President Slocum, is the subordinate place assigned to *ethics*. Ethics is the science of conduct; and conduct, it has been said, is three-fourths of life, the other fourth being presumably thought or theory. Now if this be anything like a correct view of the proportion between conduct and thought in the moral life of man, then it would seem that ethics, and especially Christian ethics, should take a very conspicuous place in the course of theological preparation for the ministry. The same conclusion would seem to follow also from the fact that the great bulk of the teaching of Jesus was of an ethical character. In fact mere doctrine and ritual had but a small place in His thought. This importance of ethics is not now generally recognized. It is generally supposed that the very limited study of ethics in an academic course, turning mainly upon a few common places from Plato, Aristotle and Kant, is all that the case requires. Consequently some theological schools, it is said, make

no provision for Christian ethics at all; others devote, perhaps, one or two hours a week to the subject during one year, while to dogmatics they give three hours or more a week during the whole course of three years. In dogmatics we have to do with God's thoughts and works in relation to man; and in ethics we have to do with man's disposition and works in relation to God and his fellowmen. Which, then, is the most important of these disciplines? This question is not intended in an absolute, but in a relative sense—which is the most important to the *Christian minister?* And the answer to this question depends upon the view which is taken of the nature and aim of the ministry. If that aim is merely to produce results by magic operations, or by the proclamation of mysterious dogmas, then the minister wants no ethics; if that aim, however, is the production of character, then he wants to be deeply grounded in ethical thought.

Closely related to ethics is the new science of sociology. Sociology may be defined as the philosophy of human welfare. It treats of the nature of society, of the laws of its development, and of the conditions of its well-being. Now if Christianity has any thing to do with the well-being of man in society, then clearly sociology should have a place in the curriculum of a school of theology. It is, however, only recently that this science has gained any admission to such schools; and this admission is by no means general, and is looked upon with suspicion not only by theological professors, but also by preachers. President Slocum, in his *Forum* article, strongly contends that Christian sociology should have a much more prominent place in theological education than has yet been assigned to it; and there are many who will agree with him. They will hold that not only should individuals live according to Christ, but that society also should be constructed and governed according to Christ; and that if this were the case, but little energy would need to be expended in the "rescue of fallen men and women," which is now supposed to constitute the great bulk of the church's "work." There are many who believe that the want of familiarity with ethical and sociological thought is the cause of the helplessness of so many

ministers in the face of the social questions and difficulties of the present age; and that this is a serious obstacle in the way of the church's success. There are men who are mighty in metaphysical theology. They can tell all about the economy of heaven; but about the economic questions of earth they know about as little as children; and in the face of a strike they would be absolutely helpless. Yet it is the object of the gospel to redeem and sanctify man's life on earth. But how is this possible if the preachers of the gospel know nothing about man in his social relations? How, then, can they introduce the Christian idea into life?

The successful Christian minister in our day must know man, *contemporary* man, as he may be studied in psychology, in literature, in sociology, and especially in the actual life of society. To the minister such knowledge of man is as important as the knowledge of God. And it is the contemporary man that the minister has to do with, and whom he needs to know. There are doubtless ministers who know much about Adam. They know how he was made, with what perfections he was endowed, and how he fell, and became a sinner, and involved his whole race with himself in condemnation. But about the sinful men and women around them, about their temptations, about their hardships, about their thoughts and sentiments, and about the motives by which they are moved—about these things many a learned man knows absolutely nothing. How can such a man be successful in the work of the ministry? He may know "the word" well enough, but he does not know what to do with it. The successful farmer must not only know seeds, but also the soils best adapted to their growth. And so the successful minister must not only know the gospel which he is to preach, but also the nature of the hearts to which he is to preach. And the theological seminary is the place where he ought to be at least able to begin to get this knowledge. Hence provision should be made in the Seminary at least for a beginning of that "proper study of mankind, which is man." Some, indeed, seem to think that this knowledge of man is all that ministers require; and that this

knowledge can best be acquired through actual intercourse with men. Hence they argue that theological seminaries should be located in large cities, where the students could be sent out on the streets and into the slums for their education, without much scholastic trouble either to professors or students. If that were a correct theory, then the bootblacks and newspaper boys, who spend all their time on the street should, without any further training, make the most successful preachers of the gospel. No, the preacher requires *knowledge;* but it must be practical knowledge as well as theoretical; and it must be knowledge of man and his affairs as well as knowledge of God.

And finally, the preacher's knowledge must be real and vital knowledge. In the first place it must be his own knowledge. He must have acquired it by the exercise of his own faculties. That is the only knowledge of which a man can be sure, and which he can preach with the fervor and fire that will convert men. Mere knowledge at second hand, the knowledge of dead formulas received by tradition, can never have such a result. From this point of view objection is often made to dogmatics. No theological discipline is as a rule so impatient of contradiction and questioning, as this. Its propositions are ready-made formulas, which professors need only to dictate, and students to copy, and carry home with them rejoicing. But this is not getting knowledge, at least not real and useful knowledge. The committing to memory of finished formulas in any department of study will not make a theological scholar. And theological seminaries should be so conducted as to lead their students to get their own thoughts by their own thinking. Not to pour ready-made thoughts into their students, but to help their students to do their own thinking, should be the prominent task of schools of theology. The good teacher is not one who does all the student's thinking for him, but one who makes the student feel that he too is a thinker.

Changes in Religious Thought.

During the early part of the present century there were two leading systems of religious thought prevailing in the United States. These were Calvinism and Armenian Evangelicalism. Though differing in many respects, and being commonly at war with each other, yet they were both regarded as in general orthodox. There were other systems, like that produced by the Unitarian revolt in New England, and the Roman Catholic faith elsewhere; but these were decidedly unorthodox, and did not exercise much influence over the religious life of the country. That was controlled, more or less in all the existing denominations and sects, by the systems of thought mentioned above.

Calvinism was the faith of the Puritans, but controlled the religious thought and life among Congregationalists, Presbyterians and Baptists generally. It was a strong faith, and produced a strong, but not very attractive, sort of religious character. In its doctrine of God Calvinism emphasized mainly the idea of *will*. The conceptions of reason and of love were very much obscured. God was represented as an absolute sovereign, who in His treatment of the world is governed by the mere pleasure of His will, not by any considerations of reason and love. Even His justice partakes of an arbitrary and capricious character, and is not at all like what is generally meant by justice in human relations. In its doctrine of man Calvinism laid stress upon the idea of total depravity and moral impotence. All men are born as depraved and condemned sinners, in consequence of the disobedience of the first man which is imputed to them by the judgment of God. Out of this mass of perdition, however, God is pleased to save some for the manifestation of His glory. These owe their salvation entirely to an act of sovereign election, while the rest are passed by as reprobates, and doomed to perdition. The most certain evidence of being elect is a willingness to be damned for the glory of God; but as that is a grace which not many possess, the probability is that but few will be saved. In its Christology Calvinism emphasized mainly the divine side

of Christ's person. His humanity was not appreciated, and His moral life not understood. He was supposed to have had but little in common with men. In fact, He was only brought into the world to serve as victim for the satisfaction of divine justice, and to make possible the salvation of the elect, to whom His righteousness is imputed in justification. The religious life growing out of such a faith could not be otherwise than stern, austere, gloomy, forbidding. All are familiar with the story of New England Sabbath keeping and church going, as it had been told by Edwards, Bushnell, Beecher and others. The highest virtue consisted in the acceptance of the most unreasonable dogmas. The religious life, instead of being a joy, was a martyrdom, especially to the young.

The Evangelical system was, upon the whole, not much better. It rested upon the same fundamental presuppositions. Its doctrines of God and man were essentially the same as those held by the Calvinists. Only at one point did it make a serious modification. It denied the limitation of divine grace to an elect few, and maintained that God desires the salvation of all men. The atonement, accordingly, is universal. Christ has satisfied the divine justice and appeased the divine wrath in behalf of all men. But the reception of this grace has been made dependent upon the fulfillment of certain conditions. These are a hearty consent to the divine plan of salvation, which is called faith, on the one hand, and the realization of it in an exalted state of feeling, on the other. As in the Calvinistic system a consciousness of election is necessary in order to an assurance of salvation, so here a closing with the overtures of mercy in something of an ecstatic condition of mind is the only sure evidence of being in a state of grace. Being in a state of grace, however, has no direct relation to life or conduct. To be able to point back to some moment when one "got religion" or "received the blessing" was considered equivalent to having obtained a "title to mansions in the skies," without much regard to the character of one's life. But as comparatively few only were able to "experience the change," it followed that few only would be saved; and these only

had a right to be in the church. As in Calvanism there was an aristocracy of election, so here there was an aristocracy of feeling, enjoying privileges to which the rest of mankind are strangers. In both of these systems religion is something ghostly, something apart from the common life of men, and independent of real human helps and conditions. The church, though believed to be a directly divine institution, with charter and by-laws carefully laid down in the New Testament, was yet not regarded as contributing anything essential to salvation. Salvation is not through the church, but directly from heaven; and about the only benefit there was believed to be in the church was that it affords an opportunity for people occasionally to renew their experience of the blessedness which came to them "when first they knew the Lord."

At the present time we think it must be plain to all intelligent observers that both these systems of religious thought are virtually dead. The leading conceptions by which they were characterized have either become unintelligible or wholly obsolete; and the religious life has suffered a corresponding modification. The process of dissolution has been going forward in these once honored systems of thought for many years, and is now, at the close of the century, about completed. Many, of course, have witnessed this process with painful emotions, for it seemed to them to be the destruction of all religion; and there may be some who look upon it in that view still, and upon occasions utter their protests against "the evil times upon which we have fallen." And, indeed, in many instances the loss of the old faith may be equivalent to the total abandonment of all faith. This, however, is perhaps not as serious a loss as it might at first sight appear to be; for those who have lost their faith in consequence of the change which has taken place in religious thought, are for the most part persons who under the old systems would not have been religious anyway. There were always numbers of people who believed in religion, and who also believed that either Calvinism or the current Methodistic Evangelicalism were the exclusive legitimate forms of it; but they themselves could not be religious in either

fashion. They could not accept the rigid doctrines and hard manners of Calvinism, or suffer the uniform method of Evangelicalism to be applied to them; and these are the people who constitute a large portion of the ever-increasing number of the unchurched masses. It may be admitted, however, that in some cases the breaking up of the old systems of faith has left men without any religion, who might otherwise be still in the church.

But the process of change has not been merely negative and destructive, but also positive and constructive. Man is by nature a religious being, and cannot rest long in mere negation of outworn forms of religious faith and practice. Moreover Christianity is life; and as one form of manifestation, in creed and dogma and ceremony gives way, it will immediately create a new and better form. What then, is the new form of faith and of religious thought by which the old forms have been and are now being displaced? Has the change destroyed our faith in God and in His providence? Has it taken God away from us? No, it has brought Him nearer to us, and made Him more approachable. A certain monk, when he had heard unanswerable arguments to the effect that God is not a physical being with a material body, such as he had previously imagined Him to be, exclaimed "They have taken away my God, and now I have no one to pray to." Foolish monk, he had no idea that an omnipresent spiritual being can more easily hear and answer prayer than the idol to whom he had previously offered his worship. His faith suffered no loss by the change which it was bound to undergo. And so our faith has suffered no loss, but has been benefited by the change which has come over our conceptions of God and of other religious realities.

The new theology has presented God to us, not as an absolute being or power with as little reason and feeling as the force of gravitation, nor as an irate judge who hates all that He has made and can with difficulty be restrained from hurling bolts of destruction in all directions, but as a rational and loving Father who is not beyond the world but in it, and always caring for His children, and giving them food and raiment and every good thing.

It has presented Christ as a true revelation of the Father in a real human life. It has taught us to take in earnest the word of Jesus: "He that hath seen me, hath seen the Father." The Father's heart and the Father's love are manifested truly in the life and suffering of Christ. And it has presented man as in a true sense the offspring of God, who, though sinful and perverse, is still the object of the divine love and care. Resuming again a thought that was current in the early Greek church, before Augustinianism was born, the new theology has represented God as a careful, loving, patient *Teacher*, and man as His pupil who is slowly and with difficulty prepared and trained for his high destiny. The history of humanity is a process of divine education. Redemption is not the rescue of already condemned sinners, by a work performed outside of them, but the development, the education, the training, with infinite patience, of disobedient and often rebellious children. And salvation is not the consequence of a legal fiction and substitution, but a moral process accomplished in the sinner by the love of the Father, the grace of the Son, and the influence of the Spirit, and ending in God-like character. It is sometimes charged that the new theology, in representing God as Father, obscures His justice. Far from it. The conception of God as Father is an intensely ethical conception. So just and holy is God believed to be that He can never consent to the salvation of the sinner by any other than an ethical process. And a real Christian life, according to the new theology, does not consist in the performance of meaningless ceremonies and the profession of incredible doctrines or unearthly experiences, but in the practice of those humane virtues which, according to Christ himself, will form the standard of judgment in the last day, Matt. 25:31–46. The church, too, is coming to have a new significance in the new theology. Though no longer regarded as a divine institution, fully equipped and furnished from the beginning, about whose divine polity however there may be endless disputes, she is coming to be regarded as a spiritual organism, growing more and more in consequence of the presence in it of a divine life, and serving as a bosom of gracious

powers, under the pressure of whose environment God's children are cherished and trained for eternity. Surely these are changes in religious thought that should not be regretted. The new is better than the old, although it may at first offend somewhat the old traditional taste.

Among Our Exchanges.

The leading article of *The Presbyterian and Reformed Review*, for January of the present year, extending through 54 pages, is a criticism of Dr. McGiffert's *History of Christianity in the Apostolic Age*, by Dr. William P. Dickson of Glasgow. At the outset Dr. Dickson says of this work that "it has the novelty of being an original contribution to the literature of the subject by an American scholar, and the further novelty of reaching its results by methods hitherto more familiar to the German than to the English reader." That means that American scholars are not generally supposed to be competent to produce such works, and that the appearance of one who is competent has the effect of a novelty; and that this effect is heightened by the observation that this American scholar is able even to use the learned methods of the Germans. The critic, however, continues, saying that "the book reproduces in language and method faults or fallacies that are current in German criticism, but are not so readily allowed to pass without challenge in this country." Nevertheless, it is said to be "a book marked by freshness, vigor, and adequate scholarship as well as readiness of resource, power of ingenious combination, and ample license of conjecture, discarding commonly received opinions and advancing others with singular freedom and self-confidence." After these general remarks the critic proceeds to examine the rhetoric, logic, history, and theology of the book, and finds it to be such a book as he himself would not have written at all. The critic, however, seems always to be calm and never to lose his temper, or indulge in angry denunciation. And judging from this criticism one would suppose Dr. McGiffert to be an author who is bold, fresh, subjective, illogical,

learned, self-opinionated, confused, inconsistent, Teutonic, and about everything else that is objectionable in an author, except *being dangerously heretical.* The following may be taken as an example of this manner of criticism. Dr. McGiffert, speaking of the difficulties in the Christology of the Epistle to the Colossians, says: "When it is realized that the author's object was not to teach Christology, but to emphasize the completeness of Christ's redemptive work in order to show the groundlessness of the observances and practices recommended in Collosae, the difficulties vanish." On this the critic makes the following remarks: "What peculiarity in the word 'realized' leads to its selection on this occasion? What does it mean as contrasted with *assumed* on the one hand and *proved* on the other? Is it greatly different from the familiar process of begging the question? Why should we negative or disclaim it as an object of the author of the Epistle to the Colossians to teach Christology so far as he saw fit or needful for his purpose?" That kind of word-criticism abounds throughout this article.

We do not consider this kind of criticism very strong, or very effective so far as its evident aim is concerned. And yet we are glad to see it in the *Presbyterian and Reformed Review.* We are glad to see that somebody, doubtless with the approbation of the editors of that *Review*, has undertaken to *reason* on the matter of the book which has been so much condemned. That is as it should be. Where there are differences of opinion on any subject, it is better to reason than to pronounce anathemas. It is only by reasoning, by calm discussion, that error, where it exists, can be overcome. There is no use now in saying that an opinion or doctrine is contrary to "the standards," or in reading a man out of the church and pronouncing curses upon him for holding it. And we rejoice to see that the editors of the *Presbyterian and Reformed Review* have chosen the better way of criticism and reasoning. But we hope that they will hereafter remember that, having undertaken to reason, it would ill become them to take part in the *cursing.* The pope, when he means to curse, does not reason.

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Apropos of the above we quote a few paragraphs from an editorial article in the *Methodist Review*, Nashville, Tenn., for March and April, 1900. Speaking of the case of Professor Briggs, the editor of this valuable journal says: "The major moral is the sad lesson of the actual ecclesiastical situation: American Presbyterianism has lost her scholarly and loving presbyter: and the presbyter has passed under a prelate's hands to remain a Presbyterian still. Where the blame is to be placed, or how it should be divided we know not. But we end as we began, declaring that we cannot tell which is the more to be pitied, the church which has lost her presbyter, or the presbyter who has lost his church.

"Since the preceding editorial was written, we learn that the New York Presbytery, by a vote of seventy-seven to thirty-nine, has decided not to try the Rev. Dr. A. C. McGiffert, professor in Union Theological Seminary, on the charges of heresy preferred by the Rev. Dr. G. W. Birch. This action commends itself to our judgment as a wise and wholesome decision. We have read every word of the book out of which it was proposed to establish these accusations of heresy. There are some things in the book we do not believe to be true; there are many other things we should prefer to see put in a very different way. But the perusal of the volume leaves one with a very distinct impression that Dr. McGiffert is a scholar, a Christian, and fit to be a Presbyterian clergyman and a professor. His book, as a whole, does high honor to the church of which he is a member and a minister, and to the seminary of which he is a professor. Presbyterianism cannot afford to drive this man from her fold; and Dr. McGiffert does not deserve to be forced out of the Presbyterian ministry and church. We venture to believe and to predict that Dr. Briggs' is the last of the great heresy trials in the Presbyterian church for some years to come."

To all that we can heartily subscribe. We are sorry, however, to be compelled to state that the prediction above expressed does not at present seem likely to be realized. Dr. Birch has appealed the case to the General Assembly; and unless Dr. Mc-

Giffert shall voluntarily withdraw from the church which he loves and in which he has a right to be, the case will have to go to the Assembly for trial. Men wiser and better than Dr. Birch, who dread the effects of another heresy trial upon the church and upon the outside world, are making frantic appeals to Dr. McGiffert and his friends to induce him to withdraw from the Presbyterian ministry. Whether he shall yield to these appeals and go out, or whether he shall allow himself to be driven out by the assembly, we know not. But in either case it is a sad day for the Presbyterian Church when a man of undoubted scholarship and of unquestioned piety can find no peace and no room in her bosom. What has the Presbyterian Church come to? Will it proclaim itself to be only a club banded together for the support of "the standards"? What would Christ say to that? Or does the Presbyterian Church no longer care?

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The *Catholic World*, New York, for March, 1900, devotes considerable space to the case of Dr. Mivart, in which Protestants and Catholics are alike interested. St. George Mivart, the distinguished English scientist, has been a life-long Roman Catholic, and has often been pointed to by Catholics as a proof that their church is not hostile to science. But all this has now come to an end, for Dr. Mivart's scientific conscience has led him to embrace views in regard to Christian doctrines which have been declared antagonistic to Catholic teaching, and for the holding of which he has been read out of the church, which is the worst punishment that can now be inflicted upon recalcitrant heretics. Dr. Mivart was led to take his present position gradually; but the case came to a crisis somewhat suddenly, last January, by the publication of two articles, one in the *Nineteenth Century*, and the other in the *Fortnightly Review*, in which he assailed fundamental articles of the Catholic faith, such as those relating to the infallibility of the church, the immaculate conception of Mary, and the reality and transmission of original sin, and asserts that there are many Catholics of high standing who go much further in the denial of Catholic dogmas than he does.

Cardinal Vaughan then submitted to him a confession of faith, which he endeavored to induce him to sign; and failing in this, he issued a circular to his clergy informing them that the distinguished professor is excommunicated.

In regard to this event the *Catholic World* says: "The deepest sentiment that prevails with us, as we look back over the Mivart case, is that of profound pity for the old man, with the feebleness of seventy years in his step, as he goes out from the church of his strength and maturity to wander alone among the stranger, with no priest to shrive him and no sacraments to comfort him. Not a few will offer up their prayers that he may bend the knee in submission before the end comes." That sounds pathetic; but we do not believe that the "old man" will be much moved by such appeals. The fact is, that he had fully counted the cost before he took the irrevocable step; and it was only after recovering from a serious illness, from which he had been told that he would not recover, that his conscience would no longer suffer him to be silent. His resolution to bear his testimony to the truth as he had come to see it, was taken deliberately, conscientiously, and in the very face of death; and he will probably not be much disturbed now by the prospect of having no priest to shrive him when he shall come to die.

The *World* comments on the case further as follows: "It is significant in this deplorable affair with what unanimity the non-Catholic religious press commended the church's strong attitude in favor of dogmatic truth. The *Outlook*, however, was an exception. Because Cardinal Vaughan required, in the name of the church, 'a hearty and *intellectual* acceptance of her teaching,' the *Outlook* declares that this is requiring of Mivart 'nothing less than an abdication of reason,' It is not so; the act of faith is a highly intellectual act. It is the belief in divinely revealed truth, as presented by an unerring messenger, and it is the highest act of reason to yield submission to One who is the Way, the Truth, and the Light. This of a necessity places the final authority in matters of faith not within the individual, but without him."

We do not know to what extent the non-Catholic religious press may have declared in favor of the attitude of the "church" in this case. In as far as it has done so it has betrayed the cause of freedom of thought. There may be journals which, being blinded by controversies within their own denominations, may have been led to do so; but such journals, in order to be consistent, ought to cease to be non-Catholic. A denial of the liberty of theological thought is only consistent on the supposition of the infallibility of the authority of the church. We believe with the *Outlook*, that Cardinal Vaughan's demand involves nothing less than an abdication of the reason. If it were our duty absolutely to think, not as our reason, but as the authority of the church directs, then the highest act of reason would be to slay itself. We agree with the *World* that the final (ultimate) authority in matters of faith and morals is not within the individual, but without him. But that authority is not in the pope, nor in any council, but in Christ. He is the One who is the Way, the Truth, and the Light—the absolute reason, or Logos, to whom submission on our part is the highest act of reason. But submission to Christ is not the same as submission to somebody's interpretation of Him, though that somebody may pretend to be His vicar. Submission to Christ may sometimes require resistance to outward authority parading in His name, as it did in the case of the reformers.

VIII.

NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

CALVINISM. The L. P. Stone Lectures for 1898–1899. Six Lectures Delivered in the Theological Seminary at Princeton. By Abraham Kuyper, D D., LL.D., M.P. Pages, 275. Fleming H. Revell Company, New York. 1899.

The lectures comprised in this volume constitute a message to American Christianity from a past age as well as from beyond the sea. Dr. Kuyper, Professor of the Free University of Amsterdam, Holland, is a Calvinist pure and simple, for whom the Calvinistic construction of Christianity is the end not only of all controversy, but of all thought. And it is Calvinism pure and unmitigated, although at a few points thinly disguised under modern forms of speech, that he offers to the modern world as the remedy for all its ills. The literary form in which this remedy is presented to the American public is not a happy one. The volume is printed in clear type, on good, white paper; but the style is heavy, and the book must be read with *forced* attention. This is doubtless due partly to the fact that the author is a foreigner to whom the English language, which of course he understands perfectly well, is after all not an easy medium for the expression of thought, and partly to the fact that the subject is a difficult one, and, as conceived by the author, too large to be well handled in the brief space at his command. The book, therefore, is not light reading, and will be read through only by persons particularly interested in theological studies. The proof-reading also was done carelessly, and there remain numerous typographical errors to offend the eye, if not to distort the sense.

The subjects of the six lectures respectively are the following: Calvinism, a Life-system; Calvinism and Religion; Calvinism and Politics; Calvinism and Science; Calvinism and Art; Calvinism and the Future. By *life-system* the author means a general conception of the world, something like what the Germans call *Weltanschauung*. Calvinism is that conception of the world which apprehends everything from the point of view of the divine causality and sovereignty. The other leading world conceptions with which Calvinism is contrasted, are Paganism, Islamism, Romanism and Modernism. Paganism, according to Dr. Kuyper, confounds God and the world, and worships God in the creature; Islamism separates them, and permits no union; Romanism unites them by means of a mystic middle-link, which is the church; Calvinism assumes an immediate fellowship of God with the elect, and denies all mediation between Him and the creature. Modernism has, in fact, no God at all. It is the principle of the French

Revolution, which is atheism; for the Revolutionists abolished God, in order that mankind might be without any master. Modernism is the religion of the greater part of the modern world; for though constitutionally and essentially atheistic, it still pretends to be something of a religion. In fact it is natural religion, cultivated for selfish purposes. "It is and remains a religion," says our author, "fostered for man's sake, aiming at his safety, his liberty, his elevation, and partly also at his triumph over death," p. 51. And this is the principle which underlies all the religious and philosophical systems of modern times, from Schleiermacher to Pfleiderer. One of the vices of this Modernism is that, as it abolishes the sovereignty of God, it effaces all distinctions in human society, reducing everything to a dead democratic level. On p. 26 the author characterizes it as follows: "Finally, Modernism, which denies and abolishes every difference, can not rest until it has made man woman and woman man, and, putting every distinction on a common level, kills life by placing it under the ban of uniformity."

As a religious system Calvinism, according to Dr. Kuyper, is distinguished by the following four characteristic conceptions: first, religion does not exist for the sake of man, but for the sake of God and His glory; secondly, religion permits no deviation between God and man, no church; thirdly, religion is not *partial*, but is intended for the whole life of all men; fourthly, religion is not normal to our nature, which is fallen, but abnormal, as it comes from a source outside of man. This may be allowed to be in the main a correct representation of Calvinism as a religious system. Its truth and its harshness appear in these propositions. It is true, of course, that God must be the supreme object of religious activity; and all systems of religion in fact acknowledge this truth. But this truth may be so emphasized as to bring dishonor upon God instead of honor. When God is represented as being so bent upon His own glory that He hesitates at no means of promoting it, He becomes a selfish and immoral being, whom one can neither respect nor love. And this we believe to be one of the faults of Calvinism, as well as of every system of thought which treats God not from the standpoint of rational love, but from the standpoint of mere absolute sovereignty. In regard to the second conception, we hold it to be true that religion is in essence an immediate communion of the soul with God; but this does not exclude the service of a church and ministry in the development of religion in the soul. Here is one of the points at which we would urge our most serious objection to Calvinism. Dr. Kuyper says: "In all religion God must be the active power. He must *make* us religious; He must give us the religious disposition, nothing being left to us but the power to give form and expression to the deep religious sentiment which He Himself stirreth in the depth of our heart." In this sentence we accept only so much as true as implies that the religious disposition or aptitude, the religious na-

ture, comes from God. The intellectual nature, too, comes from God; but intelligence, instead of being a direct and passive gift from God, is the product of the voluntary activity of that nature. So the religious nature is the gift of God; but piety, or the exercise of that nature, is of man, not in the sense of a mere spontaneous operation, but in the sense of a self-determined activity; so that the man who is not pious is responsible for the omission. To affirm the contrary would be of the essence of determinism, and would be to reduce man from the dignity of a *person* to the condition of a *thing*, and to rob him of all value in the eyes of his Maker, as well as in his own eyes. But in order to the development of the religious nature the services of a ministry and church, with her sacraments and sacred ordinances, may be a very important help. We believe that Calvinism is right in objecting to sacerdotalism, and to everything that looks like magical operation in religion; but we cannot consider it right when it rejects everything like moral mediation and influential help, and reduces religion merely to an abstract spiritualistic relation dependent solely upon the absolute will of God. Calvin himself made much account of the church, the ministry and the sacrament as means and helps to the development of the religious life in the soul; while Calvinism, as represented by Dr. Kuyper, has not a word to say on these subjects.

Dr. Kuyper's third mark of Calvinism is its supposed religious *universality*. By this is meant its destiny for the whole life of the individual, and for the entire race of man. In this we believe; but we do not believe that this is a peculiar mark of Calvinism. In fact we hold it to be inconsistent with fundamental Calvinistic principles. How can it be said that religion, particularly in its special Christian form, is designed for all men, and that all men therefore ought to be Christian, when it is maintained that the majority of men are not elect, but reprobate by their creation? Dr. Kuyper argues against those who hold that religion, like art, requires a special organ of the soul; and that those who have not this organ have no call to be religious. He contends that the religious organ can not be wanting in any man; and in this we agree with him. But what sort of a being would God be, if He had given to all men a religious organ but withheld from any the grace by which only it can be exercised? Would this not be a most cruel gift? As to Dr. Kuyper's last point, we of course agree with him that Christianity is soteriological; but we do not agree with him that this makes it *abnormal*. Christianity, we hold, is not an outward addition to humanity, but the unfolding of its own original idea. It is not an afterthought of God's eternal world plan, but its central principle. In this point we agree with Calvin who was a supralapsarian, rather than with Dr. Kuyper, who is a sublapsarian; only, of course, we do not agree with Calvin as to the motive of Christianity. Calvin made it to consist in sin, and supposed that if there had been no sin there

Jewish nation, to kings, and to all saints. He admits also that, like *Son of Man*, the title *Son of God* is Messianic, and does, therefore, in itself not prove the divinity of Christ; but he thinks, nevertheless, that Christ, even in the Synoptists, uses the term in such way as to compel us to accept the doctrine of His metaphysical divinity. The impartial reader, however, will probably say that this conclusion is not reached without bringing into the argument material derived from sources other than those with which the author professedly deals. *The Messiah* forms the subject of the *fourth* section, in which we simply note the remark that the temptation of Jesus had its ground in the Messianic preconceptions of his countrymen, with which He had to break at the very beginning of His ministry; and the idea that in the teaching of Jesus the use of the term *Kingdom of God* rather than *church* resembles the goldsmith's use of alloy while working the finest gold, which is afterwards evaporated by the application of an acid. Jesus used the term *Kingdom of God* because it was the one with which His hearers were the more familiar, and the apostles afterwards very properly substituted for this the term *church*. We doubt whether this view will commend itself to many readers. As for ourselves we do not believe that the term church is a substitution for that of the kingdom. We believe that the two terms denote different conceptions.

The subjects of the last two sections respectively are *The Redeemer* and *The Judge*. These subjects are treated generally in the customary orthodox way. It must be remembered that Dr. Stalker treats the teaching of Christ only as it is contained in the Synoptic Gospels; but in these Gospels there are only two utterances relating to the subject of redemption, namely, those in which He speaks of giving His life as a ransom for many, and of His blood being shed for many; and out of these Dr. Stalker extracts the common doctrine of expiation though in a somewhat modified form. And here again the reader can not help feeling that the result is obtained, not from interpreting the passages contained in the Synoptists purely in their own light, but in the light of other portions of the New Testament, as well as in the light of ecclesiastical doctrine. In the last section the author says of the view that the resurrection of Jesus was not a reproduction of the physical body, "My own belief is that, were it to become general, Christianity would wither at its very root." *Our* own conviction is that this is staking the existence of Christianity upon a rather desperate throw. We believe that if the particular view of the resurrection referred to should prove to be the true one, Christianity would not wither at all, but would easily survive this change.

It remains yet to say, in conclusion, that not the least valuable part of this book consists of two lengthy appendices, one on Wendt's *Teaching of Jesus*, and the other on *The Book of Enoch*. The latter is especially valuable to the New Testament student,

as the Book of Enoch embodies much of the Jewish theology current in the century in which Christianity was born, and by which the writers of the New Testament can not have been wholly unaffected.

THE REVELATION OF JESUS: *A Study of the Primary Sources of Christianity.* By George Holley Gilbert, Ph.D., D.D., Professor in Chicago Theological Seminary. Pages xi + 375. The Macmillan Company, New York, 1899.

This book is in the line of the one referred to in the previous notice. It differs from it, however, in two characteristic respects. First, it treats of the revelation of Jesus in *all* the Gospels, while Stalker's treatment is confined to the Synoptists. And, secondly, it is consistently *historical* and *critical* in its method. Professor Gilbert does not allow himself to be influenced in the treatment of his subject by any dogmatic prepossessions. He does not interpret Christ by Paul or Peter, and much less, of course, by ecclesiastical tradition, but only by Christ Himself. In reference to this point he says, in the preface: "I can only say that this has been my constant aim, and that never, in the interpretation of a single passage or in the presentation of inductions from a group of passages, have I consciously had regard either to my own former views or to the theological consequences that might follow from the results at which I had arrived. I have tried to follow the thought of Jesus with the utmost accuracy, and I have certainly done so with the conviction that His thought is of the utmost value both to me and to all men. . . . We can get forward in Christian thought only as we become better grounded in the thought of Jesus. It would doubtless be wholesome to test our theologies by the teaching of Jesus; but it must be fatal to our Christianity to subordinate His teaching to our theologies." In reference to the sources of the teaching of Jesus, namely, the four Gospels, the author of the work before us remarks: "The time is certainly past when any student needs to apologize for regarding these documents as essentially trustworthy. This quality is visibly stamped upon them, and the stamp is attested by the unbroken existence and the unwasting power of the Church itself."

The entire material of the book is disposed in seven chapters with the following headings, respectively: The New Revelation of God; The Kingdom of Heaven; The Life of the Kingdom of Heaven; The Outward Development of the Kingdom of Heaven; The Person of Jesus the Messiah; The Messiah's Earthly Work; The Consummation of the Messiah's Kingdom. The revelation of Jesus attaches itself to the revelation of God in the Old Testament, and in that respect is not new; but it is new in this respect that it carries the revelation of God at once to a higher plane, on which old conceptions and doctrines have been transfigured and become new. This is shown very plainly in the case of the conception of God. That conception in the Old Testament was the notion of an absolute and universal sovereign. The Rabbis

looked upon God merely as an indefinitely magnified Rabbi; who spends His time in heaven very much as they spend theirs on earth, namely, in studying the law, and keeping its observances. True, God in the Old Testament is represented as the *Holy One* of Israel, and also sometimes in the prophets as the *Father* of Israel; but His holiness was regarded very much like that of the Rabbis, standing in legal performances and ceremonies, and His fatherhood involves merely the notion that He has created Israel. In the teaching of Jesus, as Professor Gilbert shows, the conception of God is at once thoroughly ethical. But the central conception of His teaching is the conception of the universal divine fatherhood. "In the thought of Jesus, according to the Synoptists, the fatherhood of God is the eternal heart of God, a term whose import is essential and universal." The divine fatherhood however, is ethical; and so Jesus, according to Professor Gilbert, "teaches that sonship to God is ethical in like manner. A man cannot say, God is *my* father, unless he is inwardly turned toward God. Therefore Jesus teaches that while God *is* a father, men *become* sons. . . Men become His sons as they come into the sphere of his love. Hence that which constitutes them sons is inward, not outward; spiritual rather than physical. But the fatherhood of God does not begin when this sonship begins. His fatherhood has neither beginning nor end. He does not *become* a father, but *is* one, for the term 'fatherhood' is only a human means of describing what God is."

We know of nothing more satisfactory on the teaching of Jesus concerning the nature, life, and development of *kingdom of heaven* than the three chapters devoted to this subject in the volume before us. We note but two points, namely, the discussion of the words of Jesus in the third chapter of John concerning the birth of water and the spirit, and of those in the sixth chapter concerning the eating of His flesh and drinking of His blood. We all know what exegetical shuffling has been resorted to in order to get the idea of baptism out of the first passage. Professor Gilbert on the contrary rejects Wendt's suggestion that the phrase *born of water* is due not to Jesus but to the Evangelist, and admits that the only rational explanation of the expression is that which refers it to water baptism. He thinks, however, that the reference is not yet to Christian baptism, but to a baptism like that of John, which signifies such a moral and religious change as might be denominated a new birth. To eat the flesh and drink the blood of Jesus means to believe in Him as the Messiah. "It is spiritual appropriation of Him as the Messiah sent from God. Therefore it involves conviction of the understanding, allegiance of the will, and devotion of the heart. He who thus believes has indeed passed out of death into life; he is born from above or born of water and the spirit."

By far the most striking portion of the book is the chapter which treats of the *person* of Jesus; and this is the portion also

that will call forth most contradiction and opposition. The author's position on this subject may be expressed in one sentence by saying that, like Beyschlag, Baldensperger, and many others, he regards the consciousness of Jesus as *an entirely human consciousness.* There was nothing in the consciousness of Jesus, Professor Gilbert argues, that indicates conviction of divine sonship in a sense essentially different from that in which other men also may be sons of God. It must be remembered that Professor Gilbert takes no notice of anything beyond the revelation of Jesus *in His own words.* The history of the miraculous conception and birth, and the statement in the prologue of St. John's Gospel, lie wholly outside of his limits. The only question is, What does Jesus say of Himself? Does He represent Himself as God? And this question our author answers in the negative. Five general reasons are given for this position: first, Jesus recognizes God as the sole object of worship; secondly, He Himself prays to God in a manner which does not seem to imply that He regards himself as equal with God; thirdly, He acknowledges a limitation of knowledge; fourthly, He acknowledges a limitation of power; and, fifthly, He disclaims goodness in the sense in which it belongs to God, that is, in the sense of unchanging perfection. The reply which the older theology would have made to this argument, namely, that in the statements involved in the argument, Jesus speaks from the human side of His being, the divine side of it being meanwhile in abeyance, Professor Gilbert does not notice at all, probably because it involves the idea of a double consciousness which is inconsistent with the unity of person. The passages which have usually been relied upon as proving the proper deity of Jesus are gone through one by one, and declared to be insufficient for this purpose. The term *My Father*, it is said proves only an ethical, not a metaphysical oneness with God; for Jesus knew Himself to be a sinless man, and therefore in the most perfect sense the son of God. The term *Son of God* proves nothing, because of the wide difference in the use of that term. On one occasion when the Jews were offended by His claim to be the Son of God, He appealed in his own defence to the passage in Ps. 82:6: "I said, ye are gods, and all of you sons of the Most High." The utterances which speak of pre-existence have in view only an ideal pre-existence.

We make no criticism here either on the view presented or on the arguments by which it is supported. We say nothing either for or against the theory as set forth, but invite our readers to the thorough and critical study of the question involved. There are some points, however, which we regard as established. In the first place we hold that the *Christian* man must be free to go to the New Testament directly in the study of the subject. Secondly, we regard it settled that Jesus must be more than an ordinary man, even the greatest of human kind. He unquestionably regarded Himself as a sinless man. He believed Himself to

be the Messiah sent of God, the Head of the kingdom of God, the Judge of all men. He will sit upon His throne in the last day and will judge all nations. He accepted the homage and worship of His disciples. When He says, "Before Abraham was, I am," He projects His present personality into the remote past; and this seems to imply a conviction on His part that His Messianic personality is above time, and that His Messianic day is part of the eternal order of things. These are all points which Professor Gilbert would not dispute, and some of which he formally recognizes in this book. Jesus, then, is essentially what the Church has always believed Him to be. He is the *Divine Man*, in whom God is fully revealed, who could say, "He that hath seen me hath seen the Father," the Mediator between God and man, the Redeemer of the world, the center of the kingdom of God, and the Judge of quick and dead. Can we believe all this in regard to Him, and yet refuse to acknowledge Him as God in the absolute sense of that term? The majority of Christians would say, no; some of the most sincere Christian scholars say, yes. Let all study the question, and be persuaded in their own minds.

ULRIC THE JARL. *A Story of the Penitent Thief.* By William O. Stoddard. Pages 459. Price $1.50. Eaton & Mains, New York. 1899.

WINTER ADVENTURES OF THREE BOYS IN THE GREAT LONE LAND. By Egerton R. Young. Pages 377. Price $1.25. Eaton & Mains, New York. 1899.

Both these works belong to the department of fiction. They are well written, abound in thrilling incidents, are pervaded by Christian sentiment, and are just the kind of books that boys like to read. The former relates the story of a Norwegian jarl, or *earl*, who lived in the time of Christ. Like most of his countrymen at that time he was a pirate, who, after having ravaged the Mediterranean Sea for a time, and after having met with various adventures, at last lost his ship on the coast of Syria, landed in Galilea, drifted to Jerusalem, was arrested and happened to be one of the two thieves who were crucified with Jesus. The second volume mentioned above contains the story of three boys who spent a winter in the extreme north, where they lived most of the time in the society of Christian Indians and of dogs, and were engaged in hunting wild animals. The descriptions of northern scenery, of the nature and customs of Indians, and of the habits of wild animals, together with the relation of various adventures, make this a very interesting volume. Both these volumes are illustrated with a number of fine pictures. They are printed on the finest paper, in clear pica type, and nicely bound in cloth. They are evidently designed for young readers; but older readers also will enjoy them. They are the kind of literature which we believe ought to be in Sunday-school libraries. Not of the goody-goody kind, which were so popular a number of years ago, they are virile

in character, and healthy in moral and religious tone, and withal instructive. We would recommend these books to Sunday-school superintendents, and to parents who are collecting a family library. Young people will read fiction; and if they cannot get the kind of books which are published by Eaton & Mains, they are in danger of getting the publications which are low and degrading in their influence.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY. By Rev. A. Schade, Ph.D. Based upon the Works of Dr. R. Rocholl. Pages, 437. A. Schade, Publisher, 1134-1138 Pearl St., Cleveland, O. 1899.

This is a larger book than the number of pages would seem to imply. The pages are five and a half by eight inches in size, and are printed compactly in small type, the main part of the text being in bourgeois, the balance in minion, and the marginal notes, which are numerous, in pearl. In this way a vast amount of material is compressed in a comparatively small amount of space. The subject with which the work deals is certainly an interesting and important one. If it be true that "the proper study of mankind is man," and if man can only be known in his relation to the race both past and present, then history, and especially the philosophy of history, must become one of the most interesting branches of human knowledge. There was a time when history was supposed to mean merely a chronicle of kings and princes, and of their doings. He was the greatest historian who could tell most accurately the line of descent of royal families, the number and dates of their wars, and the manner of their court dress. In respectable institutions of learning that time is now past. We now want to know man and his progress. We now consult history in order to discover what man has done in the past, and how that past is related to the present—how human deeds and sufferings are related to each other, and to a divine plan which is being worked out in history, notwithstanding the fact that the individual man is a free agent and determines his own acts. Thus history must necessarily rise into the sphere of philosophy—the philosophy of history—and such a work we have in the book now under notice.

The work is divided into three books, the first treating of *Historics*, the second of the *Philosophy of History*, and the third of the *Dilemmas of Historics*. In the first book we have a discussion of the relation of history to the natural sciences, and of history to metaphysics; also of personal as distinguished from natural life, of man as the synthesis of matter and mind, and of the philosophy of history in its relation to unsatisfactory interpretations of history. In this book the author lays down the principles which are to be applied to the interpretation of history in the succeeding books. And it is perhaps a peculiarity of this author that he has no use for the doctrine of evolution, which is just now in so much favor in all departments of thought. He insists in

various ways, and we believe rightly, on the proposition that man is a *supernatural* being, whose origin and existence cannot be accounted for by a blind operation of the forces of nature; only we cannot see how this conflicts with the doctrine of evolution. Does not God make men now by evolution through the operation of secondary causes? And if He can make men in this way now, who are still supernatural beings, we do not see why he might not have made the first man in the same way.

We cannot do better, perhaps, in order to show both the philosophy and style of our author than to quote a few paragraphs on this subject of evolution: "Evolution in the progress of its affiliation or thought filtration and with dextrously manipulated wordings may conclude that everything organic is a mechanism. This is not what compels my organism to the reverse nerve-action of raising an objection. We enter protest for the simple reason that, taking such a view, the cognitions of type and design, *i. e.*, teleology, are condemned without trial.

"The doctrine of the purpose is not thus, on the sly, to be replaced by that of motion; we do uot allow this manner of killing the purpose by silence, or forcing it brevi manu out of recognition.

"The purpose has a claim as yet upon admittance to the discussion. Many investigators find a purpose inherent in everything, not for itself alone, but for everything besides. I surmise a purpose in Spencerian theories even, if they possess any value whatever. According to them, the development of the species is to be understood as caused solely by external conditions. Possibly organic life will be rendered equal to mechanical force. Yet this could not force us to relinquish our conviction that the first protoplasm must have been endowed with an immanent impulse, indicating some design and prompting the unfolding of that protoplasm in an appointed direction. We would not offer the least obstruction to motion as the constructive principle on that score," p. 10.

The second book, which forms much the larger bulk of the work, treats of the *philosophy of history* proper, in seven divisions. We can do no more than give the bare titles of these respective divisions. They are as follows: Great Pre-Historic substructure of history—polarities—first circle of nations—Turanians; second circle of nations—Aryans; third circle of nations—the Mediterranean basin; the divide of the times; third circle of nations—Rome's post-Augustan period; second circle of nations—Indo-Germans, Middle-ages; first and largest circle of nations—Turano-Mongolians. Under these divisions there occur numerous subdivisions and chapters, and altogether the table of contents is exceedingly rich. From this book we make a few quotations, as they will better show the character of the work than anything we could say about it. The first relates to the primitive man, and is as follows: "Preceding considerations of the theme of history induced us to symbolize our synopsis of man's natural appearance

by the figure of a pyramid resting with its base broadly upon the earth and its apex leaning against the sky. Equally descriptive will be the hollow ivory ball of the Chinese which contains a number of other involuted spheroid shells, and by which they symbolize their conception of the universe and of all that is going on in it. We may for once adopt the metaphor of three hollow, concentric or rather involuted spheroids of which the largest represents the astral, the narrower the mundane world, whilst the third and innermost represents man as the essence and center of both; or, what is equivalent to it, the historic world which is man unfolded, forms the third spheroid. We averred that man is the final and visible issue of both our spheroids, under the proviso that his spiritual essence belongs to still another world, which, invisibly, and from an innermost and central source, pervades, transcends, and embraces all our spheroids," p. 81. The following account is given of the nature of evil: "The Bad is now acknowledged as that which detached itself from the universal order and which in opposition to it, hides and seeks to maintain itself. Despite its subterfuges it stands convicted as something very real. It is unmasked as a power which unfolds itself and had no need of being especially revealed because it reveals, or rather betrays, itself in the sphere of personal life, and in the form of evils throws its shadows also upon nature. Its shadows are darkest in the portion of nature and of history which is nearest to its light and its crown. It is a power which presses so hard upon consciousness, and which leaves traces upon it and all pertaining to it so deep, that it cannot be laughed or sung away, nor stifled by ignoring it," p. 99.

The last book treats of the dilemmas of history. These are resolved in the logic of the Logos. We quote a few sentences on this point in conclusion: "When we firmly took our position in the middle of the times and with the personified universal reason of things, the Logos—we found in Him the empirical data of reality all explained. Issuing from Him the perversion of the world with the Infinite goes on. In Him as the chief of sufferers we found the real condition of the world to be such as to contain too much of that which ought not to be. In Him as the Risen One we saw the world in its real condition, as that which is adapted to undergo a metamorphosis and is designed for perfection, with respect to both the eternal-spiritual as well as the temporal-physical world. We found in the Logos the key which unlocked the mysteries and solved the inigmata of the natural and the historical, that is, the moral world," p. 436.

That we believe is excellent philosophy, and we agree with every word of it, provided we understand it. We have quoted pretty freely from this work in order to put the reader into a position to form his own judgment in regard to its merits. It must have cost its author an immense amount of labor, and no small amount of money; and we hope it may be a source of profit to him.

THE GREAT SINNERS OF THE BIBLE. By Louis Albert Banks, D.D. Pages 329. Price, $1.50. Eaton & Mains, New York. 1899.

This is a volume of sermons, twenty-eight in number, which were preached to Sunday evening congregations. The question of the Sunday evening service is a perplexing problem to many a Christian minister. People will not come to church. Church members, the "saints," generally think that they have "made sacrifice" enough if they have attended church on Sunday morning. They want to spend the evening in more agreeable society than that afforded by the church. This is true, especially of the great and rich saints, whose purple and fine linen would not show off to the same advantage in the evening as it does in the morning. The poor saints who have no such considerations to take into account, can more readily be gotten to join with the sinners and come to church on Sunday evening.

And this is the way in which the Rev. Dr. Banks solved the problem of the evening service in the First Methodist Episcopal Church of Cleveland, Ohio. In the morning he would preach to the saints for their comfort, and in the evening to the sinners for their conversion. We very seriously question the propriety of making such a distinction. Nevertheless, as to the manner of constructing these sermons, we believe that Dr. Banks is right. "My theory," he says, "is very simple. It is this: Men and women will not go to church very long, or very frequently, unless they are preached to. . . . On Sunday night I preach to sinners, as directly, and simply, and earnestly as I know how, and hundreds of them come to hear me every Sunday night." This is from the preface; and the succeeding sermons illustrate this principle of directness and simplicity. It is a question, however, whether the saints would not be equally benefited by the same kind of address. And we think Dr. Banks must be aware that the same kind of sinners, whom he describes in the last sermon, on *The Easter Conspiracy*, the men who run the city government, the boodlers and jobbers, who lie and steal and fatten upon the taxes paid by honest men, are to be found in the morning congregation as well as in that of the evening.

As showing Dr. Bank's theology we quote a paragraph from the first sermon, an *Eve's Dialogue with the Devil:* "It does not make the least difference to us whether this dialogue between Eve and the serpent is a literal historical occurrence or whether it is a poetical portrayal of the drama by which sin became a dark and real fact in human life. Its message to us is exactly the same in either case. One thing is sure, the picture is true to life, and it is full of graphic illustrations, valuable to the men and women who are living now, and upon whom the devil is making attacks as subtle and deceitful as those by which he accomplished the overthrow of Eve." That we believe is wise.